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Abstract 
Graphical One-Time Password Authentication 
HUSSAIN S. ALSAIARI (MSc) 
Complying with a security policy often requires users to create long and complex 
passwords to protect their accounts. However, remembering such passwords appears 
difficult for many and may lead to insecure practices, such as choosing weak passwords 
or writing them down. One-Time Passwords (OTPs) aim to overcome such problems; 
however, most implemented OTP techniques require special hardware, which not only 
adds costs, but also raises issues regarding availability. This type of authentication 
mechanism is mostly adopted by online banking systems to secure their clients’ accounts. 
However, carrying around authentication tokens was found to be an inconvenient 
experience for many customers. Not only the inconvenience, but if the token was 
unavailable, for any reason, this would prevent customers from accessing their accounts 
securely. 
In contrast, there is the potential to use graphical passwords as an alternative 
authentication mechanism designed to aid memorability and ease of use. The idea of this 
research is to combine the usability of recognition-based and draw-based graphical 
passwords with the security of OTP. A new multi-level user-authentication solution 
known as: Graphical One-Time Password (GOTPass) was proposed and empirically 
evaluated in terms of usability and security aspects.  
The usability experiment was conducted during three separate sessions, which took place 
over five weeks, to assess the efficiency, effectiveness, memorability and user satisfaction 
of the new scheme. The results showed that users were able to easily create and enter their 
credentials as well as remember them over time. Eighty-one participants carried out a 
total of 1,302 login attempts with a 93% success rate and an average login time of 24.5 
seconds.  
With regard to the security evaluation, the research simulated three common types of 
graphical password attacks (guessing, intersection, and shoulder-surfing). The 
participants’ task was to act as attackers to try to break into the system. The GOTPass 
scheme showed a high resistance capability against the attacks, as only 3.3% of the 690 
total attempts succeeded in compromising the system.
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Introduction   
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In today’s globalised digital life, services over the Internet have evolved rapidly, and they 
now play an essential role in fulfilling people’s daily needs. With the ever increasing 
dependency on computers and digital information, the task of keeping people’s data 
secure is of the utmost importance. As a matter of fact, information assets are crucial to 
the interests of both individuals and organisations. Thus, data must be protected and 
unauthorised access prevented in order to hinder data manipulation and theft. One 
significant way to achieve the required sort of protection is through authentication, which 
verifies the identity of the claiming user. However, it is often a challenge to make 
authentication systems both secure and usable, since a trade-off between these two 
necessary requirements often occurs.  
The traditional text-based password is the foremost knowledge-based authentication 
method and the primary form of user authentication to date (De Angeli et al., 2005) (Fu 
et al., 2001). While many techniques are used to secure passwords (Pinkas & Sander, 
2002), most are insufficient in the face of attackers’ tools (Chakrabarti & Singbal, 2007) 
(AuthenticationWorld.com, 2012). Yet, the text-based password system is widely used 
despite its well-recognised deficiencies, which affect both usability and security (Dhamija 
& Perrig, 2000) (Xiaoyuan, Ying & Owen, 2005). The difficulty of remembering strong, 
complex passwords is one of the fundamental problems that users encounter, leading 
them to choose weaker passwords or to adopt insecure behaviours (Dhamija & Perrig, 
2000) (Por et al., 2008) (Xiaoyuan, Ying & Owen, 2005). Another major issue with 
textual password authentication is its susceptibility to credential theft (Dhamija & Perrig, 
2000).  
Due to the aforementioned shortcomings of the traditional textual authentication method, 
the need for alternatives has emerged. Consequently, a diverse range of alternative 
technologies have been proposed to replace the text-based password, such as biometrics, 
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security tokens, OTPs and cognitive passwords. Nonetheless, it is expected that each 
alternative has its own weaknesses and strengths. The graphical password is among the 
most promising alternative proposals and occupies an important position within user-
authentication research (Ray, 2012).  
 
1.1 Motivations  
As time passes, and with the accelerated pace of technology development, the use of the 
traditional form of authentication (i.e. textual password) is no longer sufficient to fulfil 
the increasing demand for a secure, usable authentication mechanism to protect users’ 
accounts. Thus, an alternative authentication technique which has less of a burden on 
human memory is always sought after. For this reason, the idea of utilising images either 
by recognition or easy recall, has gained an increased research interest. 
One field that has benefited from the evolution of the Internet is the financial industry. 
The opportunity to provide clients with a range of electronic services that are available 
anywhere and anytime over the Internet has been an area of growing interest for financial 
institutions. A vital requirement of online systems, particularly for financial firms, is to 
grant access to legitimate users only while preventing others from gaining unauthorised 
access. In order to achieve this in the online banking systems, various types of 
authentication mechanisms have been implemented (e.g. textual username and password, 
OTP security token and OTP via SMS). In addition, a combination of multiple 
authentication methods is mostly used in such a critical environment as a way to safeguard 
the systems from any potential fraud. However, that does not guarantee the optimal 
security and usability of the Internet banking system. For example, the use of security 
tokens to generate an OTP could add a significant degree of security; however, in practice, 
carrying around a token (or more) can be inconvenient experience for clients, and 
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forgetting/losing the token can be even worse, since it is impossible to gain authentication 
without the token. Thus, extending the investigation into this crucial area is needed in 
order to discover more about the limitations of the authentication techniques of the current 
system and, consequently, propose a suitable alternative solution to overcome the main 
security/usability issues. One potential solution can be through the use of graphical 
password as it does not require a device or phone connectivity to operate.  
This research has made use of the online banking context to explore the security, usability 
and user convenience of an alternative authentication mechanism that depends on the 
utilisation of various graphics. 
 
1.2 Aims and objectives of the research  
The research aims to establish a tokenless graphical authentication system capable of 
generating one-time passwords without complexity or dependency on devices as a 
prospective alternative authentication solution. Thus, this research focuses entirely on 
graphical password authentication as a key potential alternative to the traditional 
authentication method. The objectives of the research are outlined as follows: 
• Review the common user-authentication mechanisms to highlight their strengths 
and weaknesses, and then conduct a comprehensive review of graphical password 
schemes to explore their characteristics in an attempt to find an opportunity for 
enhancement. 
• Assess the authentication mechanisms offered by online banking systems to 
explore the authentication limitations, and then investigate the users’ perceptions 
of the idea of carrying around multiple authentication tokens and how they 
perceive the adoption of the graphical password method as an alternative 
authentication method to protect their accounts.      
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• Design and develop a novel authentication scheme and then empirically evaluate 
its security and usability. 
• Investigate the users’ perceptions of the security and usability aspects of the new 
proposed authentication scheme.      
 
The aim of the novel authentication scheme is to tackle some of the main issues with the 
earlier authentication proposals, including the following issues:   
• Low memorability for secure passwords.  
• The need for an additional device to generate or receive OTPs.  
• Susceptibility to guessing and observation attacks.  
• Exploiting the recognition feature of visual -based schemes.  
These issues are included in the literature that will be discussed later in this thesis, as they 
are some of the main issues facing alternative authentication techniques. 
 
Of great value to the information security would be to propose and develop a graphical 
authentication scheme with the security capability and adequate usability to serve the 
purpose of securing critical systems, such as the online banking system. The proposed 
scheme should then undergo intensive evaluations including security and usability aspects 
to ensure its suitability for such a system.   
 
1.3 Research outcomes and contributions  
A summary of the main contributions of this research is listed below: 
• Suggest a new data-entry classification within the field of graphical authentication 
that utilises keyboard-typing entry as a way to submit the secrets and add some 
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distinguishing classification details, involving several design aspects, such as 
input approach and display style, to enable better representation. 
• Develop a hybrid multi-layer authentication system, combining several graphical 
password methods along with one-time password technique (draw-based, 
recognition-based and OTP). Figure 1-1 illustrates a summary of the main 
contribution of the proposed authentication solution. 
• Employ a dynamic one-time password combination obtained through a multi-step 
graphical password. 
• Implement a web-based 4×4 unlock pattern to provide an effective proactive 
protection. 
• Reduce the selection of hot-images by using system-assigned themes along with 
a user-chosen images approach. 
• Evaluate the security of a hybrid graphical authentication by utilising two 
methods: theoretical and empirical.  
 
 
Figure 1-1: Overview of the contribution of the proposed solution  
 
Part of the research work presented in this thesis has already been published in several 
peer-reviewed publications as enumerated below:  
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• Graphical One-Time Password (GOTPass): A Usability Evaluation. Information 
Security Journal: A Global Perspective, May 2016, pp. 1–15. 
• Secure Graphical One Time Password (GOTPass): An Empirical 
Study. Information Security Journal: A Global Perspective, 24(4-6), December 
2015, pp. 207–220. 
• Alternative Graphical Authentication for Online Banking Environments. 
In HAISA, 2014, pp. 122–136. 
• A Review of Graphical Authentication Utilising a Keypad Input Method. In 
Proceedings of the Eighth Saudi Students Conference in the UK, February 
2016, pp. 359–374. 
The researcher was the corresponding author in the above-listed publications. For a full-
text copy of each publication, please refer to Appendix G. 
 
1.4 Structure of the thesis   
The remainder of the main body of the thesis is organised into seven further chapters as 
summarised below.  
Chapter 2 provides a general overview of the user-authentication domain, starting with 
the threats to authentication, classification, various enhancement implementations, 
textual password issues and, finally, highlighting the need for alternative authentication 
and the requirements of such alternatives. 
Chapter 3 introduces the notion of graphical authentication by reviewing the main 
schemes under different categories. A comparative summary of each category is also 
provided. Moreover, the applicability of one-time password to graphical authentication is 
discussed. This chapter also highlights password space and entropy and then concludes 
by outlining the issues associated with, and the vulnerabilities of graphical authentication. 
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Chapter 4 begins with an overview of authentication in the online banking environment. 
It then addresses the limitations of the current authentication in this field and finally 
reports the details of the preliminary research survey that seek the users’ perception of 
the online banking authentication and the extent of accepting a graphical password as an 
alternative authentication.   
In Chapter 5, the new enhanced method (GOTPass) is described in details; including the 
design and development. It also explains the process flaw of the registration and 
authentication tasks, in addition to the explanation of each component of the system. 
Moreover, the characteristics and advantages of the proposed system are presented. 
The main focus of the sixth chapter is to report the result of the conducted experiment to 
evaluate the usability of the GOTPass scheme as well as the analysis of the outcomes. 
The usability experiment shows the performance stages that were carried out over several 
time periods with certain evaluation conditions, to ensure sufficient data was gathered for 
a reliable investigation.    
Chapter 7 elaborates on the security aspects of the new proposal. At the beginning of the 
chapter security concerns and threats are outlined, then the security features of the 
GOTPass scheme are presented, followed by a detailed demonstration of various security 
evaluation approaches. The results of the evaluations are analysed and discussed, before 
closing the chapter with the presentation of the supplementary security study and its 
outcomes.  
The final chapter concludes by summarising the major research findings and 
achievements reported in this thesis along with the research limitations and future work 
opportunities. 
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2 Chapter Two 
User Authentication 
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2.1 Introduction 
As the previous chapter introduced the importance of the Internet security and 
authenticating users to systems in particular, now this chapter generally takes us through 
user authentication methods to explore some of their advantages and disadvantages as 
well as the related threats. In addition, the last section will talk about the requirements of 
alternative authentication techniques.    
With the global evolution of the Internet-based information services, more platforms have 
been connected, not only the traditional computers but also smartphones, wearables, 
gaming consoles, Internet of things (IoT) and even smart cars. This has created enormous 
networks interconnected globally and increased the requirement for the accessibility and 
availability of information. In such cyber era, the entity (possibly a friend, a machine, or 
an attacker) on the other end of a remote connected network cannot be seen and thus 
difficult to be verified. There is always a concern to keep the sensitive information, that 
is exchanged online, private and protected from attackers who are not required to be 
physically presented to breach the data.  
One of the Internet activities that is growing fast and gaining popularity is the online 
banking services which facilitate many of the customers’ banking tasks. With that 
widespread growth in the online banking services and usage worldwide, threats and 
vulnerabilities are also on the rise. Hackers and fraudsters are attracted by the illegal 
financial gain (Ortiz, 2007) which expose online banking to numerous threats. Therefore, 
banks have to undertake strong security countermeasures to protect their customers from 
those adversaries with malicious intentions who always develop means to be at least one 
step ahead of their targets (Sule, 2013). 
Thus, the need for more robust safeguards and system security to protect the resources 
and services of the connected users has become a vital requirement. A fundamental 
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security measure for computer systems and services is to accurately allow access for 
legitimate users while preventing others from gaining unauthorised access. Therefore, 
researchers have been interested in developing various types of authentication 
mechanisms including textual password enhancements, token-based and biometrics 
authentications. Authentication is a key aspect of the access control system that lies at the 
core of information security importance (Anderson, 2010a). Before a user can access a 
certain system, they must identify themselves through the presentation of their credentials 
which is known as the identification step (Meyer, 2007). Then, the process of granting 
access to the system begins with authenticating people to that system, which in turn 
proves that the requester is who s/he claims to be and then determines whether access is 
permitted or not. This is followed by the authorisation operation where privilege controls 
are applied to link access rights with specific system resources. Although authentication 
and authorisation are tightly bound, it is important to note that they are two distinct 
mechanisms. Due to this close correlation, authentication and authorisation are sometimes 
wrongly considered as one method (Rescorla & Lebovitz, 2010). Authentication is the 
first step in the access control process, and it will remain the main concern throughout 
this research. 
 
2.2 Common authentication-related threats  
According to the First Half Review of 2015 breach level index originated by Gemalto, 
identity theft was the leading type of data breach accountable for 53% of the total attacks 
and almost 75% of compromised data records. Furthermore, most of the highest severity 
data breaches were caused by identity theft-based attacks. The report also indicated that 
the first step towards mitigating the overall consequences caused by a security breach is 
through controlling access and authentication of users (Gemalto, 2015).  
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Security attacks can be categorised into human-based and technology-based attacks. In 
the human-based attacks, the attacker interacts with the victim who possesses valuable 
information (e.g. social engineering attacks), whereas in the technology-based attacks, 
confidential information is accessed by employing other non-interactive means (e.g. 
phishing emails) (Luo et al., 2011). 
Various types of threats are exploited to breach data such as phishing, spyware/keylogger, 
guessing credentials, eavesdropping, and social engineering. Regardless of the attack 
type, attackers have one unified goal that is stealing secret information to gain an 
unauthorised access. The following subsections present a brief overview of some of these 
threats classes.   
2.2.1 Phishing 
Phishing attacks build a counterfeit website, which apparently looks legitimate with all 
official graphics and logos, to fool victims to submit confidential, personal and financial 
information. The phishing scam is then distributed via e-mail or other electronic means 
to reach as many users as possible. 
2.2.2 Social engineering 
A social engineering attack is used to manipulate legitimate users by tricking them into 
performing insecure practices such as revealing personal/account information. The 
common methods used in this attack is telephone calls or Internet. 
2.2.3 Dictionary attack 
A dictionary attack is based on searching a large number of possibilities to determine the 
correct password. The dictionary is typically built from a list of words that are most likely 
to succeed. In contrast, a brute force attack uses an exhaustive search to try all possible 
combinations of password’s characters. 
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2.2.4 Spying 
Tracing users’ activities in a computer system is achieved by using a variety of spying 
techniques. The first of these is physical observation, which is usually referred to as 
shoulder-surfing. This simply involves watching victims during authentication to obtain 
their passwords. Second, is the so-called spyware, which is an electronic form of software 
spying that is designed to run silently in the background to observe, collect and log the 
actions of a victim’s system. Keystrokes, screenshots and the interactions of a user can 
be all recorded through spyware. An important use of such attack on compromised 
devices is to capture payment card information and user’s sensitive data. One way of 
defending against spying is through the implementation of encryption to secure the 
communication and transmission of data (Gordon, 2005).  
2.2.5 Guessing 
Users often tend to choose easy to guess passwords, including things like first or last 
name, family member name, special date or even trivially the word ‘password’. 
Attempting to guess several likely values might eventually lead the attacker to succeed 
and break into the system. Password guessing attempts can be controlled by applying 
account lockout mechanisms, which lock out access to the vulnerable account for a certain 
amount of time when a number of failed login attempts is exceeded (Federal Financial 
Institutions Examination Council  'FFIEC', 2006). 
2.2.6 Eavesdropping  
Eavesdropping is a type of attack in which users’ credentials are stolen through listening 
to the communication channel between the client and the requested system in order to 
record login information in transit. As a result, the valid but stolen credential allows 
attackers to gain access to the target system or device. Therefore, users must protect their 
accounts by accessing them over an encrypted connection that utilises a cryptographic 
protocol such as SSL or TLS (Smetters & Jacobson, 2009).   
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2.3 Categorisation of user authentication  
One of the key research areas in the field of information security is user authentication, 
which is mainly concerned with the approach of authenticating people to systems. The 
main authentication methods can be simply formulated as “Something we know”, like 
passwords, “Something we have”, such as Smart/ATM cards, or “Something we are”, 
such as biometrics (Stamp, 2011). In addition, there are other categories which can be 
involved into this taxonomy; “Something we do”, such as access point push button (WPS) 
(Stamp, 2011), “Somewhere we are in”, like the Cellular Network Based Positioning 
(Kuseler & Lami, 2012), which can be used to verify or challenge a claimed identity. The 
latter categories can mitigate risks but do not directly enhance the authentication 
assurance level (Burr et al., 2013). The main authentication methods can act either alone 
or in collaboration with others. Combining more than one authentication method is called 
“Multi-factor authentication”, and this is said to produce an enhanced authentication 
mechanism and improve system security (will be further discussed later in subsection 
2.4.1). 
The following subsections will discuss the three main categories and then will be followed 
by outlines of some major authentication implementations.  
 
2.3.1 Knowledge-based authentication – KBA (Secret) 
Knowledge-based authentication relies on some secret information known only to the 
user.  This authentication mechanism can be provided in different formats, one of which 
is a username and its associated password. Graphical password is another branch of the 
KBA as well. The process of knowledge-based authentication involves different parties 
mainly the Claimant: the applicant to be authenticated, and the Verifier: the party to verify 
the identity of the claimant. When a claimant provides the correct identity information to 
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a verifier through an authentication protocol, the verifier validates the credential and 
asserts the claimant identity (Burr et al., 2013). 
As a matter of fact, KBA is the most common and widely used authentication method 
since it includes the textual password (Dhamija & Perrig, 2000). The text-based scheme 
occupies an advanced position within the users’ interest in spite of its well-known 
drawbacks (Xiaoyuan, Ying & Owen, 2005). There are several factors that help the 
knowledge-based authentication to dominant such as the inexpensive and easy 
implementation and scalability as well as the vast user familiarity (Zippy & Moshe, 2009). 
In addition, knowledge-based authentication and in particular text-based password can 
provide other significant advantages such as cross device, ease of entry and accessibility 
(Kessler, 1996).   
 
2.3.2 Attribute-based authentication (Biometric) 
The uniqueness of human attributes of a specific user is the characteristic of the attribute-
based authentication. A human body biometric is a feature that can be distinguished to be 
utilised for user authentication based on “who you are” (O'Gorman, 2003). A biometric 
authentication system usually operates by obtaining biometric data from a user, extract a 
feature set, and then compare it against the stored template set in the database. There are 
two operational modes for a biometric system; verification or identification. The 
verification mode – determines whether the claiming identity is true or not by conducting 
one-to-one comparison whereas in the identification mode – the system carries out a one-
to-many comparison to identify a user which means searching for a match among all users’ 
templates in the database (Jain, Ross & Prabhakar, 2004). A practical biometric system 
should meet the performance requirements; accuracy, speed and resources. In addition, it 
should also be harmless and acceptable to the users besides being sufficiently resistant to 
various fraudulent methods and attacks (Jain, Ross & Prabhakar, 2004). Biometric 
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features can be categorised as physical or behavioural as illustrated in Figure 2-1 (Jain, 
Ross & Nandakumar, 2011). 
 
Figure 2-1: Biometric classifications  (Gibson, 2011) 
According to Jain, Ross & Prabhakar, (2004), any human physiological or behavioral 
characteristic should satisfy certain requirements in order to be used as a biometric 
characteristic. These requirements are enumerated as follows: 
• Universality: the characteristic should be in each person. 
• Distinctiveness: the characteristic should be sufficiently different for any two persons. 
• Permanence: the characteristic should be sufficiently unchangeable over the time. 
• Collectability: the characteristic should be quantitatively measurable. 
 
Physical features are based on the stable body including fingerprints, the eye (iris and 
retina), the face and hands, whilst behavioural features are based on learned movements, 
such as a handwritten signature, keyboard typing (keystroke) and the way of walking 
(gait). The ability to link the authentication information to its owner is an interesting 
property of biometrics that passwords and tokens lack since they can be lent or stolen. 
However, gaining unauthorised access to a security system operated by biometric is not 
infeasible since biometric features can be copied or counterfeited with different levels of 
difficulty. In such cases, it is impossible for the legitimate user to revoke the stolen 
biometric and request a replacement. Moreover, another frustrating issue is the output 
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errors, where users are refused access to the system because of a device fault. Similarly, 
another permission-related problem is the rate of the False Positives (where illegitimate 
user is falsely granted access) and False Negatives (where the legitimate user is falsely 
denied access). The need for a capture device to enter the biometric information along 
with the associated cost of such hardware might prevent this authentication mechanism 
from being widely used (O'Gorman, 2003) (Renaud, 2004).  
 
In the case of the recent biometrically-enabled mobile devices that are equipped with 
various integrated biometric sensors such as fingerprint, manufacturers ensure that the 
biometric template is securely stored into the user’s device. However, securing services 
other than the device unlock utilising fingerprint biometric may require allowing third 
party to access the fingerprint sensor which in turn raise the privacy concern of the users 
(Goode, 2014). Ivor Lewis stated that “Despite this rigorous process, public perception 
of risk is actually often the biggest hurdle and suspicion that fingerprints can be stolen 
and reused persists” (Lewis, 2014).  
The device usage is also utilised by the continuous transparent authentication to extract 
characteristic and measureable patterns that can be collected from most mobile device 
users without requiring specific action. Gathering such patterns can be through common 
tasks like email composition and phone calls that help to determine the ownership of the 
mobile device for that user. This type of authentication is carried out transparently as no 
explicit interaction is required from the user. In addition, it is a continuous authentication 
since it runs dynamically in the background in response to certain user actions (Crawford, 
Renaud & Storer, 2013).  
One of the disadvantages of using the integrated biometrics on mobile devices for user’s 
authentication is that it is being tied down to the mobile device, besides targeting a 
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specific platform (mobile) only and not universally usable across different platforms such 
as web-based application on a desktop or laptop. Furthermore, a demonstration of a fake 
finger fooling a smartphone's fingerprint sensor was undertaken at the Mobile World 
Congress tech show. In relation to that, the BBC was told that fingers made of modelling 
clay can fool lower-resolution sensors (BBC, 2016). Another obstacle that face the 
reliance on mobile phone for sensitive tasks including authentication is the mobile theft. 
According to the Crime Survey for England and Wales, there were 538,000 victims of 
mobile phone theft between 2014 and 2015 (Office for National Statistics, 2015). The 
Home Secretary Theresa May said: “However, the level of mobile phone theft remains a 
concern and people are increasingly carrying their lives in their pockets, with bank 
details, emails and other sensitive personal information easily accessible through mobile 
phones.” (Home Office and The Rt Hon Theresa May MP, 2014). 
 
2.3.3 Possession-based authentication (Token) 
This authentication type is characterised by the physical possessing of objects to indicate 
the identity or eligibility of a user to access the system. This kind of devices is commonly 
referred to as a token including USB token devices, smart cards and active password-
generating security tokens (O'Gorman, 2003). Rather than depending on human memory, 
this sort of authentication mechanism relies mainly on carrying a token and proving its 
ownership as an essential part of the entire authentication process. Various types of token 
devices are generally temper-resistant that makes it difficult to duplicate and manipulate 
(Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council, 2011). Still, tokens can be used 
illegally by sharing them with others (Ratha, Connell & Bolle, 2001). The need for 
additional hardware readers or software drivers is the primary disadvantage of such an 
authentication mechanism. Furthermore, the inconvenience and high cost associated with 
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the hardware tokens, when compared to a textual password, are other disadvantages of 
this kind of authentication technique (O'Gorman, 2003). 
Recently, mobile phones were proposed to be used for authentication that can fall under 
different categories depending on the purpose of use, which will be discussed in 
subsections (Error! Reference source not found.) (Error! Reference source not 
found.).   
 
2.4 Implementations of authentication 
Having discussed the different authentication classifications in the previous section, this 
section reviews the major authentication implementations that fall into these categories 
such as multi-factor and one-time authentication techniques. 
2.4.1 Multi-factor authentication (M-FA) 
Any composite authentication mechanism derived from more than one form of identity 
verification (any combination of the authentication factors: Knowledge-based, 
Possession-based, or Attribute-based) is called “Multi-factor authentication”. In general, 
multi-factor authentication is usually employed to enhance the security of the common 
text-based password. However, using several authentication factors improves the security 
but may complicates the process of authentication (Sabzevar & Stavrou, 2008). 
Implementing multi-factor authentication makes the system more secure since a 
successful attack would need an extra means of authentication rather than merely the 
details of the user’s credentials. This should result in reducing the impact of Internet 
identity theft and phishing attack (SecurEnvoy, 2013a). The condition to form a strong 
multi-factor authentication is to ensure that at least one of the factors is not reusable, 
replicable, nor easily stolen online (European Central Bank, 2013). It is also 
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recommended to physically separate one of the factors from the device accessing the 
system to increase the effectiveness (The Defence Signals Directorate, 2014).   
A layered authentication is another variation that verifies the identity of a user through 
multiple layers of authentication. These layers involve more than one authentication 
technique derived from the same category i.e. password and passphrase (knowledge-
based), fingerprint and retina scans (attribute-based) (Sollie, 2005). The key aspect is to 
ensure that the combinations among a particular authentication factor are distinct and not 
the same. In practice, several UK banks still support multi-layer authentication by 
implementing more than one text-based credentials (Just & Aspinall, 2012). 
Multi-factor mechanism is the required implementation to comply with the Federal 
Financial Institutions Examination Council (FFIEC) authentication guidance to safeguard 
sensitive systems (Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council, 2011). Although 
multi-layer authentication provides less security compared to multi-factor (Al 
Abdulwahid et al., 2015), but still can increase the level of assurance since a successful 
authentication will require resolving several secrets. 
 
2.4.2 One-Time-Password (OTP) 
In crucial systems, such as those found in financial organisations, robust security is 
constantly demanded. One of the solutions to meeting that goal is through the 
implementation of One-Time-Password approach. The key idea of OTP is to encode the 
password for a single use, producing a unique password for each login session or 
transaction. In other words, the user will end up using different dynamic passwords in 
each login trial. Interestingly, illegitimate obtainment of OTP should be of no use to 
attackers in generating any further encoded passwords. Thus, an already used OTP would 
be totally unusable for upcoming login attempts since OTP loses its validity (expire and 
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discard) after first use. As a result, OTP systems are protected against replay attacks 
(Rubin, 1996) (McDonald, Atkinson & Metz, 1995). 
The operation of OTP involves two main processes: OTP generation and OTP delivery. 
First, the generation of OTP is achievable through a number of approaches mainly 
mathematical (e.g. previous password-based algorithm or challenge-based algorithm) or 
based on time-synchronisation (valid for a limited time only) (Ortiz, 2007). Next, comes 
the delivery of the generated OTP to clients which represents how the end user receives 
and views the OTP. Several approaches have been used to fulfil this operation 
requirement, such as hardware (proprietary tokens, mobile phones), text messaging, 
image-based methods or paper-based (codebooks) (Bonneau et al., 2012). These mediums 
are not free of shortcomings, for instance, the hardware-based approach is expensive to 
implement and maintain, besides being burdensome to users (to carry around, exposure 
to loss/damage) (Khot, Kumaraguru & Srinathan, 2012). Whereas, the paper-based 
approach is cheap but vulnerable due to the possibility of it falling into unauthorised 
hands or captured by a camera (Bonneau et al., 2012). Mainly, One-Time Password 
mitigates the problems related to the poor choice of passwords, however, the reliance on 
additional hardware or special software decreases its availability and thus limits its wide 
deployment. Also, the synchronisation between the client and server can possibly get out 
of synch which requires intervention for resynchronisation (Renaud, 2004).    
There are various types of one-time password technique, which are outlined next.  
 
i. Token-based OTP  
One of the important factors that usually forms part of a multi-factor implementation is 
the hardware tokens which are physical devices used to authenticate users by generating 
random numerical codes. The device is equipped with a small screen on one side to 
display the generated code. As a consequence of using this type of technique, crackers 
and keyloggers are avoided and password sharing is prevented. However, lending the 
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device or sharing it with others is still possible. One downside of such a method is the 
incurred cost which was further classified by (Grand, 2001) into different stages; 
Immediate cost (initial purchasing and deployment), Support/Maintenance cost (on-
going), and Remediation cost (e.g., revoking and reissuing of hardware token).    
Another drawback of using a hardware token is the process of issuing a new token or 
reissuing a replacement, which can be slow as it needs to be ordered and prepared 
specifically for each user, which in turn delays gaining access to the user’s own data. In 
addition, although the small size of the token is appreciated but at the same time it exposes 
the token to be easily lost or forgotten (SecurEnvoy, 2013a). According to (Levy, 2011), 
the time when most people forget to carry their devices is when they need them most, 
such as while travelling. 
ii. Non-Hardware-Based OTP (Tokenless) 
Non-Hardware-Based aka ‘Tokenless’ authentication usually plays a part of two-factor 
authentication which was proposed to resolve the hardware token problems by utilising, 
for instance, mobile phone devices via an SMS service or mobile software. In some 
applications, OTP can be generated by an installable software either on the user’s 
computer, smartphone or tablet. RSA SecurID Software Tokens (EMC, 2015) and Google 
Authenticator (Google, 2015) are examples of this type of technology that are also called 
software token (soft-token).  
This form of authentication can usually be accomplished using the existing infrastructure 
with no much additional requirements, such as software, hardware or devices (Meyer, 
2007). The use of individual’s mobile phone is said to be an advantage since such device 
is supposed to be carried around with the user all time in contrast to the token-based 
solutions. However, losing the registered mobile phone is possible which is considered a 
drawback that may cause a distressful experience for the users to access their account 
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(Borgohain et al., 2015). Nonetheless, since a hard-token is not often in frequent use, 
users are unlikely to miss it if stolen or lost until they need to use it again, whereas a 
missing mobile phone would usually be noticed shortly (SecurEnvoy, 2013b).  
Although using an SMS service to deliver the one-time password to the user provides 
strong authentication, but it is not broadly popular due to the high implementation cost, 
user experience (e.g. poor network signalling coverage, latency of message delivery, and 
longevity of the phone battery) (Borgohain et al., 2015). In addition, SMS OTPs are 
limited in terms of their inability to provide in-app or in-browser authentication as well 
as the lack of support for non-SIM based smart devices, such as tablets, notebooks and 
laptops (ENCAP, 2012).  
The flexibility and lower cost of the non-hardware techniques make them more appealing 
than hardware-based solutions. On the other hand, they are vulnerable to malware and 
keylogger attacks as well as visual spoofing attacks (Meyer, 2007). 
 
Token and tokenless OTP techniques utilise an out-of-band transmission approach where 
a different channel than the one initiated by the user (e.g. token, mobile application, SMS, 
e-mail, or phone call) is used to deliver the generated OTP. Separating channels adds an 
extra security layer to complicate the task of the attacker as a successful attack would 
involve intercepting both channels (StrikeForce Technologies Inc., 2015). However, one 
way an attacker may use to bypass the out-of-band authentication is by attempting to 
change the registered phone number on the customer's account with the attacker’s own 
phone number (Rouse, 2014). In addition, out-of-band technique is prone to man-in-the-
middle attacks that target the user’s browsers (man-in-the-browser - MITB) or mobile 
phones. This type of embedded Trojan can intercept and manipulate messages while in 
transit (Sule, 2013).  
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Still some people may argue that the use of out-of-band technique complicates the 
authentication process since these systems require the user to look somewhere else, other 
than the current screen, to complete the authentication request. For example, the user may 
need to use a hardware-token, mobile phone, or home phone to receive a code or answer 
a voice prompt. 
Another way to deliver the OTP is through the use of an in-band channel authentication. 
In this method, the system utilises the same channel to initiate the authentication request 
and deliver the code, for instance, using the browser to accomplish such tasks. However, 
although this method appears easy to implement and use, but it does not seem to provide 
the same security level as that offered by the out-of-band channel due to its vulnerability 
to malware that can capture important data on that single channel.    
iii. Graphic-based OTP 
The human ability to recognise and recall images has made it possible to utilise images 
or drawings to authenticate users to computers. In addition, this idea has been extended 
to use image recognition to provide OTP. Several techniques have been proposed, 
including various graphic-based methods to generate OTP (ConfidentTech, 2012) 
(CRYPTOCard Inc, 2010b) (Gupta et al., 2012) (Ku et al., 2013), and these will be 
reviewed later in the next chapter. 
 
Table 2-1 gathers and summarises the advantages and disadvantages of the main 
commonly used OTP techniques. 
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Type of OTP 
technique 
Pros Cons 
T
o
k
en
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d
 
Hard-Token 
(Hardware) 
Safe against keylogger. High cost. 
Inconvenient to carry multiple tokens. 
Slow process of issuing /replacing tokens. 
Easily lost or forgotten due to small size.  
T
o
k
en
le
ss
 
Soft-Token 
(Software) 
Use existing 
infrastructure. 
Vulnerable to malware, keylogger. 
(SMS) 
Use existing devices. 
Phones are tied to user, 
so quickly discovered 
when missing. 
Affected by poor cellular network. 
Delay of message delivery. 
Lack of in-browser authentication. 
No support for non-SIM based devices. 
Table 2-1: Comparison between OTP techniques  
2.4.3 Other implementations 
Attempts to enhance and strengthen user authentication are continuing and evolving to 
meet the changing needs of the end users. Recently, a ‘One Touch Authentication’ 
technique has been launched (Swivel Secure, 2014) (AuthShield, 2015). The concept of 
this technique is to exempt the user from re-entering the authentication code. Instead, 
users will receive the authentication request through a ‘push’ notification on their 
smartphones or desktop. The notification contains two options at a click of a button; 
‘approve’ to accept the authentication or ‘deny’ to reject it.  
 
2.5 Issues with the conventional Text-based authentication 
Despite the fact that text-based authentication being widely used, it is well-known for 
deficiencies that affect both usability and security (Dhamija & Perrig, 2000) (Xiaoyuan, 
Ying & Owen, 2005). One of the main problems with textual passwords is the difficulty 
to comply with the security policy for authentication, such as remembering strong 
complex passwords, which leads to increase user’s tendency to choose weak passwords. 
Although easy to remember passwords are often simple or meaningful, at the same time 
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they are vulnerable to attack since they can be easily guessed or cracked. On the other 
hand, long or arbitrarily chosen passwords seem secure and are thus hard to guess or crack 
but are often difficult to remember. The limitation of human memory to remember secure 
passwords has led to the adoption of other insecure behaviours, such as writing passwords 
down or using the same password for multiple accounts. Although the password 
memorability is deemed as a significant problem, but in fact there are other factors that 
make remembering passwords a lot more difficult such as the number of passwords to 
remember and the complexity of rules (Adams & Sasse, 1999). Furthermore, the 
possibility to share passwords with others is also considered a problem as the password 
is then no longer secret (Dhamija & Perrig, 2000) (O'Gorman, 2003). Another major issue 
with password authentication is the credential theft, which makes use of different 
intelligent techniques to acquire victims credentials (Balfanz et al., 2012). 
 
2.6 The need for alternative authentications 
The most common cause of system break-ins is a weak password, nevertheless, text-based 
authentication is still predominant (Dhamija & Perrig, 2000). A number of solutions to 
strengthen the text-based password and to overcome the flaws of weak passwords have 
been proposed. Nonetheless, the majority of these solutions fall into three main 
categories. The first is known as proactive security measures, and this aims to identify 
and prevent weak passwords by running password checker programs in advance of them 
getting broken. The second is based on the technical capability to intensively increase the 
computational overhead of cracking passwords. The last category relies on raising the 
security awareness of the users through training and education in addition to establishing 
security guidelines. However, the aforementioned solutions are unable to address the 
human memory’s inability to remember secure passwords, which is the main cause of 
textual password insecurity (Dhamija & Perrig, 2000). 
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Proposals for replacing text-based passwords have been offered occasionally but with low 
expectations of success. That proves the popularity of textual passwords and how reliant 
the users are on this technique. Previous attempts to replace passwords have revealed 
uncertainty about which threats to address. Consequently, “Inability to quantify harm 
precludes quantifying the expected improvement from alternatives” as stated by Herley 
& van Oorschot (2012). Moreover, displacing passwords is often costly and most 
alternatives would not be vulnerability free as well.  
In addition to the obvious need for a strong authentication technique in terms of security 
requirements, usability is an increasingly important factor of the authentication process 
that needs to be taken into consideration while designing any authentication scheme. 
However, there is often a conflict between the requirements to achieve a higher level of 
security and the requirements to maintain adequate level of usability at the same time. In 
some cases, users tend to misuse complicated authentication techniques as they might 
find themselves unable to keep up with the increasing workload of such technique (Braz 
& Robert, 2006). Thus, a trade-off between potential security and usability requirements 
must be considered depending on the sensitivity of the target system. 
 
 
2.7 Alternative authentication mechanism requirements 
According to Patrick Elftmann (2006), several existing alternatives to alphanumeric 
authentication mechanism have not been broadly adopted by computer systems nor 
accepted by end-users. The reasons behind that are varied including resistance to change 
on the side of the users, additional hardware costs or a low level of security and usability. 
In order to consider an authentication method as an ideal alternative, it is important that 
it meets the following essential criteria, as introduced in (Elftmann, 2006).   
28 
A. Elimination of the need for additional hardware 
Unless a uniﬁed infrastructure is built, it seems illogical to force users to carry multiple 
tokens for different systems everywhere. Moreover, adding hardware, such as smart cards 
or biometrics readers, to all users’ systems may cause inconvenience to users. This 
includes other convenience issues, like hardware renew, recover and revoke. On top of 
the expected high cost of purchasing and deploying such hardware, these approaches 
involve additional expense for ongoing maintenance and customer support. More 
importantly, lost or broken hardware will prevent users from gaining access to their 
accounts. Therefore, the requirement of additional hardware should be avoided when 
planning for a convenient/low cost alternative authentication mechanism. 
B. Higher level of security 
When the purpose is to find an alternative to text-based authentication, it would be 
obvious to aim for better security in any new scheme than that existing in the traditional 
password. That is to say, the alternative should have an increased password space to be 
more resistant to security attacks, like brute force or dictionary. Also, reduce the 
possibility of writing down passwords or disclosing them to others. Thus, the alternative 
authentication method should achieve adequate security. 
C. Better memorability  
The problem with passwords is that humans find difficulty in creating a secure complex 
password that is easy to remember at the same time. Thus, it is important for the 
alternative to be memorisable for better memory retrieval and to avoid any possible 
subsequent problem that may occur as a result of memory limitation.    
D. Simplicity and ease of use 
The problem with security is not always technical, as used to be thought, but rather 
involves aspects of human-computer interaction (HCI). In other words, the security 
mechanism is effective when taking into account the usability and the interaction between 
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the security mechanisms and user practices. Therefore, a quick and easy process of 
enrolment, training and authentication should be the style of the alternative method. 
E. Compatibility/Applicability on various areas 
The conventional textual password has been used and applied on various platforms and 
applications, such as computer log-on, mobile and tablet devices, Internet banking 
applications, email and ATM machines, etc. Thus, the alternative authentication method 
should be applicable to cross-platforms, freely usable and compatible with different 
applications.  
In addition, Pinkas and Sander (2002) outlined some functional requirements and criteria 
for authentication methods. The identified requirements include availability, portability, 
robustness, reliability, friendliness, seamlessness and low cost of implementation and 
operation.  
The design of a successful authentication mechanism should be evaluated against several 
aspects of security and usability (De Angeli et al., 2005). The usability evaluation consists 
of objective data on mechanism performance and subjective data on user experience 
(Beautement & Sasse, 2010). Hence, the usability of the new proposal will be evaluated 
based on the main usability components of the ISO 9241-11 (International Organization 
for Standardization, 1998) that involve effectiveness, efficiency and satisfaction. In 
addition, memorability is another significant usability component that will be also 
included in the evaluation. As far as the security evaluation is concerned, De Angeli et al. 
(2005) have considered three basic dimensions (guessability, observability and 
recordability) to assess different aspects of the authentication system’s security which 
will be used to evaluate the security of the new proposal.  
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2.8 Summary   
To summarise, secure/usable alternatives to text-based authentication mechanises are 
needed. Although several alternative authentication systems have been proposed such as 
biometrics and token-based authentication, but most have not managed to be widely 
adopted for reasons such as costs for extra hardware, low security or a complex 
authentication process. In accordance to the study by Zippy and Moshe (2009) which 
compared the main authentication categories, the result of the study showed that 
knowledge-based authentication performed very well across all factors except the 
security. That has motivated this research to be confined to alternatives of the knowledge-
based authentication type to ensure that there is no additional hardware requirement and 
potentially can provide higher security with better memorisation.       
 
The focus of this research will be mainly on a branch of the knowledge-based 
authentication that is graphical password along with one-time password technique since 
combining both of these techniques could potentially lead to a successful alternative 
method to the conventional alphanumeric authentication method. At the same time, this 
should also intend to be a suitable alternative authentication method in the absence of 
security hardware tokens. The reasons for this are derived from the characteristics of each 
method. In the first place, making use of graphics to authenticate users will eliminate the 
need for any additional hardware. Furthermore, the burden on human memory will be 
reduced since both OTP and graphical passwords do not normally rely on password 
memorisation, as opposed to the traditional username and password scheme.  
 
The next chapter will review various types of graphical authentication schemes along 
with comprehensive comparisons of similar schemes. Reviewing these schemes allows 
discovering the characteristics, advantages and disadvantages of each scheme in 
particular as well as its relevant category in general.
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3.1. Introduction  
Alternative knowledge-based authentication approaches to replace the traditional text-
based authentication have emerged with the potential to succeed, for example graphical 
passwords (recognising graphical elements – e.g. images, iconography, grids) (Gyorffy, 
Tappenden & Miller, 2011) or associative/cognitive questions (Alexander, 2008). Instead 
of remembering long set of characters, a user can be authenticated by recognising 
predefined images or recreating graphical drawings (Rittenhouse, Chaudry & Lee, 2013). 
The idea of using images rather than text or numbers was motivated by the assumption 
that presenting items as pictures is easier to remember than presenting items as words 
(Snodgrass & Asiaghi, 1977). Thus, the picture superiority effect is of particular 
importance to this research domain, which will be highlighted in the coming paragraphs.  
In a study conducted by Shepard (1967), the recognition level for images was examined. 
A set of 600 images were used and individually displayed for the participants, each of 
which last for a few seconds. Afterwards, participants were challenged to recognise and 
distinguish the previously seen images out of the others on the display. Participants 
performed very well by recognising 98% of the images.      
The effect of long term memory on image recognition was studied by Nickerson (1968). 
The study was conducted over four time intervals (Day: 1, 7, 28, and 360). Similar to 
Shepard study’s methodology, this study used 200 pictures and displayed each for 5 
seconds. The participants’ task was to determine whether the displayed pictures were 
previously seen in the initial task or otherwise. The overall result indicated that there was 
a decrease in the success rate throughout the study periods. Despite the falling success 
rate, the study concluded that the long-term memory for image recognition was still better 
compared to words.   
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In 1970, Standing, Conezio and Haber (1970) examined the relationship between 
perception and memory through 4 experiments, two of them investigated the recognition 
memory for images. With 1100 magazine images in experiment 1, participants obtained 
95% successful recognitions while they scored 85% in experiment 2 which used 2560 
photographic pictures and were viewed over 4 days. As for the remaining two 
experiments, both were concerned about the effect of different aspects on recognition 
during viewing such as duration, reversing, and orienting. The results returned a success 
rate of over than 90% even with reversed images and a lower average score of above 50% 
when images were oriented. Overall, participants achieved high chance level of success 
for image recognition.    
With regard to the capacity of memory and speed of retrieval, an investigation on that 
respect was carried out by Standing (1973).  A total of 4 experiments were conducted to 
examine both images and words in several forms including ordinary images, visual and 
verbal words. The study used a large set of 11,000 images and changed the recognition 
approach (sequential display of images instead of simultaneous). In summary, the 
outcome of the recognition tests on the basis of memory capacity indicated that the use 
of images was superior to words or audios. However, there was a superiority for verbal 
words with respect to retrieval time. Additionally, Nelson, Reed and Walling (1976) 
proved that the image superiority effect can be disrupted or eliminated when the visual 
similarity in pictures is high. 
The dual coding theory explained the picture superiority effect (Paivio, 1986) (Paivio & 
Csapo, 1973). It states that there are two methods the brain uses to remember information 
depending on the type. That means imagery information is remembered in a different way 
than verbal information (spoken or written). The process of remembering images involves 
the dual coding technique which form the representation of images in memory. The first 
code is visual where images are stored as imagery information while the second code is 
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verbal in which images are translated into a semantic form and stored as descriptive 
information. In order to recognise images, the memory utilises both code representations. 
On contrast, remembering text-based information requires symbolic representation only.  
In the generate-recognise theory, the retrieval process of free recall is accomplished in 
two steps. The first is the generation step where a list of candidate words is formed by 
searching the long-term memory. Then the recognition step starts which involves 
evaluating the list of words to decide whether it matches the sought-after memory 
(Anderson & Bower, 1972). This theory explains why the recognition memory is faster 
and easier to perform than recall, as the former makes no use of the generation phase 
while depending only on the recognition phase. 
Various types of memory retrieval are leveraged by different graphical password 
mechanisms. Although these varieties affect memory in the first place, but can also have 
an impact on other factors like login time or ease of use. Recall and recognition are aspects 
of memory processes for retrieving information. The process is called ‘recall’ when the 
context is provided and a particular event is missing, whereas it is called ‘recognition’ 
when the event is given and the contextual information (setting, list) is required 
(Hollingworth, 1913). 
To sum up, the picture superiority effect appears to substantially increase memorability 
since storing or retrieving pictures from long-term memory is more effective. In addition, 
recall for recent pictures is higher than recent words which apparently mean that 
retrieving pictures from short-term memory is even better (Paivio, Rogers & Smythe, 
1968). According to Renaud and De Angeli (2009), “humans have a vast, almost limitless 
memory for pictures which they remember far better and for longer than words”. Thus, 
types of authentication that depend on graphics are likely to overcome the memorability 
problems that negatively affect text-based authentication. Remembering complex 
passwords as well as multiple passwords for different systems is a difficult task (Furnell, 
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2005) (Furnell & Zekri, 2006) while humans find it relatively easier to recognise images 
even after a period of time (Anderson, 2010b). In addition, pictorial passwords include 
other possible advantages, such as enlargement of the passwords space, reduction of 
choosing trivial passwords, difficulty to share and note down password (Gołofit, 2007). 
Since the mid 1990s, many graphical password schemes have been proposed aiming to 
enhance the password memorability and strengthen the security. More recently, some 
graphical password approaches have started to gain popularity as they are assumed to 
have desirable usability and memorability properties (Von Zezschwitz, Dunphy & De 
Luca, 2013) (Chiang and Chiasson, 2013). That is inline with the revolution of online 
services and mobile devices that demand friendlier alternatives to traditional methods. 
 
3.2. Categorisation of graphical authentication  
Researchers have mainly categorised graphical password authentication based on the 
cognitive tasks used to remember or retrieve the password. Monrose and Reiter (2005) 
divided graphical authentication into three main types: image recognition, tapping or 
drawing and image interpretation. Whereas Suo, Zhu and Owen (2005) classified it into 
two categories: recognition-based and recall-based techniques. As for Wiedenbeck et al. 
(2005c) they expanded the aforementioned categories to include recognition, pure-recall, 
and cued-recall. This latter type of classification is the one this research has found most 
appropriate to adopt throughout the rest of the work. However, combining any of these 
categories is also a feasible option. Furthermore, for better clarification, this study has 
suggested adding some distinguishing details in a manner that involves several design 
aspects, as illustrated in Figure 3-1.  
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Figure 3-1: Categorisation of graphical authentication 
 
Firstly, the input approach, for instance, is what the user needs to submit as the login 
information for the authentication session. The major input approaches include the 
following: Draw, Click, or Choice. In addition, Typing entry is another newly introduced 
input approach that uses keyboard/keypad in conjunction to the graphical password. Some 
graphical password schemes use obfuscated entry or indirect input method to obfuscate 
the password entry process in order to mitigate the observation attacks so that by the time 
an input is observed, it should be too late for an attacker to link that input data back to the 
password of that user (Bianchi, Oakley & Kwon, 2011) (Komanduri & Hutchings, 2008). 
The second aspect is the display style, which refers to the presentation mode that forms 
the password challenge, such as: Grid, Image, or Icon.  
 
This work will include many graphical password schemes that fall under different 
categories as shown in Figure 3-2. These schemes will be reviewed and compared to 
enable better understanding of their characteristics, advantages and disadvantages. 
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Figure 3-2: List of the discussed graphical password schemes 
 
3.3. Recall-based techniques 
The recall-based techniques are a type of authentication where access is granted by 
reproducing a secret – (e.g. drawing or clicking on image locations) that was previously 
created or chosen during the registration phase. The recall-based category can be further 
divided into pure-recall and cued-recall. Pure-recall is difficult in practice due to its 
reliance on human memory to access the information directly without aids whereas in 
cued-recall users are helped to remember their passwords by providing the necessary 
associated cues that trigger the memory (Malempati & Mogalla, 2011). As far as the 
password space is concerned, many recall-based schemes offer a large password space 
compared to that of textual passwords (Jermyn et al., 1999) (Tao & Adams, 2008). 
There are three subdivisions in this type of graphical authentication that depend on the 
required action by the user to authenticate (Draw-based, Click-based, and Typing-based 
entry). Schemes of each type will be reviewed and later compered in the following 
subsections. 
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3.3.1. Draw-based schemes 
In a typical model of a draw-based scheme, the registration phase would require the user 
to digitally draw a certain shape on a blank or gridded background. During authentication, 
the same shape must be redrawn correctly. Schemes of this type use different types of 
encoding (e.g. coordinates, grid intersections, or values of occupied grid cells) to store 
the drawing information and matching them later for authentication. In addition, drawing 
task can be carried out using different means such as computer mouse, touchpad, digital 
pen or fingers on touch-enabled devices. 
 
In 1998, Syukri, Okamoto and Mambo (1998) developed a system whereby the user needs 
to use a mouse for signature drawing. During the registration stage, after the user draws 
the signature, the signing area is extracted and normalised by the system before storing 
it. The verification stage then begins with the user’s input being taken and normalised to 
extract the signature parameters. It was claimed that the successful verification rate was 
satisfactory. In addition, a review of this scheme was included in a survey of Graphical 
Passwords by Xiaoyuan, Ying and Owen (2005). They stated that although this approach 
does not require users to memorise any information other than their own signatures, which 
are supposed to be hard to counterfeit but it was found that they encountered problems 
due to the lack of familiarity with the use of a mouse as a writing device for drawing the 
signature. A pen-like input device is one possible solution to this problem, but such 
devices are not commonly used, and it would be expensive to add additional hardware to 
the existing system. Small devices, such as a PDA that may already have a stylus, can 
benefit from such a technique. 
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Figure 3-3: A sample of "Syukri" algorithm (Syukri, Okamoto & Mambo, 1998) 
Jermyn et al. (1999) launched an authentication mechanism called "Draw-A-Secret" 
(DAS), which gives the user the ability to draw their desired password.  Put simply, the 
user is required to draw a secret shape on a grid. The system then records the coordinates 
on the grid occupied by the drawn shape in the drawing sequence. During authentication, 
the user must re-draw the secret shape closely enough to the pre-stored input. The authors 
claim that the full password space of DAS when using an adequate length on a 5x5 grid 
is larger than that of the full textual password space. However, other studies (Goldberg, 
Hagman & Sazawal, 2002) (Nali & Thorpe, 2004) showed that forgetting the stroke order 
or marking adjacent cells inaccurately are considered to be the main reasons for incorrect 
match of the original password redrawing. 
 
Figure 3-4: Sample password: "Draw-A-Secret" (DAS) (Jermyn et al., 1999) 
Thorpe and van Oorschot (2004) investigated the role and impact of the number of 
composite strokes, the length of the password and the dimensions of the grid as 
complexity properties in the DAS scheme. The largest impact on the password space of 
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the DAS scheme was from the stroke-count. They also found that for a fixed length 
password, fewer strokes result in a significant reduction in the size of the DAS password 
space. The password length has an impact on security but less than what the number of 
strokes has. The grid size provides negligible security unless supported by the use of a 
larger number of strokes. 
 
Since the introduction of the DAS scheme, many researchers have utilised the concept of 
DAS to build new schemes with different enhancement aims (e.g. "Grid Selection" 
(Thorpe & van Oorschot, 2004), "Multi-Grid DAS" (MGDAS) (Chalkias, Alexiadis & 
Stephanides, 2006), "Qualitative Draw-A-Secret" (QDAS) (Lin et al., 2007), 
"Background Draw-A-Secret" (BDAS) (Dunphy & Yan, 2007), "DAS with Rotation" (R-
DAS) (Chakrabarti, Landon & Singhal, 2007)). 
 
Tao and Adams (2008) designed and improved a DAS algorithm named "Pass-Go". This 
scheme retains the advantages of DAS whilst adding some extra security features. Pass-
Go is a grid-based scheme and is referred to as a matrix of intersections since passwords 
are drawn using grid intersection points. Grid lines and intersections are displayed as dot 
and line indicators to eliminate the impact of small variations in the input trace. The 
password encoding is formed, similarly to DAS, by aggregating the sequence of 
intersections, movement encodings, pen-up separator code, in addition to adding colour 
codes (if applicable). Furthermore, Pass-Go achieved stronger security and better 
usability. According to Gao et al. (2013), this algorithm offers a large full password space 
with additional parameters, such as diagonal movements and pen colour, to further 
increase the theoretical password space.  
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Pass-Go design Pass-Go main login interface 
  
Figure 3-5: "Pass-Go" scheme (Tao & Adams, 2008) 
In the same context, the authors also proposed some variations on the basic Pass-Go 
scheme which offer either better usability or stronger security. First was "PassCells" 
which replaces the grid with a matrix of cells making the boundary of sensitive areas 
visible to users. Second, was called "Cell Indicator" where the right button of a mouse 
may be used to choose cells in the grid. Last, was named "Curved Line Indicator" in which 
an invisible cell centre point is defined as an area surrounding the centre of each cell in a 
grid that made the drawing of a curved line possible.  
Moreover, a number of researchers have investigated the Pass-Go scheme and have 
pointed out some improvements (i.e. "Background Pass-Go" (BPG) (Por, Lim & 
Kianoush, 2008), "Multi-Grid Background Pass-Go" (MGBPG) (Por & Lin, 2008)). 
 
"Android Unlock Pattern" is an adapted scheme of Pass-Go with some slight 
modifications to fit for the smaller screen sizes of mobile devices (Biddle, Chiasson & 
van Oorschot, 2012) (Uellenbeck et al., 2013). The scheme operates by presenting a 3×3 
grid that contains nine dots. To enrol, a pattern must be chosen by drawing lines to 
connect the dots. During authentication, the user has to recall the pattern and redraw it in 
the correct sequence. The system enforces some constraints to create an acceptable 
pattern. The length of a pattern should be between 4 and 9 connected dots, each dot can 
be selected only once, jumping over an unselected dot is not allowed, and a selected dot 
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can be used to reach another unselected dot. According to Aviv et al. (2010), there are 
389,112 distinct patterns in the total size of the pattern space. Their research investigated 
the smudge attacks that exploit the oily marks of finger touches left on screen devices. 
The outcomes of the study stated that by using smudge attack, the pattern can be 
recovered either fully or partially. In addition, the gathered information from a smudge 
attack can be used to increase the chance of guessing user’s patterns. However, the 
success of a smudge attack is conditioned to a prior physical obtainment of a user’s phone 
which is not always feasible (Chiang & Chiasson, 2013). 
 
Figure 3-6: "Android Unlock Pattern" scheme 
Haichang et al. (2008) inspired by the DAS technique and proposed a position-free 
graphical password strategy called "Yet Another Graphical Password" (YAGP). This 
approach has the advantage of free drawing positions that permit redrawing anywhere. 
Also, it attains a large password space through the use of more precise grid cells. The 
YAGP password is formatted based on the extended concept of DAS neighbour cells, 
which means that every stroke of a drawing is composed of one of three types of 
movement elements: pen-down, pen-move and pen-up. Each pen-movement obtains a 
code represented by the numbers 1, 2, 3, 4, 6, 7, 8, 9 according to the last neighbour cell. 
The code ‘5’ is used to represent pen-up and pen-down in a stroke. When authenticating 
the re-entered drawings, YAGP provides a more flexible judgment mechanism. Still, the 
difficulty of redrawing the password precisely is a drawback of the YAGP scheme. 
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Figure 3-7: The "YAGP" strategy (Haichang et al., 2008) 
A review of additional draw-based schemes can be found in ‘Appendix A’ including 
"PassShapes" by (Weiss & Luca, 2008) and Touchscreen Multi-layered Drawing "TMD" 
by (Chiang & Chiasson, 2013). Moreover, the Android unlock pattern scheme has drawn 
the interest of many researchers, thus several studies to enhance this scheme have been 
published. Most of which have been reviewed and added to ‘Appendix A’ including (von 
Zezschwitz, Dunphy & De Luca, 2013), (Uellenbeck et al., 2013), (Andriotis et al., 2013), 
(Andriotis, Tryfonas & Oikonomou, 2014), (Schneegass et al., 2014), (Song et al., 2015), 
(Zezschwitz et al., 2015), and (Siadati et al., 2015). 
 
3.3.2. Click-based schemes 
A click-based scheme is usually formed by a set of user-selected click-points. During the 
registration process, the system first displays an image consisting of enough details to 
typically offer a wide range of click points. Then the user can create a password by 
clicking on several secret locations on that image. To authenticate, the approximate areas 
of the pre-chosen locations must be clicked. In such schemes, the image can play an 
assistant role for the users to easily recall their passwords which makes these schemes 
more convenient to use than pure recall. 
Blonder (1996) is regarded as the founder of the graphical authentication notion. He 
developed a graphical password scheme that allows users to create a password by clicking 
 
 
The neighbour grid Example: the code of the string of the whole drawing is: 
‘57777776666666666661111155888888771125’ 
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on various permitted locations on an image. This method is a cued-recall since the image 
plays an important role in assisting users to retrieve their passwords. One drawback of 
Blonder’s scheme is the limited password space, which is affected by the predefined 
boundaries that restrict user selection of clicking areas. 
 
Figure 3-8: "Blonder" scheme (Blonder, 1996) 
Wiedenbeck et al. proposed a further extension of Blonder’s design known as 
"PassPoints" (Wiedenbeck et al., 2005c) (Wiedenbeck et al., 2005b) (Wiedenbeck et al., 
2005a). In this scheme, arbitrary images are allowed to be used and the predefined 
boundaries are eliminated to expand the clickable areas of the image background. As a 
result, users are able to make free clicks anywhere on an image. Additionally, the 
tolerance area around each chosen location is calculated to enhance usability and security. 
To achieve that, the ‘robust discretization’ technique (Birget, Hong & Memon, 2004) 
(Birget, Dawei & Memon, 2006) was implemented with three overlapping grids. This 
method ensures the determination of the tolerance square of a click-point and the 
corresponding grid. As a result, attempts to enter approximately correct click points 
(passwords) are accepted and regarded as an exact match to the originally stored click 
value despite the slight difference between the original click and the repeated one.  
In short, PassPoints password is composed of a number of anywhere click points on a 
single image. In order to gain authentication, the user needs to accurately click on all the 
preselected spots within the defined tolerance of each chosen area. Interestingly, the idea 
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of allowing the use of any type of images increases the amount of memorable password 
space.  
 
Figure 3-9: A sample of "PassPoints" Scheme (Gani, 2010) 
Following the launch of the PassPoints scheme, several user studies including both lab 
and field ones have been carried out by a number of researchers to examine different 
aspects of the PassPoints system. Wiedenbeck et al. conducted a number of user lab-
studies to examine PassPoints system’s usability compared to textual password, measure 
the impact of image choosing on usability, and define the minimum size that can be 
assigned to the tolerance square (Wiedenbeck et al., 2005c) (Wiedenbeck et al., 2005a). 
They concluded that the memorability of both text-based and graphical passwords was 
almost similar. Next conclusion stated that although using a smaller tolerance square led 
to a larger password space, but too small squares pixels turn into unusable system. Last, 
password memorability was found not that much affected by the image choice.   
Other studies were carried out by Chiasson, Biddle and van Oorschot (2007) involving 
both lab and field studies to explore the claimed usability when using a wider range of 
images as well as collecting information about users’ chosen passwords (click points). In 
the field study, the scale of participation was large to practically test the click-based 
graphical passwords. The studies’ conclusion stated that there were differences between 
results; the result of the lab study was mostly positive compared to the field study result. 
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Nevertheless, the studies showed a good usability level in terms of success login rates and 
time duration for password-entry and positive participants’ opinions. Additionally, it was 
confirmed that the accuracy of targeting click-points was higher than previously 
suggested which may lead to accepting smaller tolerance squares. Finally, success rates 
were found influenced significantly by the choice of images in contrary to previous 
works. Furthermore, interference of multiple passwords was found apparently 
problematic due to the lower success rates recorded when using more than one password.  
Thorpe and van Oorschot (2007) extended the study domain to focus on the security of 
click-based graphical password schemes such as PassPoints. Mainly, the security 
examinations included the impact of the use of various background images as well as the 
different techniques to guess users’ passwords. As a result, an empirical evidence of the 
existence of hotspot points (the most popular clicked areas) for many images was 
provided. On top of that, two diverse types of attack exploiting hotspots were explored 
and evaluated: (i) a “human-seeded” attack which uses a small set of users to harvest 
click-points information in order to attack other larger targets, and (ii) a purely automated 
attack utilising image processing techniques to help predicting hotspots automatically for 
efficient exhaustive search. Although the human-seeded attack was more effective, but 
the entirely automated attack could also be an interesting tool possibly used as a proactive 
password checker. Overall, whenever an offline attack is absent then click-based 
graphical password schemes may still be considered a suitable alternative solution for 
authentication. 
Devlin et al. (2015) studied the extent of the predictability of PassPoints password based 
on knowledge of the user. The result proved that predicting PassPoints password is 
somewhat possible. In addition, the tendency of users to select similar password points 
was observed which is responsible for creating hotspots. Another finding was the 
influence of the background image on the user selection of the click-points. 
47 
Chiasson, van Oorschot and Biddle (2007) introduced a cued-recall graphical password 
technique called "Cued Click Points" (CCP) as an alternative method to PassPoints. The 
characteristic of the CCP scheme seem to be drawn from a combination of several 
techniques: PassPoints, Passfaces (Passfaces Corporation, 2015b) and Story (Davis, 
Monrose & Reiter, 2004). In CCP, a password is composed of one click-point per image 
for a series of images. Thus, users need to click on one point of each image rather than 
on multiple points of a single image. The discretization method (Birget, Hong & Memon, 
2004) (Birget, Dawei & Memon, 2006) was also used here. Displaying the next image 
depends on the previously clicked-point, so users are cued during logging in process as 
to whether they are on the correct path or not. Being on an incorrect path means that a 
wrong point was clicked and therefore a wrong image is displayed, but more importantly 
an explicit indication of authentication failure is only shown after the final click to avoid 
any potential online attack. However, CCP is susceptible to shoulder-surfing attacks like 
most other graphical passwords. Observation of username, image sequence and click-
points is enough to ensure supplying the attacker with all the information needed to break 
into the account. Attacks can exploit the areas that have a higher probability of being 
selected by users as part of their passwords, which are also known as (hotspots). With 
CCP, attacks based on hotspot analysis have been made more challenging due to the 
significant increase in the number of images and the associated difficulty of analysing 
corresponding images on multiple levels throughout the authentication process.  
 
Figure 3-10: "Cued Click Points" (CCP) passwords: a choice-dependent path of images  
(Chiasson, van Oorschot & Biddle, 2007) 
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Chiasson et al. (2008) used CCP as a base system to implement a variation called 
"Persuasive Cued Click-Points" (PCCP). The motivation behind this idea was to persuade 
users to choose random passwords as well as to make the selection of hotspots for all 
click-points much harder to provide better security. It has the same CCP functionality but 
differs slightly in the password creation stage when only a small square viewport area, 
randomly positioned on the image, is enabled to accept clicking while the rest of the 
image is dimmed.  
 
Figure 3-11: "Persuasive Cued Click-Points" (PCCP) (Chiasson et al., 2008) 
Password creation interface with the viewport highlighting a portion of the image. 
 
Liu et al. (2011) proposed a new cued-recall graphical authentication technique named 
"Click Buttons according to Figures in Grids" (CBFG). To register, the user needs to 
choose either single or multiple passimages (max four images). The selected passimages 
are partitioned into a 12×8 grid matrix then presented again to the user to select a number 
of password cells (pass-cells). Last registration step involves the selection of a start-icon 
which acts as an indicator to begin entering password sequence. As for the authentication, 
this phase consists of 4 background images and one centric icon. Each cell displays a 
random number between 0 and 9. The actual login process does not start unless the correct 
pre-chosen start-icon become on display. Afterwards, the user should start entering the 
password by looking for the numbers on the pass-cells and then click on the 
corresponding numeric buttons on the side of the screen in any order.  
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The performance of the scheme was evaluated through a lab experiment with 24 
participants. First statement showed a reasonably high success login percentage of 92.3% 
and 21.4 seconds of average login time. After ten days, a memorability test was conducted 
in which users were asked to re-login again for several times. 87.5% of the participants 
were able to recall their credentials correctly with a mean login time of 26.7 seconds. 
Moreover, two further security experiments were undertaken. In the first test, users were 
asked to observe their counterparts’ passwords and record information that may help them 
to attack the account. The result indicated that all attempts failed to login using the 
collected information within 3 given times. In the second test, users’ input sequences were 
recorded and an intersection analysis attack was carried out on them. By analysing the 
outcomes, it was found that this type of attack is ineffective. 
 
Figure 3-12: "CBFG" authentication screen 
Additional click-based schemes were reviewed and added to ‘Appendix A’ including 
"Multi-Factor Graphical Authentication" by (Sabzevar & Stavrou, 2008), "Multitouch 
Image-Based Authentication on Smartphones" (MIBA) by (Ritter et al., 2013), and "Tri-
Pass" (Yesseyeva et al., 2014). 
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3.3.3. Typing-based recall schemes 
An interesting feature to be introduced in this research is the use of keyboard/keypad as 
an input mechanism instead of using the mouse, which is the method commonly used 
with graphical passwords.  In this section, attention is paid to those schemes that utilise 
graphics as an authentication means in addition to the use of keystrokes as an entry 
approach to submit the necessary access data. According to the study conducted by Tari, 
Ozok and Holden (2006), replacing the regular use of a mouse for data entry in many 
graphical password schemes with a keypad is effective in terms of reducing the risk of a 
shoulder-surfing attack. In other words, this makes it more difficult to gain enough 
information about the password since both keystroke logger and screen scraping are 
required. Several schemes have already made use of this approach each of which will be 
reviewed next. 
Stubblefield and Simon (2004) outlined a simple cued-recall scheme called "Inkblot 
Authentication". This scheme works as an aid for the user to create and memorise strong 
textual passwords by generating and displaying a series of inkblots. During password 
registration, the user is asked to associate each of the ten displayed inkblots with a 
memorable word. The final password is derived from concatenating these words in a 
certain manner (e.g. first and last letters of each word). This scheme protects users from 
shoulder-surfing attack since an attacker cannot obtain the password by only watching 
the inkblots without knowing the word associations. Unfortunately, using a small set of 
fixed blots is considered one of the scheme’s limitations as it might prevent the use of the 
system in multiple environments due to the difficulty of keeping track of several 
associations for each blot by the user. One drawback of this scheme is that an attacker 
can build a list of popular letter pairs associated with each substitute image by replacing 
inkblot images sent to a user with other inkblot images. Subsequently, the list can be used 
to crack users’ passwords. Another problem is that the number of printable ASCII 
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characters available for association is limited. However, these issues can be solved 
through the use of an algorithm that produces an almost limitless supply of images similar 
to inkblots to replace the static images. 
 
Figure 3-13: Example of "Inkblot" Authentication login screen (Stubblefield & Simon, 2004) 
Zheng et al. (2010) proposed their authentication scheme based on Shape and Text. This 
scheme provides a grid with characters that requires users to choose shapes of strokes as 
the original passwords and finally utilises traditional input devices to login with text 
passwords. All what a user needs to remember for authentication is the pre-chosen shapes 
and strokes. During login, the grid will be filled with some similar symbols like numbers 
or characters. The input of a successful login needs to match the correct symbols appeared 
in the user’s original sequence of the grid. With regard to security, the scheme reported 
being highly resistant to shoulder-surfing as the attackers must record both of the login 
grid and the entire typing process in order to obtain the original shape password. In 
addition, the scheme is resistant to brute force and random click attacks.  
 
 
Password = [1100110110011] 
Login interface Original stroke on the interface 
Figure 3-14: Zheng's scheme (Shape & Text) (Zheng et al., 2010) 
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Although only a couple of schemes that have implemented this supportive technique 
(utilisation of keypad/keyboard typing as a means of password entry) which works 
alongside the main authentication mechanism were included in this subsection, however, 
more schemes of this type will be discussed later in section 3.6. 
 
 
3.3.4. Comparative summary of Recall-based techniques 
Table 3-1, Table 3-3 and Table 3-4 show comparative summaries of the recall-based 
technique involving three main aspects: technique attributes, security, and usability. The 
data was harvested from the existing literature, which explains why some schemes were 
included in and others excluded from some comparisons depending on the availability of 
information. In this regard, Renaud et al. have also expressed the same limitations as: 
“These levels are based on the literature which often reports findings that are extremely 
difficult to compare, so the comparison should not be considered definitive, but rather 
based on an understanding of whether the approach is prone to show vulnerabilities. 
Moreover, it becomes apparent that there are many aspects that do not allow a rating 
due to missing data or data that only allows a very rough estimation instead of a real 
assessment” (Renaud et al., 2013). 
The layout of the comparison tables was aimed to be informative and expressive. Table 
3-1 includes a comprehensive comparison of schemes based on their attributes. The data 
shows that the graphical authentication notion was first introduced in 1996 and since then, 
the number of research inventions in the area of recall-based graphical authentication has 
been increasing over the time. One of the reasons behind that might be due to the fact that 
in recent times mobile devices with touch screen and stylus have been becoming more 
popular which facilitate the drawing and clicking tasks. It can be also inferred from the 
results of the conducted comparison that there is a general pattern linking the categories, 
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approaches and styles of the schemes, as illustrated in Table 3-2. For instance, the 
majority of the pure-recall categorised schemes use a drawing with grid approach whereas 
most schemes within the cued-recall category utilise clicking with image approach.  
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1 
Syukri Algorithm – (draw a 
signature) 
1998  -  -  -   -  
2 Draw-A-Secret (DAS) 1999  -   -  -   -  
3 Pass-Go 2008  -   -  -   -  
4 
Multi-Grid Background Pass-
Go (MGBPG) 
2008 -    -  -  
  
M 
 
5 
Yet another Graphical 
Password (YAGP) 
2008  -  - -  - 
6 PassShapes 2008  -  - - PAD 
7 TMD 2013  -  - -  - 
8 Blonder Scheme 1996 -  -   -  -   
9 PassPoints 2005 -   -   -  -   
10 Cued Click Points (CCP) 2007 -   -   -  -  
  
M 
11 
Persuasive Cued Click-Points 
(PCCP) 
2008 -   -   -  -  
  
M  
12 
Multi-Factor Graphical 
Authentication 
2008 -  -  - -  
13 CBFG 2011 -  -  -  
  
S/M 
14 MIBA 2013 -  - 
  
M 
- - 
  
M 
15 Tri-Pass 2014 -  -  - -  
16 Inkblot Authentication  2004 -   -  -   -  
  
M 
17 Zheng (Shape & Text) 2010  -  SHAPE   -  
  M= Multi 
Table 3-1: Attributes comparison of Recall-based schemes 
 
Category Approach Style 
Pure-recall Draw Grid 
Cued-recall Click Image 
Table 3-2: A descriptive linking pattern 
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Table 3-3 presents some of the security features and vulnerabilities that were covered 
most by the existing schemes. Unfortunately, it was found that a vast amount of 
information is missing due to the lack of details published on the security aspects of the 
schemes as well as the absence of general standard for security requirements and 
recommendations, which is surprising for such an important authentication domain. This 
had a negative impact on the evaluation of the schemes. However, the security features 
were compared on the basis of the following factors: 
• Multiple rounds: pass-clicks or drawings are distributed over multiple screens (i.e. 
one click in each page).  
• Hash function: it is a type of cryptography that allows encrypting data in a way that 
it is difficult to invert. 
In terms of the vulnerability comparison, it was based on the susceptibility to various 
types of attack such as: 
• Shoulder-surfing: The use of direct observation techniques to obtain victims’ 
passwords or other security information. 
• Guessing: The ability to guess another user’s password by predicting higher 
probability passwords. 
• Dictionary attack: In text-based password, a dictionary of common words is used to 
identify the password of a legitimate user. In a similar way, a dictionary of graphical 
password can be built by the most clickable areas or the common drawings.  
• Spyware: A hidden unauthorised software component that capture information about 
user’s activities such as keyboard, mouse, or screen outputs. 
• Hotspots: The selection of specific areas in an image by a high percentage of users 
that make them more predictable. Combinations of these click points with higher 
probability can be used to build a password dictionary. 
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1 Draw-A-Secret (DAS) -   -  -  -  -  -   
2 PassPoints -   -  -    -   
3 Cued Click Points (CCP)     -  -     
4 
Persuasive Cued Click-
Points (PCCP) 
 -  -  -  -  -    
5 Pass-Go -  -   -   -  -   
6 
Yet another Graphical 
Password (YAGP) 
-    -  -  -  -   
7 
Multi-Factor Graphical 
Authentication 
-       
Resistant to: physical security, 
Brute force, social engineering 
attacks 
8 CBFG - -   - - - 
Safe against intersection attack 
Offer large password space 
9 MIBA  -   - - - Resist brute force attacks 
10 Zheng (Shape & Text) - -   -  - 
Resist brute force & random 
click 
Offer large password space 
Table 3-3: Comparison of security features and vulnerabilities of Recall-based schemes 
According to Table 3-3, shoulder-surfing and guessing attacks seem to be the types of 
attacks that most recall-based research attempted to resist. This might indicate that many 
recall-based schemes are more concerned about these types of attacks. Additionally, 
dictionary and brute force attacks are other types of threats included in a number of studies 
of this authentication category. Some schemes of this type seemed concerned about 
hotspots and spyware attacks as only a few of them have reported related data. Another 
finding was the limited use of multiple rounds and hashing function with the recall-based 
techniques.  
 
56 
  
Recall-based  
Graphical Password 
System 
Usability Features 
A
rb
it
ra
ry
 C
li
ck
 
In
p
u
t 
T
o
le
ra
n
t 
E
a
sy
 t
o
 u
se
 
M
em
o
ra
b
il
it
y
 
M
n
em
o
n
ic
 
L
a
b
(L
) 
/F
ie
ld
(F
) 
 
S
tu
d
y
 
O
th
er
 F
ea
tu
re
s\
 
L
im
it
a
ti
o
n
s 
1 Draw-A-Secret (DAS) -      -  
On Paper - Difficult 
password entry 
2 PassPoints   -    L / F User-provided images   
3 Cued Click Points (CCP)   -  -  -  L   
4 
Persuasive Cued Click-
Points (PCCP) 
  -  - - L Implicit Feedback 
5 Pass-Go -     -  F   
6 TMD - -   - L  
7 CBFG - -   - L 
Multiple background 
images 
Table 3-4: Usability features comparison of Recall-based schemes 
In Table 3-4, recall-based schemes are compared against major usability features on the 
basis of the following factors: 
• Arbitrary click: This feature is specific for click-based schemes. The predefined 
click areas limit the password space. Arbitrary click allows clicking on any location 
on the image and thus more choices are offered.  
• Input tolerant: This is a click-based feature. Some schemes are equipped with a 
tolerance around the click points which make them easier to click and therefore more 
flexible and usable system. 
• Ease of use: How easy it is to perform an authentication task in a natural and friendly 
manner.  
• Memorability: The ability to remember a password either on a short or long term. 
• Mnemonics: The use of any aid to help human memory to better retain and 
remember information. They come in different forms and can ease the memorisation 
of many information types.  
• Study type: Research evaluation can be carried out in a laboratory which provide 
more control on the running activities and allow better research-related observations. 
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The second type of study is a field study which is typically conducted in the wild to 
gather real user performance data usually over longer period of time. 
It is clear from Table 3-4 that the number of the compared schemes against usability has 
dropped to less than a half. Moreover, only a small number of them have provided a 
reasonable amount of details (e.g. Passpoints and Pass-Go). At the same time, these two 
schemes were the only ones to undertake field studies which emphasise the importance 
of this type of study for producing sufficient data and proofs.  
One of the issues with the beginnings of click-based technique was the tolerant square 
area. Apparently, this was taken into account with most of the subsequent schemes which 
managed to overcome the issue. Similarly, the predetermined clicking area used to be one 
of the main limitations of click-based schemes. This has seemingly led many techniques 
of this type to adopt the click anywhere technique, which in turn has helped in mitigating 
the consequent usability and security issues. As far as the ease of use is concerned, some 
schemes have claimed to be easy to use despite the fact that in some cases there was no 
clear report of the evaluation criteria that can independently judge whether the scheme 
was easy to use or otherwise. Although memorability is one of the significant usability 
features, it can be inferred from the comparative table that not all schemes included it into 
the reported work. In relation to this, mnemonics have been used with the aim of 
providing an aid to facilitate the recall of the required authentication task. In most cases, 
as can be depicted from the comparison data, the use of mnemonics is mostly linked with 
good memorability levels, which means that this can be regarded as a complementary 
feature. Moreover, enabling users to upload and choose their own images is another 
feature that has not been found to be widely implemented in recall-based schemes for 
several reasons, such as the avoidance of bias selection or predictability through the pre-
knowledge of personal preferences. 
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3.4. Recognition-based technique 
Image recognition schemes have been proposed as a replacement for precise password 
recall to minimise the burden on users’ cognitive memory and thus reduce the amount of 
mistakes they make and boost their usability experience (Dhamija & Perrig, 2000). 
Nevertheless, schemes of this kind have their own problems too. To ensure easier 
recognition task, the target images should be semantically different from the distractors. 
However, in order to avoid the possible predictability, the semantic difference should not 
simplify the distinguishing task for intruders (Renaud, 2004).  
Generally, there are two stages involved in this type of authentication technique. The first 
stage is registration, where a set of images are presented to users. They are required to 
form their password by selecting some target images from within the displayed set. The 
second stage is authentication, which involves single or multiple rounds. At each login 
round, users are asked to recognise and identify the pre-defined target images, which are 
usually presented among other decoy-images.  
Normally, this sort of scheme requires the presentation of the same images within each 
panel to avoid an obvious determination of repeatedly appearing images in the panel. 
Additionally, the images should be displayed randomly over the panel to ensure that 
user’s selection is dependent on the recognition of the image itself not on the position 
occupied by the image. With regards to the password space, the majority of recognition-
based schemes are limited in size, which makes them suitable for authentication only 
when accompanied by an online reference validation mechanism to prevent an automated 
search (Monrose & Reiter, 2005). 
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3.4.1. Choice-based schemes 
A choice-based approach refers to the action where the user needs to select a required 
image that is usually achieved by mouse tapping on the target image. A plenty of schemes 
utilising choice-based approach have been developed and studied. A decent number of 
them are reviewed and compered next. 
Passfaces Corporation developed an authentication technique based on facial recognition 
called "PassFaces™" (Passfaces Corporation, 2015b) (Passfaces Corporation, 2015a). In 
simple terms, the system assigns the user with a random set of human face images from 
a large portfolio of face images as a login password. Next, the user is presented with a 
panel consists of eight decoy face images plus one face image from the previously 
assigned password face images. The authentication requirement is met when users 
correctly recognise and identify all of their PassFaces in each repeated round by simply 
clicking anywhere on the known face image.  
 
Figure 3-15: "PassFaces" Scheme (Passfaces Corporation, 2015a) 
A number of research studies have investigated the PassFaces scheme in relation to some 
significant usability and security issues. Brostoff & Sasse (2000) performed a field study 
to evaluate the PassFaces system which showed that the login errors rate when using 
PassFaces was only one third of the rate compared to that in alphanumeric password. 
Despite the less frequent access to the system, the study showed a better memorability 
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than traditional passwords even over longer period of time in accordance to the previous 
studies by Valentine as stated by the authors of this study. 
In a lab study, Tari, Ozok and Holden (2006) compared the risk of shoulder-surfing on 
PassFaces, textual password, and PINs. The findings indicated that adopting a keypad for 
data entry with PassFaces instead of the regular mouse click was very effective mitigation 
to shoulder-surfing. By implementing a keyboard entry, an extra challenge is added 
before an attacker since in this case keystroke logger and screen scraping are both needed 
to gain enough information about the password entry.   
Dunphy, Nicholson and Olivier (2008) looked into the reality of the claim that graphical 
passwords are secure against both verbal and written disclosure. In PassFaces, the absence 
of cues that stand out (background, eye glasses, and clothing) is an essential characteristic 
of facial graphical passwords to reduce the users’ tendency of revealing passwords either 
by writing them down or verbally describe them to others. Notably, it was found that just 
a few participants were able to login based on verbal descriptions of the portfolio images. 
In addition, when the system uses a strategic manner to select decoys similarly matching 
the portfolio image, the participants were less likely to identify the correct portfolio 
images within the panel. Nevertheless, other forms of attacks such as social engineering 
can still induce users to share their password images through capturing photographs or 
screenshots. 
Everitt et al. (2009) chose PassFaces for their evaluation to study the interference of 
multiple passwords. Over several weeks, email messages used to be sent to the 
participants prompting them to login to 4 various fabricated accounts on a diverse 
schedules basis. With more frequent logging-in and practicing of each new password over 
the study period, users managed to remember their passwords successfully. 
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Davis, Monrose and Reiter (2004) invented another graphical password scheme called 
"Story" to compete with the ‘Face’ system that was similarly modelled after PassFaces 
scheme. This approach uses various image categories instead of restricting the choices to 
a single category, such as human faces. A story-based password is composed of a 
sequence of images chosen by the user to create a story, as a memory aid, from a single 
pool of images each of which is from distinct image category that depict objects from 
daily life (cars, food, animals, etc.). The authentication process runs for several rounds to 
allow the user to select the predetermined images in the correct sequence. However, the 
results of the conducted field study revealed that users have recorded exploited patterns, 
such as gender-related desires. In addition, remembering a story password proved 
difficult in addition to the password sequencing, which was the most frequently occurring 
error. As for the password space of this scheme, it can be exhaustively searched in a short 
time whenever an offline dictionary search is possible. Hence, making use of such an 
approach requires a trusted online procedure for mediating and confirming guesses. In 
regards to the Face system, the study warned against permitting users to choose passwords 
without a method to mitigate the bias choices. 
 
Figure 3-16: "Story" Scheme (Davis, Monrose & Reiter, 2004) 
Dhamija and Perrig (2000) developed a graphical scheme called "Déjà vu" utilising the 
Hash Visualization algorithm ‘Random Art’ that produces abstract structured images 
from meaningless strings that are referred to as seeds. The difficulty associated with 
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writing images down and sharing them with others is an important security feature of 
Random Art images. There are three stages in the Déjà vu scheme: portfolio creation, 
training and authentication. To begin with, users are required to create an image portfolio 
by selecting a number of desired images among a set of different sample images. During 
authentication, the system displays a challenge set consisting of the predefined images 
plus other decoy images. The images that form part of the portfolio should be correctly 
identified in order to ensure authentication. As a matter of fact, the scheme was designed 
to store the hashed values in the system not the images. Thus, a weakness point of the 
proposed system has been reported in relation to the seeds of the portfolio images of each 
user being stored on the server in cleartext.   
 
Figure 3-17: "Déjà vu" technique (Dhamija & Perrig, 2000) 
Pierce et al. (2003) prototyped an alternative authentication solution called 
"AuthentiGraph". It is an extended design of the Déjà vu scheme that borrows concepts 
from text-based passwords on the one hand and smartcard and biometrics on the other. 
AuthentiGraph uses a server key to generate unique random character bitmaps containing 
all characters that the login or password may include. In order to authenticate, the user is 
asked to identify and click on the right characters in the correct order. A set of (X,Y) 
coordinates representing the mouse selection of the character bitmaps is then transferred 
to the server to authenticate the user. Moreover, the character bitmaps are not statically 
positioned, which means that in each authentication attempt the coordinates’ data will be 
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different. However, the difficulty of identifying and locating the characters within a 
congested bitmap compared to character identification on a keyboard is considered to be 
one of the system’s disadvantages in addition to being vulnerable to shoulder-surfing and 
observation attacks. An adjusted system that allows various types of information to be 
presented and chosen was proposed. For example, characters are replaced with simple 
shapes like squares and circles along with colour variations.   
  
 (Character bitmap) (Shape/Colour bitmap) 
Figure 3-18: "AuthentiGraph" Scheme (Pierce et al., 2003) 
In 2007, Minne et al. (2007) investigated the usability of the AuthentiGraph scheme by 
examining the effect of different interface designs. 20 students participated in the study, 
which comprised of user trials and surveys. The result showed that colour coordination 
in the grid arrangement was effective in increasing the accuracy of locating the required 
characters. In addition, participants were asked about the scheme’s security where 85% 
stated they would use the scheme if it was proven to be secure.  
 
Sobrado and Birget (2002) designed three shoulder-surfing resistant graphical password 
techniques. The first of them was the "Triangle scheme", where pre-chosen pass-objects 
form a convex-hull. The user needs to click somewhere inside this area to complete the 
authentication process. In the second scheme, which was called the "Moveable frame 
scheme", authentication is achieved by twirling the frame until all the pass-objects are 
located on a straight line. The last scheme was "Other special geometric configurations". 
This depends on the intersection of invisible lines formed by four previously chosen pass-
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objects that produce a convex quadrilateral inside of which the user needs to click for 
authentication. Overall, these schemes suffer mainly from a slow login process. 
   
Triangle scheme            
Convex-hull 
Moveable frame scheme The special geometric 
configuration 
Figure 3-19: Sobrado and Birget shoulder-surfing resistant schemes (Sobrado & Birget, 2002) 
De Angeli et al. presented an innovative concept for user authentication called "Visual 
Identification Protocol" (VIP) (De Angeli et al., 2002) (De Angeli et al., 2003). Basically, 
VIP was built to replace the conventional numerical authentication by pictures. An 
authentication attempt is successful when the user correctly selects the images that are 
part of their portfolio among other decoys within the display panel. Three different 
systems were implemented to allow authentication through multiple rounds or sequencing 
of images. The first proposal was VIP1, which always displays the four secret pictures of 
the user in fixed locations on the visual keypad. The user is required to memorise the 
sequence of their password pictures and must enter them in the correct order. VIP2 differs 
by locating the four password pictures randomly over the visual keypad. However, the 
concept is a bit different in VIP3, where a portfolio of eight pictures is assigned to the 
user. At every login attempt, a 4x4 challenge set is presented to the user containing four 
random portfolio pictures together with additional 12 distractors. To authenticate, users 
have to identify their pre-set images amongst the 16 images shown on the interface in any 
sequence.  
The authors also evaluated the usability and security of the VIP schemes in comparison 
with the traditional PIN. The study that involved 61 participants revealed that pictures 
cause less error than numbers. The sequence errors when retrieving sequences of numbers 
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were more frequent than when recognising sequences of pictures. Although VIP3 from 
among the three schemes underperformed as participants of this type were the slowest, 
but it provides more security features. Besides, VIP3 received a relatively good user 
satisfaction of over than 5 out of 7 positive attitude. Overall, in comparison with PIN, 
VIP was preferred by users and perceived as more secure and memorable. 
  
VIP1 and VIP2 Interface VIP3 Interface 
Figure 3-20: "Visual Identification Protocol" (VIP) challeng sets (De Angeli et al., 2002) 
Jansen et al. (2003) proposed a scheme to authenticate users to mobile devices, especially 
PDAs, making use of themes and thumbnails. Their scheme’s design was built over a 
visual login technique known as "Picture Password". The first step in this technique is the 
password enrolment stage, which involves choosing a theme among a set of predefined 
themes (e.g. sea, cat and dog, etc.) or flexibly provides a favourite set of images for 
display. The theme is a 5×6 matrix consists of thumbnail photos either randomly laid out 
or possibly shaped as a single composite image. Each thumbnail image and selection 
sequence is assigned a numerical value, which will be combined to generate a numerical 
password entry. An authentication attempt is successfully verified when all the enrolled 
thumbnail photos are recognised and clicked in the correct sequence. One drawback of 
this system is its small password space due to the number of thumbnail photos being 
limited to only 30. Another addressed issue is that the resulting passcode is short in length 
compared to the textual password. This problem can be tackled by enlarging the size of 
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the password space through selecting one or two thumbnail photos in one single action 
(similar to the use of a shift key on a traditional keyboard).  
 
Figure 3-21: "Picture Password" scheme: 1. Theme layout, 2. Single composite image 
(Jansen et al., 2003) 
Charruau, Furnell and Dowland proposed an alternative authentication method based on 
graphics recognition named "PassImages" (Charruau, Furnell & Dowland, 2005) 
(Charruau, 2004). The method allows users to select six images out of a total of 100 
images on 5×5 grids. In order to authenticate, the user needs to click on the target images. 
For security purposes, a ‘traffic lights’ system is employed to make the display of chosen 
images invisible for prying eyes to avoid capturing the selection. However, after a short 
period of usage the average time spent on authentication was still somewhat longer 
compared to the typical time taken in text-based authentication. As a prevention measure, 
due to the threat of social engineering, it has been suggested that the image database 
should be increased and hobbies-related images that the user might choose in accordance 
with a pre-questionnaire data should be filtered out.  
Over 90 days of experiment duration, 29 users participated in the method assessment. In 
this experiment, PassImage scheme attained a high success authentication rate (90%). 
However, time taken for authentication (around 20 seconds) was considered somewhat 
long. 
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Figure 3-22: "PassImage" Technique (Charruau, 2004) 
"ColorLogin" is a graphical password scheme proposed by Gao et al. that aims to decrease 
the login time via the use of background colours (Gao et al., 2009c) (Gao et al., 2009a). 
Using colours was designed to confuse the observers without burdening the real users. 
ColorLogin avoids the issue of the visual mouse click selection, which may cause 
shoulder-surfing attack, by allowing the user to click on any deceptive icons on the same 
row rather than pass-icons. In the registration phase, the user needs to choose a colour 
from a random set of system colours. Among the icons of the chosen colour, the user 
should select a set of icons as pass-icons. To login, the user is challenged over a number 
of rounds each of which displays random icons on the screen. Using background colours 
organise and ease the process of searching for pass-icons within many others, which 
greatly reduces the login time. Moreover, ColorLogin resists intersection attack by 
considering the appearance probability of each icon. In other words, display equal 
probabilities for both pass-icons and decoy icons. 
Thirty participants involved in an experiment to evaluate the usability and security of the 
proposed scheme. In general, ColorLogin performed well compared to similar schemes 
but slightly slower than text-based password. According to the post-test questionnaire, 
participants found the login time still acceptable. The results showed 93.3% success rate 
with the first login attempt and 100% within three chances. All users remembered their 
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predefined colours correctly. As for the memorability test, participants were asked to re-
login after one month, and all of them succeeded within three login attempts. In the 
security part of the experiment, the resistance of shoulder-surfing attack was examined 
by requesting participants to act as onlookers to catch the credentials of their colleagues 
and then try to use the stolen information to access ColorLogin. The result demonstrated 
a high immunity against shoulder-surfing since none of the onlookers managed to login 
successfully. 
  
The displayed screen. A completed round. 
Figure 3-23: The login interface of "ColorLogin" (Gao et al., 2009c) 
Gao et al. (2010) inspired by DAS (Jermyn et al., 1999) and Story (Davis, Monrose & 
Reiter, 2004) schemes and proposed a new shoulder-surfing resistant scheme called 
"CDS". The scheme replaces the direct clicking on pass-images with drawing a line across 
them. That is aimed at confusing peepers as the drawing curve passes through both pass-
images and decoys. CDS password is composed of several images selected orderly by the 
user as pass-images. To aid the user memory, pass-images can be connected mentally by 
constructing a story. In addition, CDS enhance the resistance of shoulder-surfing attack 
by displaying degraded version of the images to reduce the viewing ability from a distance 
or a side. To login, users need to identify their pass-images and then draw a line starting 
with a given start image (head) crossing all pass-images in the correct order and finish 
with a given end image (tail). 
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Twenty participants were invited to a user study that evaluates the usability and compares 
it against Story scheme. The study was conducted in two sessions; first day and a week 
later. The results demonstrated a longer password creation time and login time for CDS 
group compared to Story group. The success rate of CDS scheme was high 96.5% but not 
as high as the Story scheme which achieved 98.2%. In the long-term recall test that took 
place one week later, CDS participants performed better which also showed an 
improvement in the login time in the favour of CDS. 
 
Figure 3-24: "CDS" scheme login interface: A possible drawing trace (Gao et al., 2010) 
Khot, Kumaraguru and Srinathan (2012) proposed a scheme named "WYSWYE" (Where 
You See is What You Enter) to protect recognition-based graphical passwords against 
shoulder-surfing threat. Two variations of the proposed approach were implemented in 
the form of: Horizontal Reduce (HR) and Dual Reduce (DR). Although they are different 
in terms of the challenge grid size and the process of identifying and mapping the image 
pattern, the underlying strategy stays the same. In the registration phase of the Dual 
Reduce (DR) scheme, users are presented with a set of 28 images and required to create 
a password of four distinct images. During the login time, the scheme generates two side-
by-side grids; the Challenge grid contains random images, four of which correspond to 
the password and the remaining 21 are decoys. The user is expected to interact with the 
second grid only, the Response grid, which is smaller in size, it is initially empty and used 
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for the input entry purposes. In order to map between the different size grids, the user 
must reduce the bigger challenge grid to the size of the response grid. That is done by a 
mental elimination of the rows and columns that do not contain any of the password 
images from the challenge grid. Login is achieved by locating the password images 
positions inside the reduced Challenge grid and by subsequently using the Response grid 
to map them accurately. The user is authenticated when the mapped positions match the 
positions of the password images. In this technique, users are not required to select their 
password images by clicking on them. Instead, they are only used to locate the associated 
positions to be marked in the response grid. This would make shoulder-surfing attacks 
ineffective, since it is hard to correlate the marked positions back to the password images 
in the challenge grid.  
A controlled lab study was conducted that involved 24 participants who evaluated several 
usability elements. The mean login time was 35.5 seconds, even with practice there was 
no significant improvement. As far as the security study is concerned, only 16 out of the 
24 users did participate in the security study. The users were shown screenshots of a login 
session and were challenged to recognise the password images. Within the 3 tries given 
to each user, only 1 participant managed to guess part of the challenge, 2 out of the 4 
required images. 
 
Figure 3-25: "WYSWYE" Dual Reduce (DR) scheme (Khot, Kumaraguru & Srinathan, 2012) 
 a) Main challenge grid, b) Reduced challenge grid, c) Response grid 
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Additional choice-based schemes were reviewed and added to ‘Appendix A’ including 
"Gaze-Contingent" (Dunphy, Fitch & Olivier, 2008), "Image Based Registration and 
Authentication System" (IBRAS) (Akula & Devisetty, 2004), "Convex Hull Click 
scheme" (CHC) (Wiedenbeck et al., 2006), "Shoulder-Surfing-Proof" (SSP) (Wu et al., 
2014), "Weinshall approach" (Weinshall, 2004), "DynaHand" (Renaud & Olsen, 2007), 
"Graphical Password with Icons" (GPI) and "Graphical Password with Icons suggested 
by the System" (GPIS) (Bicakci et al., 2009). However, these schemes are included in the 
comparison studies at the end of the section, which should help in gaining better 
outcomes.   
 
 
3.4.2. Typing-based recognition schemes 
The use of keyboard/keypad as an input mechanism instead of using mouse has been 
discussed previously in subsection (3.3.3). In this section, attention is paid to those 
recognition schemes that utilise keystrokes as an entry approach to submit the necessary 
access data.  
 
Weinshall (2006) developed a protocol named "Cognitive Authentication scheme" to 
resist spyware and shoulder-surfing. The technique requires users to set up and memorise 
an image portfolio containing their password images. To login, users need to distinguish 
their portfolio images within the panel. The authentication path is mentally computed by 
navigating the panel from the top-left corner searching for the user’s portfolio. Two 
conditions control this navigation; if the stood on image is one of the previously chosen 
password images, then the required action is ‘move down’, otherwise it is ‘move right’. 
Once the right or bottom edge of the panel is reached, the corresponding label for that 
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row or column should be noted down. The process is repeated over several rounds. This 
protocol aimed to increase the resistance to dictionary attacks and eavesdropping attacks. 
The protocol was tested by 9 users over 6 months to examine the memorability and ease 
of use. The result demonstrated a high success rate as well as memory retention. However, 
later in 2007, Golle and Wagner (2007) proved the incorrectness of Weinshall’s claim 
(Weinshall, 2006) that the Cognitive Authentication scheme is secure against 
eavesdropping attacks. By observing only a couple of successful logins, it was possible 
to recover the secret key of a user in a few seconds. 
 
Figure 3-26: A high complexity query panel of "Cognitive Authentication scheme" 
(Weinshall, 2006) 
In 2008, Mohammed et al. (2008) worked on a new scheme that depends on multiple 
rounds of challenge-response authentication to resist shoulder-surfing attacks. Creating a 
password requires the users to select multiple icons as their pass-icons. Users of this 
scheme are only required to remember the password pictures in sequence. The 
authentication challenges the user to recognise a minimum number of the password icons 
from a larger set of random icons. In a response to the challenge, the user must enter the 
pass-icon’s position where it is located on the screen in a form of numbers (0 – 9). Thus, 
the user must look for the pass-icon and then enter the number of the row and column 
where the pass-icon is positioned. Challenges are repeated for several rounds and then 
73 
authenticate the user when all responses are correct. In case of authentication failure, the 
system does not provide specific feedback about the error location.    
Usability evaluation was carried out by ten participants over two sessions. At the first day 
session, users were asked to login repeatedly for ten successful attempts. One week later, 
participants were requested to recognise the five pass-icons that were presented within a 
list of 100 random unlabeled icons. The result demonstrated that the required ten correct 
logins were achieved by all participants. The mean login time was about 64 seconds for 
correct password inputs consist of 5 icons. In regards to security, the scheme was resistant 
to dictionary attacks, brute-force, guessing and shoulder-surfing attacks. 
 
Figure 3-27: Login interface: Mohd's scheme (Mohammed et al., 2008) 
Komanduri and Hutchings (2008) implemented a picture password system with the ability 
to produce a memorable, high-entropy password. An easy to guess password is a general 
problem associated with user-selected passwords. Thus, their system attempts to avoid 
this problem by assigning users with a composed random password. The proposed system 
consists of 80 unrepeated pictures each one of which is labelled with a character. Each 
participant is assigned with a unique arrangement of eight items known as the ‘home 
grid’, which they need to recognise to fulfil the future authentication requirements. 
Pictures are always placed in a fixed-location within the home grid with the same 
correspondent keyboard key. In this system, a dual input ability is enabled by using either 
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the keyboard or an on-screen mouse cursor. Furthermore, another initiative was launched 
to accept an unordered input thus allowing the selection of the correct images in any order. 
A study was conducted on three time intervals (day 1, 2, and 9) respectively and involved 
15 participants in the picture-based study. The outcomes of the memorability test showed 
an average result of 67% success rate after one week for the ordered input task whereas 
the unordered task achieved 100% correct attempts. According to that, a successful 
authentication system could benefit more from the unordered recall. In terms of the entry 
time, the scheme performed well with a mean login time of 13.7 seconds.  
    
Figure 3-28: "Komanduri & Hutchings" Picture Password (Komanduri & Hutchings, 2008) 
 
3.4.3. Comparative summary of Recognition-based techniques 
This section uses a similar comparing process to that used previously for the Recall-based 
schemes in subsection 3.3.4, but this time the recognition-based schemes are compared. 
Comparative summaries of these techniques are presented in Table 3-5, Table 3-6 and 
Table 3-7, involving three main aspects that are technique attributes, security and 
usability. As mentioned earlier, the source of the collected data was the existing literature. 
Some schemes were included in the comparison whereas others were excluded depending 
on the sufficiency of the available data. The comparison tables were designed to include 
as much meaningful information as possible.  
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Table 3-5: Recognition-based attributes comparison 
A comprehensive attributes-based comparison was conducted, and the results are 
presented in Table 3-5. This table shows that there is an increase in the number of the 
research inventions in the area of recognition-based graphical authentication over the 
years. The output of the conducted comparison shows that almost all recognition-based 
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graphical authentication schemes utilise multiple images or icons to allow users to 
identify and choose password images from amongst other images. However, the Picture 
Password scheme offered the option to use either a single image or multiple images as 
preferred.  
It can be also inferred that the recognition-based technique is fundamentally associated 
with a direct choice-based approach or with the additional support of the keypad typing 
entry approach otherwise. Only a few schemes failed to correlate such as AuthentiGraph 
and GPI & GPIS since they make use of a click-based approach while SSP makes use of 
key pressing instead. Furthermore, a single scheme (CDS) has used drawing approach 
within the recognition-based technique. A number of recognition-based techniques have 
benefited from the keypad typing entry approach, which seems more viable with choice-
based schemes than others.  
Recognition-based schemes were also compared based upon some of the major security 
features and vulnerabilities that were covered in the existing literature. The compared 
features were almost the same as that in the Recall-based techniques (subsection 3.3.4) 
including the use of multiple rounds, and hash function, while the comparison of 
vulnerability involved the susceptibility to various types of attack, such as shoulder-
surfing, guessing, dictionary attack and spyware. The only difference is the addition of 
the following related features: 
• Shuffling images: dynamic image locations, always changeable.  
• System assigned images: users are not allowed to select their secret images; instead 
the system will assign images for them, which can help to avoid vulnerabilities such 
as the choice of predictable images.   
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Table 3-6: Recognition-based security features and vulnerabilities comparison 
It was found that the recognition-based techniques also suffer from a lack of available 
security details, as already mentioned earlier. According to Table 3-6, the majority of 
schemes are featured with image shuffling and multiple rounds. However, system 
assigned images have been implemented in just a few schemes. The use of hashing 
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function was rather limited. As far as the security vulnerability is concerned, Table 3-6 
shows that more than half of the compared schemes have managed to resist shoulder-
surfing attacks whereas above the third have prevented guessing or spyware attacks. An 
interesting finding is that schemes tend to focus on a certain type of attack and provide 
the necessary safeguard but unfortunately other threatening attacks are neglected. 
Although it is infeasible to protect the authentication mechanism from all types of attacks, 
but schemes should at least consider as much protections as possible. 
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Table 3-7: Recognition-based usability features comparison 
Recognition-based schemes were also compared based upon common usability features 
(Table 3-7), such as the use of themes, memorability, mnemonics and the conducted user 
study. Providing themes and image categories for users to choose from is one of the 
usability features that has been implemented in some of the recognition-based schemes. 
This feature may help in better remembering user’s images. User-provided images is 
another feature, but it has not been widely used. Despite the fact that allowing users to 
provide their own images appears to be a good usability feature that may contribute in 
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making the technique easier to remember but on the other hand it allows advisory to easily 
distinguish the image sources and identify the secret images of the user. In terms of 
memorability, some of the compared schemes claim to excel in this area; however, 
mnemonic in the choice-based techniques does not seem to be linked with memorability 
unlike the recall-based techniques. 
 
3.5. Hybrid graphical technique 
The Hybrid technique category contains any scheme that falls into more than one category 
or utilises multiple approaches. Most researches in this area aim to combine interesting 
features that exist in some techniques but not in another or to overcome the shortcomings 
of the available schemes. The integration is aimed to bring more strength to the proposed 
system and mitigate known issues. This category of the graphical authentication excludes 
any scheme with optional (non-combined) features such as that offered by AuthentiGraph 
scheme where more than one entry approach are provided for the user to choose 
whichever convenient. A collection of schemes of this type are reviewed and compared 
next. 
 
Motivated by the "Where Is Waldo" (WIW) technique, Hong et al. further enhanced the 
scheme by adding a flexibility feature as a way of assigning each pass-object variant with 
the user’s own codes (Hong et al., 2004) (Man, Hong & Matthews, 2003). Simply, 
password creation is achieved by choosing 4 pass-icons from an icon library. Each icon 
consists of 4 variations. The user is required to assign a corresponding string to every 
variation. In order to login, the user needs to identify the pre-chosen pass-icons from the 
grid and enter the pre-determined string corresponding to each pass-icon variation. 
Although this method aims to produce a password strongly resistant to spyware, it shares 
the same weakness of the text-based password where users are forced to memorise many 
texts. 
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Variations & codes of pass-icons  Login Screen 
Figure 3-29: Hong authentication technique (Hong et al., 2004) 
Suo, Zhu and Owen (2006) developed a hybrid graphical password technique, derived 
from both recognition and recall based techniques, called "Recall-a-Formation" (RAF). 
The scheme is composed of two 8×8 tables: a data table and an input table. The data table 
contains the possible choices of icons from different themes and the input table on which 
the user needs to place the recalled pre-registered formation of icons in the correct 
locations. In the registration stage, the user registers the icons formation to model the 
graphical password by selecting icons from the data table then drag and drop them into 
the desired cells on the input table. In the authentication stage, users must correctly 
recognise and select the target icons among the distracting icons and precisely place each 
icon into the exact input table cell. Although the data table can be very large with pages 
of icons of different themes, just one theme page is capable of producing a large password 
space. To evaluate the scheme, 30 users participated in a preliminary study to use and 
interact with the system, and on the next day users were asked to recall their passwords. 
Only 11 users managed to remember the pre-chosen formation and icons correctly. 50% 
of the users succeeded in remembering half of the icons. As a result, memorability was 
identified as a usability issue that needs improvement. 
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Figure 3-30: main interface of "RAF" (Suo, Zhu & Owen, 2006) 
In 2009, van Oorschot and Wan (2009) proposed a hybrid authentication method called 
"TwoStep" to increase the security using a two-step process that keeps the traditional use 
of text passwords and adds the recognition-based graphical passwords. Graphical 
password is created by choosing a number of images from several verification rounds to 
form the user image portfolio. The first login step requires entering a text password as 
normal and then the second step involves graphical password verification. The system 
displays a set of images in each round and users need to select their pre-chosen images. 
A successful user login is achieved by completing all rounds with correct text and 
graphical passwords.   
The authors also described a simple method to reduce the threat of shoulder-surfing attack 
(Figure 3-31).  The idea is to associate each displayed image with an index number. A 
selection panel is located in the lower part of the screen, which displays all index numbers 
in an ascending order. In this approach, users need to look for their images and click on 
the corresponding index number on the selection panel. Although this method can 
mitigate normal human peeping but cannot protect against such attacks with camera 
recording. However, this approach can reduce the vulnerability against naive keylogger 
attacks and phishing attacks since the latter requires knowing the image portfolios of the 
users beforehand, which is quite difficult. Another advantage is the indirect alert that users 
can have when seeing unfamiliar images other than their portfolios after submitting wrong 
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text-based passwords. The password strength of TwoStep was measured by entropy in 
bits. Thus, the graphical part of the scheme may enhance the security significantly, as it 
can add 12.8 bits of entropy for un-ordered images, or 25.6 bits for ordered images. 
 
Figure 3-31: "TwoStep" Graphical authentication step (van Oorschot & Wan, 2009)   
Citty and Hutchings (2010) introduced a system called "Touch-screen Authentication 
using Partitioned Images" (TAPI) that works similarly as a Personal Identification 
Number (PIN) system but uses partitioned images instead. The user of this method needs 
to enter not only one of 16 images, but also to choose the right partition of the image. At 
each login time, there are 64 possible options (4 partitions × 16 images) for the user to 
select from rather than 10 options in most PIN systems. The image is partitioned in the 
shape of X, which appeal to the ease of remembering the physical regions such as top, 
right, left, and bottom. When the user selects the image partition, the system shows no 
feedback of the selection to improve the authentication entry security. Applying the image 
partition can mitigate the shoulder-surfing attack since it would be less likely for an 
observer to be able to recognise the exact selected partition of an image. In addition, the 
increased number of possible sequences increase the difficulty for guessing attack but at 
the same time decreases target size which can cause errors and thus likely extend the entry 
time. 
83 
Thirty participants involved in two lab studies to examine the scheme. The results 
demonstrate that the level of memorability and entry time provided by TAPI scheme is 
fairly high. However, the scheme is not overly burdensome and enhances the overall 
security. After one week of non-use, 90% of users managed to remember their 
authentication with a median best entry time of 3.5 seconds. 
 
Figure 3-32: "TAPI" entry system (Citty & Hutchings, 2010) 
Jali, Furnell and Dowland (2011) studied the idea of joining two graphical password 
techniques to enhance the security. A prototype named "Enhanced Graphical 
Authentication System" (EGAS) was implemented that combines click-based and choice-
based graphical authentications. The system requires the user to remember 6 images in 
total. The first 2 images are assigned randomly by the system and the other 4 images are 
left for the user to choose from different image categories. Following the images 
selection, the user needs to create secret clicks by clicking once on each image.  As far as 
the login is concerned, four scenarios were tested with variation in the number of rounds 
and the displayed images. The login task is the same in all scenarios where the system 
displays secret images and decoys on the screen. Whether the image is a secret one or 
decoy, the user still needs to click on them all to make it harder for an attacker to guess 
users’ real secret images. Access is granted when all secret images are clicked correctly. 
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To evaluate the scheme, 30 users participated in lab trials which covered the usability 
performance. The results showed a maintained memorability with a reasonable 
creation/login time, high clicking accuracy, and positive users’ preference. Nevertheless, 
some serious issues were reported in the trial such as the user tendency to select similar 
and guessable images as well as clicking on easy to guess objects and areas. 
 
Figure 3-33: "EGAS" Login Interface - Scenario Four (Jali, 2011) 
A combination of features from several schemes has formed the base of the new scheme 
proposed by Deshmukh and Devale (2013). To create a password, the system displays 4 
random images. Users need to select click points and add single number/character on each 
of the first 3 images. The last image is for users to draw a secret and add single 
number/character. In order to login, users must identify the images, click on the correct 
points, enter the right number/character, and draw the secret on correct image. Failure to 
provide any part of the password would result in an unsuccessful authentication attempt. 
Unfortunately, this scheme has not reported information about any type of experiment to 
evaluate the aspect of usability and security.    
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Figure 3-34: Login interface for Deshmukh’s scheme (Deshmukh & Devale., 2013) 
 
3.5.1. Comparative summary of the Hybrid graphical techniques 
The same comparison process used in the previous categories is also followed in this 
section putting the hybrid schemes this time under assessment. Table 3-8, Table 3-9 and 
Table 3-10 present different comparative summaries of these techniques including 
technique attributes, security and usability. It is clear from Table 3-8 that the interest in 
hybrid techniques has a relatively recent start about a decade ago. The number of 
proposed schemes of this category is considerably low so far. The reason for that might 
be due to the difficulty of the integration or the low performance expected as a result of 
joining several techniques. On the other hand, the combination can take advantage of the 
identified good features and work towards eliminating bad ones. Thus, a further 
investigation is needed to find out more about the feasibility of such proposals. 
Apparently, almost all hybrid schemes depend on choice approach and use multi-images 
and none has used grids as a style for the challenge set. Besides, some schemes used 
clicking as a second approach whereas only one scheme has used drawing alongside with 
clicking and typing approaches. Typing entry approach has been also utilised by some 
schemes in the hybrid graphical technique.   
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Table 3-8: Hybrid technique attributes comparison 
Hybrid schemes were compared against the major security features and vulnerabilities 
that were already available in the literature (Table 3-9). The compared security features 
were the same as that used earlier in recognition-based techniques (subsection 3.4.3). It 
seems that schemes of this kind are more resistant to guessing and shoulder-surfing 
attacks. Additionally, only one scheme reported data with respect to its resistance to 
spyware or recordability.  
Table 3-9: Hybrid technique security features and vulnerabilities comparison 
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Table 3-10 presents the hybrid schemes which were compared based upon common 
usability features, such as the use of themes, memorability, mnemonics and the type of 
the conducted user study. Unfortunately, the result of the comparison is very poor and 
does not reveal any significant data that might help in exploring the usability features of 
such category. However, EGAS was the only scheme to report sufficient data about the 
conducted study. It can be depicted that none of the hybrid schemes has conducted a field 
study. 
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Table 3-10: Hybrid techniques usability features comparison 
 
3.6. The integration of Graphical authentication and One-time password  
One of the methods to produce one-time password without resorting to the conventional 
means (devices) is through the use of graphical authentication. It should be noted here 
that this section is not a graphical password category by itself but rather consists of a 
collection of schemes falling under different graphical authentication categories with a 
special feature in common that is the use of One-time password technique. However, the 
literature of some schemes included here has not necessarily mentioned the production of 
pseudo-random passwords but rather realised to do so by reviewing the scheme process. 
Thus, these schemes are reviewed and compared separately in this section for the sake of 
understanding how researchers managed to combine between these important techniques 
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– graphical password and one-time password, and what are the advantages and 
disadvantages of such integration.  
 
In 2005, Craymer and Howes invented a secure authentication methodology called 
"GrIDsure" (Blair, 2007), which was later acquired in 2010 by CRYPTOCard Inc. 
(CRYPTOCard Inc, 2010b) (CRYPTOCard Inc, 2010a) to be re-launched in a 
commercial technique form. GrIDsure generates a dynamic one-time password excluding 
the need for any additional hardware or software requirements. On the first use, a 
registration stage should be completed whereby a 5×5 grid of cells is presented to the user 
to select a favourite 'Personal Identification Pattern' (PIP), which is composed of 4 cells 
of any shape in any order. This chosen pattern (PIP) is all what the user needs to remember 
to login, which enables them to provide dynamic characters shown on their (PIP) cells in 
order to be securely authenticated. In each authentication attempt, the grid cells will be 
filled in with a random set of characters. The user is required to use a keyboard to input 
the corresponding characters occupying the (PIP) cells of the previously selected pattern.  
 
Figure 3-35: Authentication stage of "GrIDsure" technique (SafeNet, 2015) 
In 2006, Weber revealed an initial security analysis of GrIDsure in comparison to the 
traditional PIN as reported in (Biddle, Chiasson & van Oorschot, 2012). The study 
outcomes showed that GrIDsure passwords attain better security, especially in terms of 
shoulder-surfing attacks. However, several weaknesses of the system were noted by Bond 
(2008) in his initial comments. The report argued that GrIDsure is not more secure than 
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a static PIN if secret observation is possible. Security is also compromised due to the 
users’ tendency to select from a limited subset of predictable patterns. In addition, 
susceptibility to screen scraping and challenge grids retrieval from PCs were also 
mentioned as security issues associated with the system that lead to a lack of protection 
against phishing and man-in-the-middle attacks.  
  
Brostoff, Inglesant and Sasse (2010) evaluated the GrIDsure scheme independently and 
concluded that having one pass-pattern for people to use lead to high usability and 
memorability of the system. As far as the security was concerned, the study showed that 
the security level depends on the usage circumstances with, for instance, scores being 
better in situations where repeated observations of transactions are unlikely to occur. User 
instructions and guidance, which aim to narrow down the likelihood of choosing obvious 
or easy to guess patterns, were also found to positively impact upon security. However, 
GrIDsure may be hindered from being more secure than a conventional PIN when there 
is a small effective pattern space or when it is possible to capture multiple sessions of the 
one-time PIN along with the displayed grid.  
 
Dimitropoulos (2011) proposed an enhanced version of GrIDsure using background 
images in an attempt to persuade users to choose more complicated patterns and hence 
stronger passwords. The same technique as the original GrIDsure was used but with the 
help of a background image. An experiment was conducted in order to measure the impact 
of the background images with the GrIDsure on the usability and the users’ choice. The 
result showed that using background images had a positive effect on the pattern choice. 
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Figure 3-36: "Enhanced-GrIDsure" with a background image (Dimitropoulos, 2011) 
 
GrIDsure security was also analysed by Jhawar et al. (2011). The outcomes of the study 
stated that the current form of GrIDsure is vulnerable to communications interception. 
Identifying the security issues motivated the authors to suggest some security 
improvements. Thus, they proposed a system called "GrIDsure with 4 Patterns" (GS4), 
which involves two enhancements to harden the original implementation of GrIDsure 
scheme against Man-in-the-Middle or alike attacks. GS4 requires the user to select and 
register several patterns in association with their user account. In each authentication 
attempt, the user is first notified through an Out-Of-Band (OOB) technique (e.g. sending 
out an SMS to the registered mobile number of the legitimate user) to indicate which 
pattern amongst the pre-registered ones is necessary to be used for authentication at this 
specific time. As Out-Of-Band service is utilised, the second proposed enhancement 
involves sending another parameter (e.g. a random one-time string) to the user’s mobile 
phone in addition to the required pattern number. As a result, a further security complexity 
is added since the attacker is supposedly unable to keep control of both communication 
channels (the grid and the user response).  
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Figure 3-37: "GrIDsure with 4 Patterns" (GS4) (Jhawar et al., 2011) 
Patterns authentication (P1: PVRN, P2: AGMS, P3: KCWX, P4: IDNJ) 
Gao et al. innovated a solution based on a challenge-response protocol to enhance the 
security via protecting the graphical passwords against spyware attacks by utilising 
CAPTCHA (Completely Automated Public Turing tests to tell Computers and Humans 
Apart) technique (Gao et al., 2009b) (Wang et al., 2010). The new authentication scheme 
is a combination of graphical password and textual CAPTCHA, and it stands in the face 
of the automated programs to prevent passwords harvesting, whilst nonetheless remains 
a human solvable task.  
The authors proposed two schemes called the ‘Basic scheme’ and the ‘Improved scheme’. 
In the basic one, a CAPTCHA instance is assigned and embedded into each displayed 
image. To register, users need to choose and remember what is called (pass-images) as 
their password. In order to authenticate, users are required to pass two tests. First is the 
image recognition, where they need to look for their pass-images among other decoy 
images. That is followed by the second test, which involves solving and typing the 
assigned CAPTCHA string that appears underneath each pass-image. One main weakness 
of the basic scheme is the invertible relationship between passwords and the entered 
string, which may result in a simplification of the analysis and distinguishing process.   
The second scheme is an improvement of the aforementioned basic scheme, and it aims 
to overcome the vulnerabilities discussed earlier in the basic scheme. The improved 
technique uses a predefined random length as opposed to the uniform length used in the 
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basic scheme. Consequently, users need to select and memorise the letter positions of 
each pass-image, which are also called pass-positions. For example, the code can be 
formed by the letters in 1st, 3rd and 7th position of the string. The characters 
corresponding to the pass-positions of each pass-image should be entered correctly by the 
user during the authentication.  
The scheme was evaluated in-lab by 36 users over 3 sessions (day one, after a week, and 
after a month). The success login rate appeared to be considerably high with 87.8% and 
the mean login time when using 4 pass-images was 24.8 second. As far as the 
memorability is concerned, 80.6% of the login attempts were successful after one week 
while participants managed to obtain 72.2% correct attempts a month later. That shows 
that the scheme is relatively easy to remember after some time of non-use.  
 
Figure 3-38: The interface of Gao’s CAPTCHA scheme (Gao et al., 2009b) 
Gupta et al. implemented an authentication technique based on inkblots’ mnemonics 
called "Passblot" similar to the scheme introduced by (Stubblefield & Simon, 2004) but 
with an added security (Gupta et al., 2012) (Gupta et al., 2011). Passblot uses a set of 
inkblots unique to each user to generate pseudo random one-time passwords. In this 
scheme, only ten inkblot-like random images are used. During the first use of the system, 
users are presented with 10 inkblots one after another and asked to assign a description 
to each inkblot. The inkblot association is formed by the first and last letters of the 
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description. In the authentication phase, four out of the ten inkblots are shown to the users, 
and they should enter the corresponding associations. Getting at least three correct 
associations out of four leads the user to gain access. Lastly, a user study conducted on 
the proposed system showed on the one hand a good memorability level and on the other 
resistance capability to a number of active and passive security attacks. Nevertheless, 
some users encountered difficulty in describing inkblots and thus memorising those 
descriptions later on.     
 
Figure 3-39: Login screen for "Passblot" (Gupta et al., 2012) 
Confident Technologies® has introduced a new approach that provides an image-based 
one-time password named "Confident ImageShield™" (Roman Yudkin - Confident 
Technologies®, 2011). In this technique, the registration phase involves selecting a few 
easy to remember categories. Each authentication attempt displays a 3×3 grid full of 
random images overlaid by alphanumeric characters. The user is then prompted to 
identify the images that match the pre-selected themes. Finally, the user needs to type in 
the alphanumeric characters associated with the password images. A feature of this 
scheme is the changeable location of the pictures and their characters. As a result, a unique 
one-time password or PIN is submitted at each login attempt.  
 
Figure 3-40: "ImageShield" scheme (Roman Yudkin - Confident Technologies®, 2011) 
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Ku et al. proposed a solution to generate a "Graphical One Time Password" (GOTP) for 
financial services using smartphones (Ku et al., 2012) (Ku et al., 2013). The password 
creation is based on selecting an image portfolio over four rounds that should form a story 
to act as a recall assistant. Each authentication round displays images on a 4×9 grid frame 
in the correct order. The respective alphanumeric OTP code is shown on the top left 
corner of each image, and the user needs to memorise these codes for the next round. The 
final fifth round is the password input step, which contains a random layout display of 12 
buttons to allow entering the memorised four OTP codes matching the image portfolio. 
The result of the study showed that the average registration time was quite fast with 
positive results that evaluated the password recall convenience, recall interference, and 
authentication time.  
However, GOTP approach still requires the user to memorise alphanumerical code 
obtained through identifying the pass-images over several rounds and then enter that code 
in the final round. That in turn may require memory recall from the user, resulting in 
usability issues. In addition, GOTP is designed for mobile platform that can be used as 
an out-of-band channel for authentication to be carried out away from the browser. In 
other words, there is a need for an additional device (smartphone) to be present in order 
to use GOTP scheme which is not always an issue for many users nowadays. Furthermore, 
the length of the OTP code generated by GOTP is considered short.  
 
Figure 3-41: Authentication process of "GOTP" scheme (Ku et al., 2012) 
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Zangooei, Mansoori and Welch (2012) aimed at overcoming the drawbacks of existing 
graphical authentication designs by integrating usability and security attributes of 
recognition-based and recall-based algorithms. The registration process of this scheme 
requires the user to select password images between three and five. The authentication 
process uses two matrices; one is a recognition-based scheme to provide the required 
usability features, the second matrix is a recall-based algorithm to satisfy the requirements 
of the security features. During the login, the user will be displayed a matrix of pictures 
that includes the pre-selected images. The user is required to look for the selected images 
and remember their cell positions in the matrix. Subsequently, the second matrix will be 
presented which contains cells filled by random alphanumerical strings. The user needs 
to type in the codes within the cells that correspond to the selected photos in the correct 
sequence as shown in the first matrix.  
The security of the system was assessed by its ability to resist shoulder-surfing and 
password guessing attacks. Security testing involved two participants acting as attackers 
to steal other user’s password while being entered. At each testing attempt of the 10 total 
times, two random attackers were assigned and placed in random positions and distances 
away from participants. Afterwards, the attackers were given a questionnaire to realise 
the number of password pictures they managed to identify. The result of the experiment 
demonstrated that attempts to compromise the entire password pictures were 
unsuccessful. However, identifying the first 3 letters was achieved by only 3 attackers.   
A study to evaluate the usability features was performed involving 30 participants who 
were given the chance to use the system on two separate days (a week apart) and then fill-
in the questionnaire to leave additional comments about the system. Despite the longer 
time taken to login, the feedback indicated that the system satisfies the users’ 
requirements. 
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First grid: Recognition-based approach Second grid: Recall-based approach 
Figure 3-42: Zangooei’s Hybrid scheme (Zangooei, Mansoori & Welch, 2012) 
 
3.6.1. Comparative summary of the OTP-based graphical techniques 
This section followed the same comparison process as that used in the previous graphical 
password categories. Table 3-11, Table 3-12 and Table 3-13 present comparative 
summaries of these techniques including technique attributes, security and usability. It is 
clear from Table 3-11 that most graphical password schemes with the utilisation of one-
time password technology were relatively recent proposals, which may indicate that this 
research domain is still rich and there are opportunities for enhancements.  
Apparently, all OTP-based graphical schemes depend on typing approach for data entry. 
Thus, there is a clear correlation between the use of keypad typing entry approach and the 
one-time password output, which seems viable relation. The majority of schemes use 
multi-images and just a few pattern-based schemes used grids as a style for the challenge 
set. Besides, none of the schemes utilised clicking nor drawing approaches.  
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Table 3-11: Attributes comparison of OTP-based schemes 
The schemes in this section were compared against the major security features and 
vulnerabilities based on the available literature (Table 3-12). The compared security 
features were similar to those used earlier to compare the recall-based and recognition-
based techniques. It seems that schemes of this kind are more resistant to shoulder-surfing 
and spyware attacks, while dictionary and guessing attacks were also resisted by a few 
schemes. Additionally, only one scheme reported data with respect to its resistance to 
hotspot or hot-images. It was also found that hash function has not been implemented in 
any scheme of this type at all. 
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Table 3-12: Comparing security features and vulnerabilities of OTP-based graphical schemes 
 
As far as the usability comparison is concerned, Table 3-13 presents the schemes which 
were compared based upon common usability features, such as the use of themes, 
memorability, mnemonics and the type of the conducted user study. Unfortunately, the 
result was not better than that obtained earlier in the hybrid graphical techniques 
comparison as no significant result can be revealed that might help in realising the 
usability features of such group of schemes. However, it can be depicted from the reported 
data that some of the schemes were easy to remember. 
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Table 3-13: Usability features comparison of OTP-based graphical schemes 
 
3.7. Password space and Entropy 
The theoretical password space (keyspace) is the set of all possible passwords for a certain 
password scheme with a given setting of parameters, as defined by Wiedenbeck et al. 
(2005c). With regard to the term ‘guessing entropy’, it can be defined as an average 
measure of the difficulty involved in guessing a password. Thus, password space and 
guessing entropy are directly related, and both play a critical role in measuring the 
strength of the password system since they determine how safe a system is in relation to 
resisting various guessing and brute force attacks (Burr et al., 2013). O'Gorman (2003) 
has described the relevant difference between keyspace and entropy as the keyspace is an 
absolute measure of the topmost or best-case, while the entropy is a statistical measure of 
how users select from the keyspace. Thus, the larger the keyspace and entropy are, the 
harder it is to successfully guess or break a password. 
 
Usually, users choose their passwords from smaller subsets of the available keys which 
limit the full password space of the system (i.e. select only letters without numbers). For 
that reason, the effective password space is used to calculate the number of passwords 
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that users are likely to select (Thorpe & van Oorschot, 2007). However, measuring the 
effective password space accurately is hard due to the variation of schemes and user 
choice preferences (Gao et al., 2013).  
The way to calculate the theoretical password space can be illustrated as follows: if a 
textual password has ‘N’ characters chosen from an alphanumeric of ‘M’ characters, then 
the password entropy ‘E’ is represented as E = (MN), and the password space ‘S’ is 
represented as S = MN = 2  (O'Gorman, 2003). So the password is said to have E bits of 
entropy, and there are 2E possible values. For instance, a password of 8 characters picked 
from 95 printable keyboard characters will produce 958 ≈ 6.63 x 1015 – this is 
approximately 253 possible passwords and about 53 bits of entropy. 
Generally, ensuring that the password space of graphical passwords is comparable to that 
of alphanumeric passwords is a major issue. Thus, success in achieving a relatively large 
password space is one important factor in claiming that the proposed scheme potentially 
has a good if not better security level. Nevertheless, password space size is not all that 
matters; password usability and memorability are also significant key factors. For 
instance, applying a system account lockout threshold should limit the number of failed 
authentication attempts and reject any further attempts. Hence, even if the password has 
low entropy, a guessing attack is unlikely to succeed easily (O'Gorman, 2003).  
As far as the graphical passwords are concerned, three main factors determine the 
password space size of the majority of the draw-based/grid-based graphical password 
schemes: the density of the grid, the number of strokes and the length of each stroke 
(Haichang et al., 2008). In most existing recognition-based schemes the password space 
is influenced by the authentication rounds, the number of images in each round and the 
number of targeted (password) images (Haichang et al., 2009). In click-based schemes, 
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the password space is usually sufficiently large due to the effect of the number of click 
points, image size and tolerance square. 
 
Table 3-14: Password space sizes for some authentication schemes 
 
Approach 
type
Authentication Mechanism
Range of available 
selections
Length of 
password entry 
Size of password 
space 
Password 
Entropy (Bits)
1 Textual Password 95 printable characters 8 alphanumerics 53
2 PIN Number 10 numbers 4 numbers 13
3 Draw-A-Secret (DAS) 5 x 5 grid size length= 10 48
4 Pass-Go 9 x 9 grid size length= 10 64
5 YAGP
48 x 64 grid size
3072 cells
20 strokes 232
image size = 451 x 331 
373 squares
5 click points 43
image size = 1024 x 752
1925 squares
5 click points 55
7 CCP 400 squares/5 images 5 click points 54
8
Multi-Factor Graphical 
Authentication
64 Clickable areas 8 Clicks 48
9 PassFaces 9 images/4 rounds 4 images 13
10 Déjà vu 20 images 5 images 14
11
Visual Identification Protocol 
(VIP)
10 images 4 images 13
12 Zheng (Shape & Text) 5x5 Grid  = 25 cells 13 strokes 60
13
Komanduri & Hutchings 
Picture Password 
80 images 8 items 50
14 Hong scheme 121 icons/4 rounds 4 icons 23
15 TwoStep (Graphical step) 36 images/1 round 3 images 13
16 GrIDsure 5x5 Grid  = 25 cells 4 cell pip 19
17 Gao CAPTCHA
CAPTCHA length = 8
50 images
4 images 30
18 Passblot 26 possibilities 6 characters 28
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Table 3-14 highlights the size of the password space and the entropy of various 
authentication mechanisms, considering a number of parameter settings and details. In 
this review, a collection of schemes was chosen to represent each authentication category. 
As mentioned earlier, the length of password plays an important role in calculating the 
password space. Thus, it should be noted that reasonable password lengths were selected 
for calculation in this study to avoid any unpractical enlargement of the password space 
results. For instance, the entropy of Pass-go scheme could reach 256 bits if the length of 
password increased to 30, but in reality, it seems difficult for many users to select and 
remember a drawing consists of 30 strokes. By exploring the data of the above table, some 
general outcomes can be inferred such as that the draw-based schemes can lead the 
providers of a large password space. As for the click- and typing -based schemes, they 
offer a comparable password space to that in textual passwords. It can be said that the 
password space provided by choice-based and hybrid schemes is relatively small. The 
password space offered by OTP-based graphical schemes seems reasonably average. 
More importantly, it was found that there was no specific method to calculate the 
password space for schemes of the same category, which might cause inconsistent results. 
Therefore, it is recommended to further investigate this issue and come up with standard 
methods and procedures for each category to calculate the password space consistently.   
 
3.8. Challenges in graphical authentication 
This section reviews and summarises the issues and disadvantages of the main graphical 
authentication techniques. Simply put, Table 3-15 outlines the specific issues of each 
approach as stated in the literature. 
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 Category Approach Disadvantage 
Recognition Choice-based 
Time consuming (Bhanushali et al., 2015) 
Easy to share with others (Dunphy, Nicholson & Olivier, 2008) 
Most suffer from a small password space size (Weiss & Luca, 
2008) 
Usability issues due to the crowded content arrangement (Suo, 
Zhu & Owen, 2006) (Wiedenbeck et al., 2006) 
Processing large number of icons reduces the system efficiency 
(Suo, Zhu & Owen, 2006) 
Many authentication rounds take users through several pages 
of images (Suo, Zhu & Owen, 2006) 
Can be influenced by gender/race or hot-image /category 
/theme /personal preferences (Weiss & Luca, 2008) (Davis, 
Monrose & Reiter, 2004) (Wiedenbeck et al., 2006) (Suo, Zhu & 
Owen, 2006) 
Recall 
Click-based 
Time consuming (Bhanushali et al., 2015) 
High predictability (Renaud & De Angeli, 2004) 
Susceptible to hotspots/similar click-points (Gupta et al., 2012) 
(Chiasson et al., 2008) 
Difficult for users to pinpoint a precise position (Renaud & De 
Angeli, 2004) 
Remembering the click points and their order is difficult 
(Chiasson et al., 2008) (Bhanushali et al., 2015) 
Self-selected graphical codes have lower entropy than textual 
passwords (Renaud & De Angeli, 2004) 
Difficult to find an image which offers a wide enough range of 
available memorable locations (Renaud & De Angeli, 2004) 
Draw-based 
Difficulty of using the input devices for drawing (Bhanushali et 
al., 2015) (Suo, Zhu & Owen, 2006) 
Difficult to repeat the same steps/accurately duplicate 
password drawings with precise stroke order (Wu et al., 2014) 
(Gupta et al., 2012) (Bhanushali et al., 2015) 
Difficult memory task because retrieval is done without 
memory prompts or cues (Biddle, Chiasson & Van Oorschot, 
2012) 
Users’ habit of drawing symmetric images with few strokes 
decreases the password space (Gupta et al., 2012) 
Table 3-15: Summary list of graphical password techniques' disadvantages 
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Time consumption seems one of the significant issues affecting the performance of the 
graphical passwords in general. However, entering image-based passwords should not be 
expected to perform better than text-based passwords from time perspective due to its 
very nature that requires a number of actions to complete the password submission. 
Additionally, learning and practicing the graphical password scheme would likely 
enhance the time taken for authentication but unlikely to shorten it to be competitive to 
textual passwords.  
The user tendency of choosing obvious patterns or being attracted to certain images is an 
apparent challenge for choice-based schemes. Another difficulty is the number of images, 
distractors, and rounds involved in such type of schemes which eventually affect the 
overall system performance. Therefore, it is important to select proper configurations 
while designing a graphical scheme. One way of confirming the right numbers for the 
scheme components is through statistical analysis of perceptions of largely enough group 
of users to ensure that the scheme fits for the intended purpose.  
Similarly, in click-based schemes users tend to select similar click-points which turn out 
to increase the predictability chances. One related obstacle of this approach is the 
difficulty of remembering the precise order of the click-points. Hence, it is essential to 
provide an image rich of memorable click areas to help users choosing easy to remember 
points. However, finding such images is relativity hard and needs careful selection.   
Memorability tends to be a serious issue for the draw-based approach by which reduce 
the likelihood of redrawing the password accurately. Moreover, the less familiarity of 
using the input devices for drawing is another obstacle that may limit the adoptability of 
such schemes. However, with the widespread use of touch-enabled devices, users can 
easily utilise such devices to perform the authentication drawings.     
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Generally, most graphical password mechanisms depend mainly on visual displays which 
add fundamental accessibility barriers (Hochheiser, Feng & Lazar, 2008). 
 
It is worth mentioning that although this section has gathered different challenges and 
disadvantages related to various types of graphical authentication, however, that does not 
necessarily mean that they apply for all schemes. On the contrary, many schemes have 
been introduced to overcome some of these reported issues in the first place. 
In spite of the above-mentioned challenges facing the graphical password authentications, 
they can offer many other potentials and advantages such as passwords space 
enlargement, higher memorability, and complicating the disclosure of passwords in either 
written or verbal form. 
     
3.9. Summary 
In summary, there is a growing interest in replacing traditional text-based passwords with 
graphical authentication techniques. This chapter has focused comprehensively on 
graphical authentication schemes. Various types of graphical passwords from diverse 
range of categories have been reviewed to end up with an overall comparison including 
the advantages and disadvantages of this mechanism. Another outcome was the 
suggestion of an enhanced way of classification that led to introducing keyboard\keypad 
typing as a new input approach within the graphical password domain. From security 
prospective, the diversity between the authentication challenge and the data entry method 
can mitigate some common security attacks such as shoulder-surfing and keylogger.  
The high potentiality of a combined graphical password alongside one-time password as 
an alternative authentication has motivated the research to locate a sort of on the ground 
application to prove its capability not only in theory but in practice as well. Besides, an 
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important aspect of designing graphical password schemes is the context of use which 
should be considered carefully in advance. That will help in addressing any authentication 
issues or requirements in such context and then examine the capability of the proposed 
solution to fulfil that needs.  
It is important to note that the goal of this research is not to replace the textual password 
entirely but rather to realistically define a work context where the conventional 
authentication mechanism cannot satisfy the authentication requirements for that 
application. This research is particularly intended for scenarios in which both the service 
provider and the user expect a stronger level of security than traditional passwords, want 
something that remains usable, and do not want to invest in (or assume the availability 
of) tokens or biometrics. Thus, a critical system was chosen for further study, in 
particular, the online banking authentication system. This system is one of the sensitive 
and critical systems which is gaining a special attention from different parties i.e. end 
users, financial services providers, hackers and security experts. For that reason, E-
banking was the selected system for this investigation. Additionally, this choice would be 
more supportive for the research direction if the target system was found to be in need for 
a kind of authentication enhancement that creates a real environment for evaluation.  
The next chapter investigates the area of online banking authentication to address any 
system access issues and then seeks user’s views on the proposition to use a graphical 
password as a solution for the predetermined login limitation. 
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4 Chapter Four 
A Study of Users’ Perceptions of 
Online Banking Authentication 
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4.1 Introduction 
The term online banking, also known as Internet banking, is commonly defined as a 
remote channel to deliver banking services electronically to customers. Online banking 
services include accessing account information, the transfer of funds between different 
accounts and making electronic payments and settlements (Dube & Gulati, 2005) (Federal 
Financial Institutions Examination Council 'FFIEC', 2003). A major advantage of online 
banking for customers is the convenience and flexibility of being able to bank anytime 
and anywhere without restrictions. In addition, banks are also attracted to providing 
services online since this should result in lowering the running costs than those incurred 
with physical branches (Xue, Hitt & Chen, 2011). 
According to the joint report by the BBA and EY (The BBA, 2015), there was a 10% 
increase in the number of daily Internet banking logins for UK customers which reached 
9.6 million – logins by March 2015. The report also revealed that the amount of online 
transactions was £2.9 billion per week. This shows the overwhelming trend towards the 
online banking services and the huge amount of money in transactions which is indeed 
worthy of higher protection.  
Online banking is continually growing but is now faced with major challenges, one of 
which is the high risk of data being compromised. Thus, in order to reduce the threats to 
online banking and at the same time increase customer security, confidence and 
acceptance of this electronic service channel, the online accounts of customers must be 
securely protected via enhancing user authentication without adversely impacting upon 
the users’ experience (Williamson, 2006).   
Generally, there are several levels of online banking activities (Ramakrishnan, 2001) 
(Dube & Gulati, 2005). The informational is a basic level that includes information on 
the bank and its available online services, and this is of a relatively low security risk. The 
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communicative level which allows limited interaction tasks between banking systems and 
customers, such as updating static data (e.g. addresses) and account inquiries. Thus, there 
is an operational risk involved at this level. At the transactional level customers can 
execute banking transactions (i.e. e-payment, fund transfer). This level is the one 
associated with a high security risk.  
The importance and criticality of the security of the wide range of banking services being 
deployed over the Internet is a major concern for both service providers and customers. 
Thus, extreme caution is always paid to safeguarding the e-banking system as well as 
customer information. The first line of defence is through protecting the authentication 
system from fraud and identity theft. Banks should carefully select from a variety of 
available authentication technologies and mechanisms to authenticate customers in a 
secure manner. These techniques include textual passwords, PIN numbers, (PKI) digital 
certificates, hardware devices; such as smart cards, one-time passwords (OTPs) and 
biometric identification (Williamson, 2006). 
 
4.2 The provided authentication by leading banking institutes   
In order to have a closer look at the authentication approaches offered by banking services 
providers, the study assessed the practices of the top four banks, as ranked by 
(relbanks.com, 2015), in the UK and Saudi Arabia on the basis that respondents from 
these countries would form the basis for later survey data collection. The purpose was to 
gain tangible results from a field review that investigate and compare different 
authentication experiences within the electronic banking domain. 
The comparison data (valid on January 2016) was collected by visiting each online 
banking service of these banks to explore the provided authentication features. The 
services were compared based on the following factors: 
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• Authentication options: when more than one authentication method are available 
for the user to choose from (e.g. OTP hardware-token or subset digits of textual 
password). Combining more than one form of authentication mechanism is called 
Two-factor authentication.  
• Static password: The conventional text-based password approach. 
• Subset digits of password: challenges the user by requesting to submit different 
digit locations of the full password (e.g. 2nd, 4th, 7th digits of the static password).  
• Memorable information: a type of personal questions that can be easy and short 
to answer by legitimate user.  
• OTP (SMS): a one-time password sent to mobile phone through carrier short 
messages.  
• OTP (Soft-Token): a type of one-time password that is generated by software 
application usually installed on smartphones.  
• OTP (Hard-Token): a special hardware device that directly generates a one-time 
password.  
• PIN-dependent token: an additional protection feature to the Soft/Hard tokens 
where a PIN is needed to generate a one-time password.  
• Card-dependent token: another additional feature to the hard-token device 
where a smart-card is required to generate a one-time password. 
• Authorisation site image: a feature that allows the selection of a picture that will 
be displayed at every login time to indicate a correct access to the genuine online 
banking website and not a phishing website.  
• Authorisation personal image: allows uploading a personal picture that will be 
shown at every login to ensure accessing the official online banking website.  
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• Designation of safe computer: a computer that typically being used to access 
online banking accounts can be designated to be recognised as a Trusted 
Computer, any access from any other PCs will be denied.  
• Audio PINsentry: an audio card reader device that can optionally display the OTP code 
on the card reader screen or read it back to the user (audio). 
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1 HSBC Holdings UK            
2 Barclays UK           
Audio 
PINsentry 
3 
Royal Bank of 
Scotland Group 
UK           
 
4 
Lloyds Banking 
Group 
UK           
 
5 
National 
Commercial Bank 
SA           
- Authorisation 
site image 
6 Al-Rajhi Bank SA            
7 
Samba Financial 
Group 
SA           
- Authorisation 
personal image 
- Designation of 
safe computer  
8 Riyad Bank SA            
Table 4-1: Authentications by leading banking institutes 
The comparison table above shows the diversity of authentication techniques and features 
used to secure access to the electronic banking system. The text-based password is still 
occupying a key position among the used methods, appearing in different forms, such as 
fixed password, subset digits or memorable information. Usually, textual passwords are 
used in conjunction with other authentication methods such as one-time password (OTP) 
which in turn forms a two-factor authentication. In addition, the majority of banking 
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systems have fortified their systems by implementing two-factor authentication instead 
of relying on a single factor. One-time password is another significant method that has 
captured the interest of the banking system administrators. A number of banking systems 
have offered a various types of OTP implementations using short messages (SMS), 
hardware or software tokens with the support of some additional security features.  
Furthermore, it can be inferred that some authentication features are widely applied in 
one country but not in the other. For instance, while most UK online banking systems, 
included in this study, utilise subset digits of textual password and memorable 
information, none of the Saudi Arabian banks offer such authentication technique. In 
contrast, static password is used in every Saudi Arabian online banking system, whereas, 
only one UK bank still uses such type of authentication. However, soft-token OTP has 
been implemented in Saudi Arabia a while ago and has also started to roll out recently in 
some UK banks. Notably, this part of the study was focused solely on the login 
authentication service which means it does not cover any further authentication like 
transaction-based authentication or adding a new payee. 
 
4.3 Limitation of online banking authentication 
Giving the option for the user to choose the appropriate authentication method is a 
fundamental usability feature that adds flexibility to the system. Despite the fact that this 
feature does exist in some current systems, it is realised that the available options depend 
mainly on giving the customer the choice of selecting between the use of a 
software/hardware token or SMS to obtain the required OTP or in some cases on phone 
banking services providing the required access. In addition, other systems may offer the 
traditional passcode option or allow authentication via a series of Q&A challenges in case 
the user is unwilling/unable to use the recommended secure authentication options. That 
might potentially lead to falling back into the weaknesses of the traditional textual 
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password. However, none of the discussed authentication options other than the text-
based password offer in-session authentication which uses the web browser to process 
any extra login task. That in turn emphasises the dependency on an additional out-of-band 
means (e.g. token, mobile) to accomplish the authentication task. 
More recently, many banks have adopted OTP authentication using hardware tokens that 
are supplied to each client as part of a multi-factor authentication scheme. Although this 
method is effective, it has a fundamental downside due to the reliance of the applied OTP 
authentication being mostly on a single OTP delivery method. Moreover, many online 
banking systems are not equipped with a secondary authentication method to back up the 
primary Soft-/Hard-Token OTP authentication. In other words, lost/ stolen/ forgotten/ 
damaged hardware tokens or smartphone will prevent clients from gaining access to the 
online banking system due to the absence of an operative alternative means of logging in 
under such critical circumstances. However, some online banking systems utilise an out-
of-band method, such as mobile SMS messaging, as a parallel means of obtaining the 
OTP. Still, this service can encounter several problems, such as message delivery delay, 
weak signalling, roaming availability and charges (Weir et al., 2010) (The Royal Bank of 
Scotland ©, 2014). Therefore, the need for a secure, usable secondary authentication 
method to play an alternative role alongside the primary hardware-/software-based OTP 
scheme has emerged in cases where such tokens are unavailable. 
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OTP Type Advantages Disadvantages 
Hard-Token 
- Can be protected by PIN or chip & 
PIN. 
- Additional device to carry around. 
- Different services may require 
different devices. 
- High cost. 
- Hard to reissue and replace. 
- Availability issue of being: lost, 
stolen, forgotten, damaged.  
Soft-Token 
- No need for Internet, the use of 
smartphones is wide spreading.  
- Several soft-tokens for different 
services can be installed on one 
smartphone.  
- Can be protected by PIN. 
- Dependent on smartphone which 
might cause the same availability 
issue of the Hard-token (mentioned 
above). 
SMS 
- Very common and friendly service.  - Dependent on mobile phone which 
might cause the same availability 
issue of the Hard-token (mentioned 
above). 
- Service problems: message 
delivery delay, weak signalling, 
roaming availability and charges. 
- Not protected by PIN. 
Prospective 
Solution 
Aims Concerns 
- No extra cost. 
- No need for additional devices. 
- No need for carrier services. 
- Can be protected by PIN or alike. 
- Can be deployed on different 
systems.  
- Need to ensure:  
System security and usability 
User perception and acceptance 
 
Table 4-2: Comparative review of the OTP types 
Table 4-2 presents a review of the advantages and disadvantages of different types of the 
one-time password (OTP) techniques. The review data was helpful to determine the 
prospective aims and concerns of the prospective solution as illustrated in the last section 
of the table. The listed aims form a baseline for the requirements needed to fulfil the 
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authentication gap in the current online banking system. Therefore, any new proposal 
should take the above mentioned points into consideration while planning the solution.  
 
4.4 Research survey 
Beside the importance of the authentication security, the ease of use and convenience of 
the authentication process are usability factors that also have a direct impact on security. 
Secure and usable authentication is a key factor in the adoption and expansion of the 
electronic commerce and banking activities. A significant concern for an effective 
security is the users’ acceptance and willingness to apply the required security procedures 
(Schultz et al., 2001). Hence, investigating the effect of alternative authentication systems 
on customer perceptions is a necessary step. 
Therefore, a structured questionnaire was designed and published to investigate the 
authentication issues associated with online banking in addition to polling to gauge the 
participants’ perceptions and attitudes towards the current authentication methods for 
online banking. Another aim of the survey was to measure the user acceptance level of 
using a graphical password mechanism as a possible alternative within the context of 
online banking system.  
 
4.4.1 Survey design and methodology 
The survey was carried out over the Internet and was hosted online by the Centre for 
Security, Communications and Network Research at Plymouth University. The interface 
of the survey was bilingual, which offer the respondents the choice to view the questions 
either in English or Arabic language as the main expected languages within the regional 
distribution of the survey. Closed-ended questions were the most used form of questions 
in this survey to allow smooth gathering of information while keeping the participant’s 
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task of completing the survey as simple as possible. In some questions, a Five-Point 
Likert’s scale was used for more precise rated answers. In addition, illustrative images 
along with brief descriptions were added to some questions to ensure clarity and better 
understanding for users.  
All users participated in this survey of their own accord, it was clearly stated at the 
beginning of the survey that participation is optional and withdrawal is possible at any 
stage. Moreover, the survey was designed anonymously throughout the entire process to 
ensure the confidentiality of the participants’ information.  
The survey was comprised of a total of twenty-nine questions divided into five sections. 
Section 1 captured the respondents’ demographic information, consisting of age, gender, 
education background, employment status and computing skills. Section 2 studied the 
respondents’ experiences of user authentication schemes and security-related techniques. 
Section 3 acquired background information about the participants’ usage of the banking 
system. Section 4 analysed the respondents’ experiences of authentication within the 
online banking system, while Section 5 sought users’ opinions and the acceptance level 
of the alternative authentication mechanisms.  
The questionnaire began with two consent-related questions to confirm the age of the 
participant was 18 or above and to ensure their understanding of the provided information, 
which lead to obtaining the necessary agreement to take part in the survey. Following 
that, the respondent was taken gradually through the survey questions. In order to obtain 
a professional statistical analysis, the IBM Statistical Package for Social Science (SPSS) 
was used as an assisting tool to analyse the survey data.  
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4.4.2 Results interpretation and analysis 
A total number of 250 respondents participated in this online survey over a period of 3 
weeks of live time. Interestingly, the response rate was encouraging and exceeded the 
expectations of the researcher. As far as the survey data is concerned, responses were 
recoded where appropriate to aggregate similar answers with the aim of enhancing the 
outcomes of the survey. Moreover, the resulted percentages of the answers were rounded 
to the nearest integer number for easier representation of the data.    
 
Demographics Variable Categories Response Freq. Percent % 
Age (years) 
18-29 84 33.6 
30-39 107 42.8 
40-49 39 15.6 
50-59 14 5.6 
60+ 6 2.4 
Gender 
Male 165 66.0 
Female 85 34.0 
Country of Resident 
United Kingdom 115 46.0 
Saudi Arabia 109 43.6 
Others 26 10.4 
Educational Level 
Higher education  109 43.6 
Postgraduate  97 38.8 
Further education  37 14.8 
Other 7 2.8 
Employment Status 
Employed 167 66.8 
Student 61 24.4 
Self-employed 9 3.6 
Other 13 5.2 
Computer Skill 
Experience 
Advanced 121 48.4 
Intermediate  118 47.2 
Basic  11 4.4 
Table 4-3: Demographic information for participants 
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Descriptive statistics were used to analyse the demographic characteristics of the 
participants. Table 4-3 shows that nearly two thirds of the respondents were males and 
the remaining third were females. The age group between 30 and 39 years comprised the 
majority of the sample which represented 43 percent of the total number of participants. 
The residential location shows that almost 90% of the respondents resided either in the 
UK (46%) or Saudi Arabia (44%). Regarding the educational background, the highest 
percentage of participants (44%) had studied at Higher education level, while 39% were 
Postgraduates. As for the employment status, the highest percentage of participants (67%) 
were employed followed by 24% being students. In regard to the level of computer 
experience, most participants (48%) considered themselves to be at an advanced level 
followed closely by 47% at an intermediate level with only a small percent (4%) having 
a basic level of computer skills. 
 
The result of the second section revealed that most respondents, over 90%, had used 
alternative authentication methods. ATM cards (chip & PIN) occupied the most used 
alternative methods with 78% of the participants having used them. One-time password 
came next with 57%. Moreover, a selection of both techniques together was made by 
almost half of the participants. Only a few participants, about 8%, stated that they had not 
previously used alternative authentication approaches. In regard to the importance of 
multiple levels of authentication where users are asked to go through several verification 
steps before gaining access, 62% of the participants were supportive of this technique 
agreeing that it is very important, whilst 28% stated it is important. On the other hand, 
only a few participants of less than 2% had an opposite view.  
An important question asked in this section aimed to measure the users’ opinions on 
carrying around multiple security devices to fulfil the authentication requirements of 
multiple online accounts. Table 4-4 demonstrates that most of the respondents opposed 
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the idea with 69% feeling that carrying multiple tokens is not convenient and 38% 
thinking it is unnecessary. However, 38% of the participants said it is acceptable on 
balance. 
 Convenient Necessary Acceptable 
Frequency % Frequency % Frequency % 
Agree 44 17.6 90 36.0 96 38.4 
Neutral 34 13.6 64 25.6 71 28.4 
Disagree 172 68.8 96 38.4 83 33.2 
Table 4-4: Participants' opinion about carrying multiple tokens 
With regard to the participants’ knowledge about image-based authentication, the study 
shows that more than three quarters (80%) of the total number of participants had prior 
knowledge of various types of such authentication mechanism, as presented in Table 4-5. 
The draw-based technique was the most known one with 70% followed by the 
recognition-based with 28%, and the least known technique was the click-based with 
25%. It was also found that 16% of the participants responded to this question had made 
a cross selection of recognition-based and draw-based techniques both together.    
Graphical password Technique Frequency Percent % 
Draw-based 174 69.6 
Recognition-based 71 28.4 
Click-based 62 24.8 
Never heard of these techniques 49 19.6 
Table 4-5: Participants knowledge of graphical password techniques 
Starting from the third section onwards, the participants were asked banking-related 
questions. As per the survey results shown in Table 4-6, the vast majority of the 
respondents, representing 94%, indicated that they were online banking users. Among 
those users 66% were managing more than one online account out of which 56% had 
between 2 and 5 online accounts. Noticeably, 23 respondents had more than five online 
accounts, while approximately a quarter of the participants had a single online account. 
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In contrast, only a small percentage of participants, about 6%, had no online accounts to 
manage. The majority of those participants who do not use online banking had no bank 
account in the first place or they preferred to conduct financial transactions in person. 
Around two thirds of the online banking respondents stated that they access their online 
banking accounts on a regular basis (e.g. daily, weekly), while nearly a quarter of the 
respondents access their accounts occasionally (e.g. couple of times a month). The final 
part of this section investigated the purpose of using online banking services. The results 
showed that 40% of the participants were utilising this service to conduct a variety of 
online payment services, such as paying bills or transferring fund, while 36% of them 
used the service for checking bank account information/transactions. 
Number of online 
banking accounts 
Frequency Percent % 
None 8 3.2 
One 70 28.0 
2-5 141 56.4 
6-9 14 5.6 
10+ 9 3.6 
N/A  8 3.2 
Table 4-6: Number of online banking accounts 
The fourth section of the survey focused on the online banking experience. More than 
85% of the participants’ online banking systems required multi-factor authentication. 
Remarkably, one-time password authentication was offered by 90 percent of the 
participants’ banks, as appears in Table 4-7. The most offered type of one-time password 
was found to be the SMS text message with 44% of the total responses, followed by the 
security hardware token device with 37%, while only a very small portion (8%) of the 
responses using software tokens. Furthermore, since most of the participants were from 
the UK and Saudi Arabia, a further analysis was carried out to assess the popularity of 
certain types of one-time password techniques in these countries. The findings indicated 
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that the most used technique in the UK was the security token device whereas SMS text 
messages recorded the maximum utilisation ratio in Saudi Arabia.    
Type of OTP Count Responses % 
None - the online banking system does not 
facilitate a One-time password 
32 10.4% 
SMS text message 136 44.2% 
Hardware token device (Hard-token) 114 37.0% 
Software token (Soft-token) 26 8.4% 
Table 4-7: The offered types of One-time password 
Table 4-8 illustrates that 76% of the responses pointed out that users were satisfied with 
using one-time password authentication, while in contrast a very small percentage of 
nearly 6% were dissatisfied with this type of technique. As part of multi-factor and one-
time password authentication, the participants were asked if they had failed to login using 
these methods before. The result shows that 65% of the users had experienced failure in 
fulfilling the login requirements for several reasons, such as mistyping the code which 
came in the forefront (48%), the lack of mobile services (21%) and lost token/mobile 
(9%). However, 43% of these incidents occurred only rarely, while less than 3% happened 
frequently.  
OTP experience Frequency Percent % 
Satisfied 160 76.2 
Neutral 38 18.1 
Dissatisfied 12 5.7 
Table 4-8: Participants experience with OTP technique 
Those participants who had not experienced login problems were asked for their opinions 
on the possible causes of failure. From Table 4-9, it can be inferred that the results were 
relatively close to each other. The majority of responses (23%) indicated that forgotten 
token/mobile was the most possible reason followed closely by losing the token/mobile 
and mistyping codes (22%).  
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Login failure reasons (opinion) Count Responses % 
Forgotten token/Mobile 41 22.8 
Lost token/Mobile 39 21.7 
Mistyped the code 39 21.7 
Lack of mobile service 37 20.6 
Token/Software failure issues 24 13.3 
Table 4-9: Participants opinion about the login failure reason 
The last section concerned about the participants’ opinions of alternative authentication 
mechanisms. To start with, the respondents were asked about their agreement level 
regarding utilising visual secret images to enhance system security. The results 
demonstrated that 47% of the participants agreed to the use of images in this manner, 
whereas 17% had an opposite view point. In terms of accepting the idea of replacing or 
supplementing the existing one-time-password method with a graphical one-time 
password technique, the responses in Table 4-10 shows that almost half of the participants 
(49%) accepted the idea but in contrast less than a quarter (23%) rejected it.  
Adopting graphical one-time password Freq. Percent 
Strongly Accept 28 11.2 
Accept 95 38.0 
Neutral 69 27.6 
Reject 52 20.8 
Strongly Reject 6 2.4 
Table 4-10: The adoption of graphical one-time password technique 
Another question in this regard was about the participants’ confidence in using an 
alternative graphical authentication method for online banking. 49% of the participants 
responded with “confident” and 26% with “un-confident”, as appears in Table 4-11. 
Those respondents who showed no confidence were asked for their reasons which were 
varied. Quarter of them of about 33% chose insecurity of the system as their reason, 27% 
were concerned about the unfamiliarity of such technique, and 23% thought the technique 
is impractical. As the method is not yet widely adopted for use, that was considered a 
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reason for a small number of participants (17%) to feel unconfident. In addition, a 
complementary question was asked to those 64 unconfident participants to find out if 
fixing their identified issues in the previous question would help in changing their minds 
so they would accept and use the proposed alternative graphical authentication method. 
It was found that many respondents (41%) were uncertain about whether fixing these 
issues would make a difference or not. On the positive side, a quarter of the responses 
thought that they would use the alternative graphical authentication method if the issues 
they raised were fixed.  
Confidence level Freq. Percent % 
Very Confident 32 12.8 
Confident 90 36.0 
Neutral 64 25.6 
Un-confident 59 23.6 
Very Un-confident 5 2.0 
Table 4-11: The confidence of using alternative graphical password method 
Lastly, Table 4-12 reveals that more than half of the participants (58%) preferred to use 
the proposed alternative graphical one-time password authentication as a secondary 
(supplementary) one-time-password authentication alongside the current one-time-
password system only when needed, while 23% preferred to use it as a replacement for 
the existing (primary) one-time-password authentication. 
Usage Preferences Freq. Percent % 
as a secondary (supplementary) method  118 58.4 
as a replacement for the existing primary system  46 22.8 
Not sure 33 16.3 
Other 5 2.0 
Table 4-12: Preferences of using the proposed authentication 
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4.4.3 Discussion of research survey 
The collected survey data showed a diversity in the participants’ experiences and 
knowledge about authentication and online banking. It appears that plenty of participants 
had a reasonable understanding of user authentication within the online banking 
environment. The positive record of participants’ computer experiences indicates the 
development of users computing skills and their competency to perform more complex 
computer tasks. In addition, this can give the survey responses more credibility as most 
participants have the skills and knowledge that enable them to provide more accurate 
answers.  
As per the survey results, it was found that a high percentage of respondents hold and 
manage several online banking accounts. This demonstrates a trend towards the utilisation 
of the online channel to simplify performing banking transactions as well as other account 
management tasks. Moreover, the result also emphasises the difficulty of using multiple 
security tokens to manage these accounts. Thus, many participants disagreed with the idea 
of carrying around multiple devices for login purposes describing it as inconvenient and 
unnecessary. Additionally, the results of the survey showed that a high percentage of the 
total sample number access their accounts regularly on a daily or weekly basis, which 
obviously proves the increasing popularity and demand of online banking services. 
Consequently, these critical accounts would need adequate protection.  
One of the interesting results was the high percentage of responses indicating that the 
online systems of the participants’ banks require multi-factor authentication as part of the 
security measures. Furthermore, many of those systems make use of the one-time 
password authentication method. More than half of the participants had already been 
using one-time password as an alternative method of authentication. That in turn 
represents the importance and feasibility of both techniques (multi-factor and one-time-
password) for the online banking environment. 
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Interestingly, the results also revealed that the majority of respondents have had 
satisfactory experiences using one-time password techniques. In spite of this positive 
statistic, failing to satisfy login requirements for multi-factor or one-time password 
authentication has recorded a relatively high ratio but with rare occurrence frequency. By 
excluding half of the incidents (experienced failures) caused by mistyping the code, which 
is a common human mistake, it can be inferred that the lack of mobile service is the cause 
of many login failures. However, a number of participants have different views in this 
regard since they think forgetting or losing a token/mobile can be the main reason for 
login failure. 
Although the satisfaction level with the existing one-time password methods is apparently 
high, that does not contradict with the need for consolidating the overall authentication 
mechanism for such a crucial system. In other words, the current system is able to some 
extent to fulfil the authentication need of large amount of clients and reach to the 
functioning expectations of many clients and providers of online banking services, 
however there are some cases where some clients can find themselves unable to access 
their accounts because of the inability to fulfil the login requirements for the primary 
authentication method and at the same time the absence of secure alternative 
authentication methods. From here the demand for further investigation and consideration 
of this issue has emerged. The authentication system should cover most possible login 
scenarios to ensure high availability and less restriction authentication system. Figure 4-1 
illustrates the limitations of the current online banking authentication methods and shows 
how the new proposal of graphical authentication can fit into the context and overcome 
the existing shortcoming.   
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Primary authentication methods
SMS 
OTP
Hard-Token 
OTP
Soft-Token 
OTP
Alternative authentication method
Text-based 
password
Typical Online Banking Authentication Methods 
x Device-dependent mechanisms
  Device-independent mechanism 
x Well-known security flaws
Proposed authentication solution
Graphical 
OTP
  Device-independent mechanism  
 Potentially more secure than textual password
 
Figure 4-1: The limitations of the current online banking authentication methods  
Of those respondents who indicated they have prior knowledge of image-based 
authentication, the majority have specified the draw-based graphical authentication as the 
technique they know most. This was expected, as this type of authentication includes the 
unlock pattern scheme which is widely used on many smartphones in recent time. 
However, knowing about recognition-based and click-based schemes by a number of 
participants is generally a good indicator towards the spread of graphical password 
authentication. Thus, this can be a motivation finding for the graphical authentication 
research area since new techniques in this domain will be less resisted by users in contrast 
to those schemes that being completely new and never been known before.  
 
The aim of the final section of the survey was to determine participants’ views towards 
alternative authentication mechanisms. Specific questions were asked about graphics 
utilisation for authentication purposes which were positively answered with acceptance 
of such technique’s implementation. In addition, the participants were asked about how 
acceptable it would be to replace or supplement the existing one-time password system 
with graphical one-time password system. The result was somewhat astonishing as a large 
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amount of participants were open to the idea of using such graphical authentication in the 
context of online banking system with confidence. The concern regarding insecurity and 
unfamiliarity of using the alternative graphical authentication method was found to be the 
main potential threats to the participants’ confidence towards this type of technique. 
Nevertheless, part of those respondents showed their willingness to accept and use the 
proposed alternative scheme whenever their raised issues are fixed. However, asking such 
exploratory questions have been useful in order to understand the concerns of those who 
were not in favour of graphical authentication. Despite this fact, the survey result shows 
that participants seem ready to accept the alternatives.  
With regard to the preference form of using the proposed system, many respondents have 
preferred to use it as a secondary means of authentication to be used side by side with the 
existing primary one-time password system. Primarily, choosing this implementation 
option in this stage seems sensible choice that should reduce any potential risk by 
conducting complete replacement of the current system. On top of that, having this 
alternative graphical one-time password in place should positively influence the usability 
of the online banking system while maintaining its security.  
 
From the viewpoint of the researcher, equipping the online banking system with a 
graphical authentication technique is one step forward towards a robust and flexible 
authentication system. Currently, the goal is to patch the shortage within the existing 
system (as shown in Figure 4-1) then it would be worthwhile to examine the suitability 
of the proposed solution for other roles of authentication such as being part of the primary 
multi-factor authentication, resetting password process, or adding new beneficiary. Later, 
the proposed solution may act as a practical model that enables measuring the user 
satisfaction, and familiarity with such technique as well as the method limitations to 
properly plan a further system enhancement or different application utilisation.    
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Interestingly, the respondents overwhelmingly accepted the initial form of authentication 
that makes a combined use of two significant techniques; the graphical password and one-
time password, which might show the participants’ preference to have some sort of 
alternative authentication methods. Thus, the researcher believes that having this type of 
alternative authentication should add a remarkable feature to the field of user 
authentication. Moreover, implementing the proposed scheme is hoped to boost the 
usability as well as security of the online banking system. 
 
4.5 Summary 
This chapter presented a comparative review of the authentication methods provided by 
a number of online banking systems. The goal was to obtain an actual data to explore the 
authentication-related aspects that need enhancement. The review concluded that many 
online banking systems provide authentication methods utilising one-time password as 
part of the two-factor authentication. In spite of the effectiveness of such methods, they 
still rely on a single source to deliver the generated OTP. In cases where the offered OTP 
technique is not available (i.e. forgotten Hard-token, technical difficulty in receiving 
SMS), authentication process cannot be carried out and therefore users will be prevented 
access to the system.    
With the idea of further addressing the above-mentioned findings, this chapter presented 
the result of the conducted online survey that investigated the user experience with 
various types of user authentication methods in general and with online banking in 
particular. In addition, the questionnaire aimed to understand the participant’s opinion 
about a new form of authentication method using graphical one-time password.  
The results showed that many participants manage multiple online banking accounts, 
most of which use OTP. Although the majority of participants were satisfied with the 
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OTP authentication, they find it inconvenient to carry around security devices. Moreover, 
many participants were unable to accomplish their login requests as the OTP cannot be 
obtained due to the lack of mobile services or lost token\mobile. This part of the survey 
clearly confirms the finding of the earlier review of the online banking limitations 
discussed in (section 4.3) that there is a shortcoming in the current provided 
authentication services as a result of the dependency on additional devices or the 
availability of the mobile network services. That is also in line with what previously 
mentioned in the related literature in (section 2.4.2). 
The survey also investigated the participants’ acceptance to use a graphical one-time 
password technique instead of or in parallel with the current OTP methods. Almost half 
of the responses were positive and, more importantly, participants stated that they would 
be confident to use the proposed solution for online banking. The results of this part give 
an encouraging impression since many users were in favour of the idea of the graphical 
one-time password and willing to use it in a critical system like online banking.  
Based on the results and findings of this study, the research will proceed by introducing 
and developing the proposed graphical one-time password scheme with the anticipation 
of solving the aforementioned problems. 
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Graphical One Time Password 
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5.1 Introduction   
The interest in the graphical authentication mechanism is derived mainly from the believe 
that graphical passwords might be less susceptible to several drawbacks of the 
conventional textual password including both aspects of usability and security (e.g. 
memorability, guessing, shoulder-surfing, spyware, credential theft, revealing password, 
writing password down). 
The previous chapters have provided detailed review of the current state of graphical 
authentication techniques and studied the users’ experience with authentication in general 
and within online banking environment in particular. Besides, the study explored the 
users' attitudes and preferences toward alternative authentications especially graphical 
authentication.  
 
Figure 5-1: General linkage diagram between the research issues and the proposed solution 
The conducted review of the current state of graphical authentication techniques along 
with the outcome of the study has pointed out to the need for an enhanced authentication 
method to fulfil the security and usability requirements. This research aims to overcome 
the major issues within the existing graphical passwords to obtain an improved scheme 
132 
that can be utilised to fill-in the authentication gap in the online banking systems (Figure 
5-1).  
According to the study conducted by Renaud (2004) to quantify the quality of various 
web authentication mechanisms, the quality of one-time password mechanisms for the 
web environment was high (8.99 out of the highest quality coefficient of 13) but lack a 
critical requirement with respect to the need for a special hardware/software. Semantic 
password mechanisms came second with quality of 7.9 and then recognition-based 
mechanisms with 7.72. Based on these results, a conclusion can be drawn that joining 
some of these authentication mechanisms can potentially produce a considerable secure 
alternative mechanism. 
Therefore, the research in this chapter will continue towards the design and 
implementation of a new hybrid authentication solution named "Graphical One Time 
Password" (GOTPass), which uses graphical authentication techniques to produce a one-
time password that can be also viable for use in a context like online banking.  
 
This stage of the work would not be particularly confined to the online banking 
environment, since the proposed scheme under investigation is considered to be generally 
applicable in many other systems as well. Therefore, the study at this level is independent 
and not limited to the online banking domain. 
 
5.2 Prototype designing  
In order to practically prove the concept and feasibility of the proposed solution, a 
prototype was developed with consideration of the testing and refinement cycle that 
properly shaped the final version. Moreover, specific evaluation criteria were defined to 
enable an appropriate assessment of the assurance and suitability of the proposed method 
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as an alternative means of authentication. The design and operation of the new technique 
is discussed in details in this section. 
 
5.2.1 Arguments for GOTPass scheme  
One of the significant features of an image-based authentication technique is the ease of 
recall, which is something that a conventional text-based password lacks. Thus, this has 
motivated the research to investigate and develop an enhanced graphical authentication 
mechanism. However, most recognition-based graphical password schemes are 
vulnerable to observation attacks (e.g. shoulder-surfing), due to their very nature of being 
visible to surrounding peepers. Therefore, a user-friendly graphical technique (unlock 
pattern) was employed that acts as a front-line defender before the recognition-based 
technique. Moreover, the role of the unlock pattern can be similar to the PIN-protection 
that is used to fortify the Hard-/Soft- token. That is also in line with the results of an 
earlier online survey conducted to measure participants’ experience with user 
authentication (Chapter four - 4.4.2), which showed that the draw-based technique 
(android unlock pattern) was chosen by about 70% of the participants as the most familiar 
technique among other graphical authentications. Similarly, another field study carried 
out for 21 days confirmed that users were in favour of the pattern mechanism despite the 
repeated errors they made (Von Zezschwitz, Dunphy & De Luca, 2013). According to 
Chiang and Chiasson (2013), the Android screen unlock technique is the most well-
known deployed graphical password. Finally, the system’s security is strengthened by the 
implementation of the OTP technique. Moreover, the use of one-time password (OTP) 
technologies have been spreading, as 90% of the survey’s respondents stated that they 
used this type of authentication technology, and they did so with an overall satisfaction 
rate of 76%. Table 5-1 summarises the rationale behind the selection of these various 
authentication techniques.      
134 
 Authentication technique Rationale of selection 
1 Pattern unlock 
Protect the main image-based scheme 
User-friendly and familiar 
2 Image recognition 
Easy to remember 
Easy to use 
3 GOTPass input format Add a security feature 
Table 5-1: Rationale behind the selection of various authentication techniques 
 
5.2.2 Characteristics of GOTPass scheme  
GOTPass is a hybrid secure solution that leverage a multi-layer authentication to ensure 
a robust secure authentication. An integration of multiple authentication mechanisms has 
been employed utilising a graphical password along with a one-time password. Moreover, 
a combination of various graphical password methods has been implemented to form a 
mixed technique of Recall-based [Draw] and Recognition-based. The final component of 
this authentication system involves a determination task of GOTPass input format which 
indicate the location of the associated random codes. More precisely, the method is 
established by solving the unlock pattern (draw-based), followed by identifying pass-
images (image recognition) and the last step will be to enter the corresponding OTP codes 
according to the pre-chosen format (knowledge-based). 
 
As illustrated in Table 5-2, the proposed scheme GOTPass is a hybrid technique falling 
under several categories of graphical authentication. First is a pure recall-based where 
two recall operations are required to be performed; redrawing an unlock pattern and 
determining the OTP input format. Second is recognition-based where users need to 
recognise their images.  
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Table 5-2: Categories and characteristics of GOTPass scheme 
 
The process flow for the registration and authentication phases is summarised in Table 
5-3, which defines the requirements and procedures for each phase as well as showing 
the authentication classifications of each part. 
General process flow Registration phase Authentication phase 
Secret knowledge 
(username) 
- Select a unique username  - Enter the correct username  
Unlock pattern  
 
Graphical password 
(recall-based, draw) 
- 4×4 pattern grid will be displayed 
- The user needs to draw a secret 
pattern in any preferred shape  
- Unlock the pattern grid by 
redrawing the pre-chosen secret 
pattern 
Image recognition 
 
Graphical password 
(recognition-based) 
 
- The system will assign four random 
themes for the user 
- A panel of images from each of the 
assigned themes will be presented and 
the user will make his/her own 
selection 
- The system displays a 4×4 
panel of images containing two 
random pass-images out of the 
four previously registered pass-
images, plus 14 decoy images 
- The user needs to identify the 
two pass-images  
One-Time Password 
 
Knowledge-based 
(Typing-based entry)  
 
- Since the left & top edges of each 
row and column of the panel will be 
assigned 4 random digits, the user can 
choose from two available security 
level options: basic or advanced. Each 
level has two different GOTPass input 
format combinations and the system 
will randomly assign one to the user  
- Enter the associated GOTPass 
code with each image based on 
the previously chosen format 
and in the correct order  
Table 5-3: Process flow details for the registration and authentication phases 
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The system consists of 400 images in total, distributed on 12 different themes; namely 
‘Animal’, ‘Clock’, ‘Computer’, ‘Earth’, ‘Flag’, ‘Food’, ‘House’, ‘Paint’, ‘Sign’, ‘Sport’, 
‘Stationery’, and ‘Transportation’. The number of images and themes were determined 
on an empirical dynamic basis and do not necessarily represent optimal settings. They 
were simply used to demonstrate the capabilities of the prototype system. The selection 
of these themes for this prototype was based on their representation of daily or commonly 
seen images aiming to help in making them easy to remember. Each theme contains an 
average of 33 images, all of which were taken from a free Internet source for images 
(www.iconfinder.com) available under different types of licenses (see Appendix B) and 
processed for study purposes only. Images were 128×128 pixels in size and chosen 
manually to ensure suitability for the intended theme and to prevent repetition. However, 
acquiring suitable images for the authentication purpose is quite difficult since the 
memorability and the security of the mechanism can be affected by the characteristics of 
the available images. Thus, the image acquisition process should consider the following 
basic properties: 
- image quality that ensures a display of the image at a high enough resolution on 
various displays using the same size. 
- easy to name images for better memorability. 
- secrecy of the user’s images to remain difficult to guess. 
However, image properties are often difficult to test in isolation which complicate the 
task of acquiring suitable images to be used in the context of graphical authentication 
(Renaud, 2009).  
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5.3 Registration   
The registration stage involves four main phases; user information, unlock pattern 
registration, pass-images selection, and input format determination (Figure 5-2).  
 
Figure 5-2: Registration process flow diagram  
 
5.3.1 Unlock pattern 
Creating a password pattern is formed by connecting several grid points that appear as a 
sequence of straight lines on the grid. For a successful login, the registered pattern needs 
to be recalled and redrawn correctly. 
In GOTPass scheme, the user first needs to choose a unique username and draw any 
shape on a lock pattern grid. This pattern scheme is similar to the original Android unlock 
pattern scheme but differ in the grid size where it uses a matrix size of 4×4 to offer 16 
contact points. The aim of utilising larger grid was to increase the security of the proposed 
system as well as keeping the simplicity of swiping to draw a password. As a web-based 
scheme, drawing the pattern can be performed by mouse or swiping finger on the touch-
enabled devices. The following grid representation (Figure 5-3) is used to designate the 
4×4 unlock pattern. 
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Figure 5-3: Pattern nodes representation  
The rules and constraints of the 4×4 unlock pattern scheme is detailed as follows:   
1. A minimum of 5 nodes should be connected (and obviously, not more than 16). 
That is to ensure no straight strokes are used. 
2. Starting point can be made from any node. 
3. One or several ‘knight moves’ can be used which can connect to non-neighbour 
node, such as (1, 7, 11, 10, 4) in the following illustration Figure 5-4: 
 
Figure 5-4: Example of the knight move (between 1 & 7). 
4. Going over (jump) an unvisited node without connecting it is forbidden. For 
example, the pattern (1, 3, 7, 6, 5) is illegal, because moving between (1) and (3) 
must visit (2) in the middle.  
5. Passing over a visited node is possible but without connecting it again. For 
example, both (1, 6, 7, 5, 2) and (1, 6, 5, 7, 2) are legal. In the last example (1, 6, 
5) were visited then (6) was passed over again to reach (7, 2). 
6. Moving between nodes must only be in straight lines. 
7. Direction may only be changed when visiting a node. 
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5.3.2 Selection of pass-images  
As pointed out by Biddle, Chiasson and van Oorschot (2012), allowing users to choose 
their own passwords can enable a personalised attack where the probability of guessing 
the user’s password by a person who knows the user might be higher than other attackers. 
In further support of that claim, Davis, Monrose and Reiter (2004) stated that users will 
keep selecting predictable passwords, therefore giving the user the option to choose a 
password is unadvisable. On the other hand, system assigned images lead to usability 
issues derived mainly from the difficulty of remembering random images (Chiasson et 
al., 2008). Due to the conflicting problems mentioned above, a new balanced approach 
has been adopted to benefit from the advantages of both techniques and overcome their 
problems. The idea is to have themes assigned by the system and then give the user the 
chance to select the favourite images within those specific assigned themes. This can 
reduce the bias choice, hot-images, and personal preference images but at the same time 
should keep the task simple for users to remember their own selection of images.   
In this step, the system will automatically assign four random themes for the user, one 
after another in a separate page. The name of the random theme will be displayed on the 
top of the page. Each theme will display 30 images (Figure 5-5) for the user to select one 
pass-image from each of the given themes (a total of four altogether). This is called the 
pass-images portfolio, which aims to provide a dynamic pass-images pool without 
requiring memory recall from the user. Furthermore, the pass-images portfolio can also 
provide a sort of challenge-response protocol since the system will challenge the user 
with a subset pass-images at each login time.  
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Figure 5-5: Registration - Pass-images selection 
Determining the number of pass-images to be four in this scheme was in accordance to 
some similar schemes which implemented the same number of password images such as 
VIP3 (De Angeli et al., 2002). Besides, in a study by Suo, Zhu and Owen (2006) which 
had no restriction on the number of secret images to be selected, they found that the 
number of the chosen images by 80% of the users did not exceed four. 
The user needs to select the preferred image on each page by clicking on it. The system 
then displays a pop-up confirmation screen (Figure 5-6) to ensure that the user is happy 
with the selected image. For a security purpose, the number of theme’s images in the 
database is always larger than 30 which ensures that the displayed set of images is always 
changeable. Moreover, that should also prevent any adversary from acquiring the entire 
images which can be used to build a fake system to deceive users. 
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Figure 5-6: Confirmation of the selected pass-image 
5.3.3 Determination of input format  
The position of the pass-images in the grid will be used to indicate a code that needs to 
be entered using the keypad/keyboard, which is referred to as the GOTPass input format. 
These codes are located on the top or left-hand axis of each pass-image as illustrated in 
Figure 5-7.  
 
Figure 5-7: Registration - Input format 
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There are two security level options for the user to choose from: basic or advanced. At 
the basic security level, the numeric codes for both pass-images are taken from the same 
axis, whereas the numeric codes in the advanced level are taken from different axis for 
each pass-image. Inside each level there are further code combination options for the 
system to randomly assign to the user. The assigned input format is clearly presented to 
the user with an illustration example (e.g. top axis for the 1st pass-image + left axis for 
the 2nd pass-image). The GOTPass input format is implemented to hinder the observation 
attack as each pass-image can have various code combination options. Table 5-4 shows 
details of the GOTPass input format combination options. 
User choice Random system assigning 
Security level Option Pass-image Code 
Basic 
Option 1 
1st pass-image  
2nd pass-image 
from TOP axis  
from TOP axis 
Option 2 
1st pass-image  
2nd pass-image 
from LEFT axis  
from LEFT axis 
Advanced 
Option 3 
1st pass-image  
2nd pass-image 
from TOP axis  
from LEFT axis 
Option 4 
1st pass-image  
2nd pass-image  
from LEFT axis  
from TOP axis 
Table 5-4: GOTPass input format combination options 
Finally, on the lower part of the last registration page, the system will display the four 
selected pass-images (see Figure 5-7) as a way to remind the users of their selections 
before hitting the button to create the account.   
For security enhancement, the system stores three random images from distinct themes 
in association with each chosen pass-image as illustrated in Figure 5-8. Thus, in total the 
system will store 4 pass-images and 12 distractor-images for each user. The role of the 
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so-called distractor-images is to be displayed alongside the original pass-images in every 
login attempt to confuse the illegitimate peepers.     
Pass-images Distractor 1 Distractor 2 Distractor 3 
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Figure 5-8: Example of the associated distractor-images 
5.4 Authentication   
The login part of the system comprises of four steps; the username and unlock pattern, 
pass-images recognition, and GOTPass code determination and entry (Figure 5-9).  
 
Figure 5-9: Authentication process flow diagram 
144 
5.4.1 Unlock pattern  
At first, the system will prompt the registered user for their username and display an on-
screen unlock pattern (Figure 5-10), which requires the user to redraw the pre-registered 
unlock pattern shape by connecting nodes together to re-form the correct pattern shape.  
 
Figure 5-10: GOTPass unlock pattern step 
5.4.2 Recognition of Pass-images  
The image-based step consists of 4×4 grid of images with an extra top row and left 
column to accommodate the random codes. The 4×4 layout was designed to be easy and 
quick for users to search for their pass-images among other images and at the same time 
maintain the potential security of being hard for illegitimate user to distinguish those 
pass-images. Moreover, the chosen layout was also motivated by several previous 
studies. The personal observations by Citty and Hutchings (2010) led them to use the 4×4 
matrix of images for their ‘TAPI’ scheme. Similarly, the challenge set used in the 
experiments conducted by Jebriel and Poet (2011) comprised of 16 doodles.  
The display of the content of the image panel depends on the correctness of the provided 
information of the previous step (username and unlock pattern). Firstly, the 
145 
authentication process will display a fresh (4×4) image panel containing dummy images 
when the information given in the previous step is incorrect. The implementation of this 
technique serves as an implicit authentication feedback to protect the scheme from a 
guessing attack and trial & error method, since the system gives no indication of which 
step in the login process was incorrect, and therefore confuses the attacker. However, the 
inability to spot the correct pass-images by legitimate users acts as an alert that something 
went wrong with that login attempt which they need to correct.  
Secondly, in case the preceding step is correct, the panel will contain two random pass-
images out of the four previously chosen pass-images (as illustrated in Figure 5-11), six 
distractor-images that are associated with the pass-images (three for each) and another 
eight random decoy images. However, the system will coordinate the distribution of the 
pass-images to ensure that both are never placed on the same horizontal-axis (row) 
neither the same vertical-axis (column).  
As a fundamental part of the authentication process, the user must identify the password 
images among others in the panel (this is done only mentally, there is no need to 
touch/click on the images). The search navigation for the pass-images should be carried 
out on a row basis starting from the top-left corner down to the bottom-right of the panel.  
 
5.4.3 Determination of GOTPass code  
The system generates new OTP codes and fills the panel edges (axis) of each row and 
column (only the locations that are occupied by the correct pass-images will contain the 
correct GOTPass codes). Therefore, each image has two four-digit random numbers, one 
presented on the horizontal-axis and another on the vertical-axis. From the grid top or 
left axis, the user needs to locate and enter the codes associated with each pass-image 
(these should be entered in the correct format, as previously assigned and shown in the 
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registration phase). In other words, the user has to combine the 4 digits of the first pass-
image with the 4 digits of the second pass-image to form the final 8 digits OTP code. 
Moreover, it is necessary to select the pass-images and, thereafter, the associated codes 
in the correct order depending on which pass-image appears first.  
To enter these credentials, the user is required to use a separate means than the challenge 
one; keyboard or keypad. The idea behind that is to enhance the security of the graphical 
passwords by avoiding the unshielded mouse clicks. A study by Jebriel and Poet (2011) 
suggested that using keyboard for inputting graphical passwords was more secure than 
mouse selection.  
Once the system ensures that all of the information that has been provided is correct, then 
the user is successfully authenticated and granted access. 
 
Figure 5-11: GOTPass image recognition and OTP code entry 
Assuming security level option 3 is in use (top axis code for the first pass-image + left axis code 
for the second pass-image) 
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5.5 Prototype development   
Following the completion of the GOTPass design, the development of the prototype 
started to prove the concept of the proposed solution and to enable carrying out actual 
evaluations. The GOTPass prototype was developed as a web-based application using 
Microsoft Visual Studio 2013 – C#, and SQL Server 2012 as the Database Management 
System. The prototype application was hosted on a laptop with 15.6" touch screen display 
set at a resolution of 1366 × 768 pixels and running windows 8.1. As far as the associated 
coding work is concerned, it should be noted that the prototype development was 
supported by an additional developer, Farhan Jamil, who was contracted to carry out the 
coding under the direction of the researcher. However, all supporting aspects for this 
activity, such as application and database designs, have been finalised and documented 
exclusively by the researcher (i.e. the developer was not involved in the creative design 
or contribution to the research).   
From a developmental perspective, the system was simply designed to save the 
application images on the web-server and store their unique IDs (based on a naming 
convention) into the database. In a preparation step, all images were categorised and 
arranged into their relevant themes. During registration, users are asked to provide their 
names and username, which will be checked against duplication before accepting it, and 
then a pattern must be drawn. In the background, the system deals with patterns in their 
digital representations as described earlier in Figure 5-3. In case of making mistake or 
dislike the drawn pattern, there is an option to clear the provided information and start 
over again. Next, the system selects 4 random themes and displays the related images of 
each one separately in sequential pages. Last, the system chooses one of the two security 
level options for the user who still be able to change this selection as preferred. However, 
the user is unable to change the input format inside each security level which is assigned 
automatically by the system. To complete the account creation (registration), the submit 
148 
button needs to be clicked which will insert a record for that specific account into the 
database.  
The system tracks each step throughout the registration process to attain statistical data 
for further analysis. In line with the account creation process, a record is added into the 
database containing the start and end times of several elements; username entry, drawing 
pattern, selecting (4) pass-images, and determining the GOTPass input format (Table 
5-5). 
Description of log data Remarks 
User ID  Unique number to identify every user.  
Start time of typing user information 
Begins when the user puts the curser on the user 
full name field and starts typing in. 
End time of typing user information 
Finishes when the user starts the next step; drawing 
the unlock pattern. 
Start time of drawing pattern Begins when the user clicks to draw the pattern. 
End time of drawing pattern 
Finishes when the user clicks on the ‘Register 
Pattern’ button. 
Start time of choosing images Begins when the user clicks on the first image. 
End time of choosing images 
Finishes when the user confirms the fourth pass-
image by clicking on ‘Yes, go to next step’ button. 
Start time of selecting GOTPass 
input format 
Begins after the upload of the input format page. 
End time of selecting GOTPass 
input format 
Finishes when the user clicks on the submission 
button. 
Table 5-5: Description of the registeration log data 
During authentication, after inputting the username and unlock pattern, the system fills 
the login grid with 2 pass-images (selected randomly out of the registered 4 portfolio 
images) along with their 6 associated distractor-images and other 8 arbitrary chosen 
decoy-images. The system then generates two sets of random 4-numerical codes and 
place them in the designated boxes corresponding to the correct pass-images whereas the 
remaining boxes are filled in with other arbitrary codes. Hence, a successful login attempt 
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requires identifying the pass-images and entering their associated one-time codes in the 
right order. 
To obtain a statistical data for later analysis, the system also tracks each step throughout 
the authentication process. With each click on submit button, the system inserts a record 
into the database linked to that particular user. Regardless of the correctness of the login 
attempt, the record contains some significant data as described in Table 5-6. 
Description of log data Remarks 
The username used for login  Whether the username is correct or wrong 
Authentication status  Overall assessment – Success/Failure 
Date/time of the login attempt 
Record the date and time when the login was 
occurred 
User ID for correct/existing user Leave blank if the username does not exist 
Start time of typing username 
Begins when the user puts the curser on the 
username field and starts typing in. 
End time of typing username 
Finishes when the user starts the next step; 
drawing the unlock pattern. 
Success status of username  
Individual assessment, if the username is 
correct or not (OK=1, NO=0) 
Start time of drawing pattern 
Begins when the user clicks to draw the 
pattern. 
End time of drawing pattern 
Finishes when the user clicks on the login 
button. 
Success status of pattern  
Individual assessment, if the drawn pattern is 
correct or not (OK=1, NO=0) 
Start time of login GOTPass input 
format 
Begins when the image-based page uploads. 
End time of login GOTPass input 
format 
Finishes when the user clicks on the 
submission button. 
Success status of GOTPass input 
format  
Individual assessment, if the provided OTP 
format is correct or not (OK=1, NO=0) 
Table 5-6: Description of the authentiaction log data 
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It should be noted here that the activity log for the last element – GOTPass input format 
was not as effective as expected. In its current state, it only checks the correctness of the 
code similar to that done by the ‘Authentication status’. The ideal action should be to 
check each part of the code (4-digits) aside and find out whether that specific part is 
correct or otherwise. Not only this but also should be capable of determining which 
combination option of the GOTPass input format (as explained in Table 5-4) was 
followed based on the analysis of the entered codes compared to the available codes on 
the login grid edges. That means that there are some other cases that should be considered 
to allow better and more precise analysis such as: code could be mistyped, the input 
format option could be correct even though the final code was wrong, the input format 
option could be wrong even though the selected pass-images were correct, or the input 
format option could be partially correct (one of the two codes is correct) (Table 5-7).  
 Pass-images Input format option Final code 
1    
2   
 
(coincident) 
3    
4  
 
(one correct code/ 
missing order) 
 
5    
6    
Table 5-7: Input format cases 
 
5.6 Piloting, testing and evaluation 
The development process went through the essential phases including testing and 
modification. The goal of the pilot phase was to test and confirm that the proposed 
solution would function as it is supposed to, otherwise, it undergoes the required 
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refinement. In other words, testing was helpful in identifying faults, which in turn brought 
in considerable improvements to the system.  
Passing the testing phase successfully made the prototype ready for real experiment’s 
deployment involving users to take part in the trials and provide their valuable comments 
and feedbacks. Generally, user evaluations allow assessing the feasibility of the prototype 
to succeed as an alternative authentication method. In addition, that was helpful to identify 
the strength and weakness aspects of the system from the end user perspective.  
 
5.7 GOTPass as an alternative authentication  
Having implemented and tested the proposed solution, it is worthwhile to revisit the 
requirements needed for a new alternative authentication mechanism to succeed and 
check whether GOTPass is capable of satisfying them or not. Chapter two – 2.7, discussed 
the essential criteria that need to be met by the new authentication proposal. The following 
table consists of the criteria along with the GOTPass compliance status.  
Criteria GOTPass compliance  
Elimination of the need for 
additional hardware 
Device-independent scheme which works on the web browser 
without any extra devices. 
Simplicity and ease of use Based on the usability study (Chapter 6), users found 
GOTPass easy to use.  
Better memorability  The conducted usability study (Chapter 6) demonstrated a high 
level of memorability.  
Higher level of security The initial security study (Chapter 7) showed a relatively high 
security safeguarding against common security threats.  
Compatibility/Applicability 
on various areas 
Web-based application capable to work across platforms. 
Table 5-8: GOTPass compliance with alternative authentication criteria  
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Generally, Table 5-8 shows that the GOTPass scheme is able to satisfy all criteria of an 
alternative authentication. However, the level of compliance varies which may satisfy one 
criterion more than others. Furthermore, the GOTPass scheme is also able to satisfy the 
aims of the prospective authentication solution that were discussed in (Chapter four – 4.3) 
as part of the comparative review of the OTP types. The use of this scheme does not 
involve extra cost, additional devices, nor carrier services. Besides, it is protected by PIN 
alike (unlock pattern) and can be deployed on different platforms as it is a web-based 
solution. However, fulfilling these criteria and aims should not be taken as a claim for 
best solution but rather as an indication of potentiality.     
 
5.8 Summary  
This chapter explained the proposed GOTPass scheme, which produces a one-time 
password utilising multiple graphical authentication techniques that is suitable for an 
online banking context or alike. The design of GOTPass scheme was presented in details 
including the advantages and characteristics. Being a composite scheme, it was necessary 
to explain the rationales to select these various authentication techniques. On top of that, 
the registration and authentication components were described along with their process 
flow.    
The scheme comprised of three main components; pattern unlock as a protection layer, 
image recognition that is easy to remember and use, and GOTPass input format to 
strengthen the security provided by OTP. During registration, the user needs to choose a 
username and draw a shape on a 4×4 unlock pattern. Next, four random themes are 
randomly chosen by the system and assigned for the user. One pass-image should be 
selected from each of the given themes which result in a selection of four pass-images in 
total. At the end, the GOTPass input format, which depends on the position of the pass-
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images in the grid, needs to be selected to indicate the random codes that need to be 
entered during login using the keypad/keyboard. With reference to the authentication 
process, the method simply begins with entering the username and drawing the unlock 
pattern, followed by recognising the pre-chosen pass-images and lastly entering the OTP 
codes matching the registered input format. For real evaluation purposes, the prototype 
system was developed and prepared with 400 images in 12 distinct themes. Moreover, 
the collection of analytical data was enabled by recording some users’ activity logs. 
Clearly defined evaluation criteria plays an important guidance role for evaluative 
judgments related to functionalities and performances of the overall goals of the 
authentication solution. A solid evaluation is a fundamental determination of the merit 
dimensions of any system. The evaluative criteria include attributes covering both system 
aspects of security and usability such as features and impacts to realise how robust, how 
acceptable, how effective the system is. Therefore, the next two chapters will continue by 
carrying out essential assessments that cover the usability and security aspects of the 
proposed GOTPass scheme. 
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6 Chapter Six 
Usability Evaluation of the 
GOTPass System 
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6.1 Introduction   
Image-based authentication technique has several interesting features that distinguish it 
from others, one of which is the ease of recall. Thus, this has motivated the research to 
develop an enhanced graphical authentication mechanism and investigate its usability. 
The GOTPass scheme intends to improve the usability features of the existing graphical 
authentication system by developing a new multi-graphical password technique that 
fulfils most of the usability requirements. The main usability characteristics that the 
GOTPass authentication system aims to satisfy can be highlighted as follows.  
The first requirement is the ability to create a new password using a simple process and a 
minimal amount of steps. Second, the password should be easy to remember, so users are 
not overwhelmed by complex secrets that they have to memorise. Third, it should be a 
simple to use scheme that is reliable (an unreliable system may result in denial of access). 
Fourth, it should be efficient to use, and the registration and login time should be 
acceptably short. Fifth, there should be nothing to carry, which means that a user should 
not rely on auxiliary devices (e.g. tokens) to perform the authentication task, excluding 
devices that users usually carry around at all times, such as mobile phones. However, 
mobile phones are exposed to lose or stealing which is considered another type of 
limitation. Finally, it should be easy to recover, allowing users to regain the ability to 
login in case the authentication credentials are forgotten. 
 
A successful authentication system should maintain a balance between usability and 
security. System usability is an essential design aspect that should not be compromised 
for the sake of security (and vice versa). The GOTPass proposal contains some interesting 
usability design features (Table 6-1), such as the use of image themes that prompt users 
to remember password images. Although the system prohibits users from using their own 
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images, to protect against a guessing attack by a familiar person and help to reduce the 
impact of users’ tendency to choose predictable images, they are however allowed to 
choose preferable images from a given theme, which adds flexibility to the system as 
well as freedom of choice for the user. In relation to that, Catuogno and Galdi (2014) 
expected that allowing self-selected secrets would help users to remember them easily 
and therefore reduce the average login time. However, even if that hold true, the attention 
level of their selections is decreased which makes users prone to incorrect inputs in the 
future. 
 
Usability features 
System-assigned 
Themes 
User-own 
images  
User-selected 
images 
Memorability Mnemonic 
GOTPass 
Scheme 
     
Table 6-1: GOTPass usability features 
One of the GOTPass goals is to offer a reasonable level of memorability so users manage 
to remember their pass-images easily. However, there is no use of mnemonics to assist 
users in remembering their passwords, since the proposed scheme uses multiple 
authentication mechanisms which makes applying such a feature on each mechanism 
both difficult and pointless.  
 
6.2 Usability evaluation design  
The study conducted by Biddle, Chiasson and van Oorschot (2012) stated that the 
consistency of the published research data within the domain of graphical authentication 
is almost absent, which complicates the task of reproducing results or comparing 
schemes. Many graphical password system proposals have an inadequate evaluation of 
either security or usability, or even both. The lack of an accepted usability standard in this 
area of research might be a result of the missing coordination work between researchers, 
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which led to the use of different evaluation criteria for nearly every system proposal. 
Furthermore, Bonneau et al. (2012) realised that the original publications on such 
schemes have included optimistic and incomplete ratings. Therefore, standard evaluation 
methods and measurements are required to carry out a reasonable comparison against 
other works. 
A reliable evaluation of a new authentication mechanism must consist of objective data 
on mechanism performance and subjective data on user experience with such system 
(Beautement & Sasse, 2010). A proper framework is required to evaluate the design of a 
successful authentication mechanism against several aspects of security and usability (De 
Angeli et al., 2005). Hence, a collection of evaluation criteria and guidelines has been 
carefully identified by exploring the characteristics and methods of the existing graphical 
authentication schemes alongside a review of the available evaluation studies. However, 
it should be noted that fulfilling all the requirements of security and usability in a single 
authentication scheme is unlikely to be achievable (Schaub et al., 2013). 
To establish an appropriate evaluation plan, a review of studies conducted by similar 
graphical password techniques was undertaken. As Table 6-2 illustrates, almost all 
schemes carried out in-lab studies. Most schemes were evaluated over several sessions 
with various time intervals. The maximum number of sessions used was three and the 
minimum was one. With regard to the number of trials, two schemes allowed 10 
authentication attempts. The number of participants ranged between 10 and 61. Essential 
evaluation elements, such as effectiveness, efficiency, memorability and user satisfaction, 
were the components of most of the conducted studies. In addition, at the end of the table, 
a summary of the study proposal of the GOTPass scheme was also included to enable an 
easy basis for comparison.  
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Scheme Type of 
study 
Sessions Trials Participants Evaluation 
elements 
Komanduri  
Picture 
Passwords  
In-lab and 
any 
location 
Day 1: in-lab  
Day 2: any 
location 
Day 9: in-lab 
8 complete 
correct 
inputs 
- 23 participants 
- Only 15 
participants in 
picture-based 
passwords  
Effectiveness, 
efficiency and 
memorability 
TwoStep  
No user 
study 
Future work: 
lab/field 
studies 
– – – 
WYSWYE 
(DR)  
Controlled 
lab 
One login 
session 
 
3 login 
attempts 
- 24 participants 
- None of them 
knew about GP 
Accuracy, 
efficiency, 
learnability and 
user satisfaction 
VIP  
Controlled 
lab 
Two login 
sessions: 
first day & 
after one 
week 
10 login 
trials – 3 
allowed 
incorrect 
attempts 
61 participants 
Effectiveness, 
efficiency and 
user satisfaction 
TAPI  In-lab One session  
5 correct 
login 
attempts 
30 participants 
– two groups of 
15 each 
Login time, 
correct logins 
and user 
satisfaction 
GOTP  In-lab – – 
10–20 
participants 
with prior 
knowledge of 
use 
Password 
creation & login 
times, recall 
convenience & 
recall 
disturbance 
Gao 
CAPTCHA  
In-lab 
Three login 
sessions: 
day one, one 
week later 
and one 
month later 
Test 1 (day 
1): 10 times, 
Test 2 (one 
week) 
Test 3 (one 
month): 
three times 
36 participants 
unfamiliar with 
the scheme 
Login success 
%, login time 
and 
memorability  
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GOTPass In-lab 
Three login 
sessions: 
first day, one 
week later 
and one 
month later 
Allowed: 
maximum10 
login 
attempts for 
each session. 
Required: 
only 5 
correct 
logins 
81 participants 
Effectiveness, 
efficiency, user 
satisfaction and 
memorability 
Table 6-2: Summary of the graphical password technique studies 
6.3 Experiment procedure and framework 
A user study was designed to conduct three separate trial sessions; on the first day of the 
study, one week later and after one month. A within-subjects design method was used in 
which the same users participate in all experimental tasks – that is, repeated measures are 
taken from the same people. Participants performed two main assignments; firstly, to 
enrol to the system then authenticate for several times over specific time intervals, and 
secondly, to act as observers to try and capture the experimenter’s login password using 
various attacking techniques. This study is a longitudinal testing method, since several 
observations of the same subjects were conducted over a period of time. 
The experiment to evaluate the usability aspects of the GOTPass approach was conducted 
in a controlled lab environment, as all users were required to be physically present and 
use the same computer to perform the study tasks. For study purposes, the implemented 
prototype generated some significant activity logs in such a way that it stores timestamps, 
login status (successful, failed) as well as details of the duration of each session as 
descried in the previous chapter five (5.5). In addition, results of the responses to the pre-
test and post-test questionnaires were also collected. Only the research investigator and 
the participant were allowed in the lab, to avoid any possible disruption and to enable the 
researcher to observe any usability or security issues during the experiment and record 
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the participant’s comments. Nevertheless, attention was paid to the task duration, in 
which the participants were urged to remain focused on the experiment and discourage 
any side conversations during the trials, unless participants chose to talk.  
Below is the series of tasks the users were required to perform at each session. 
A. Initialisation session – Day one 
The first session started with a brief introductory overview of the procedure, participants’ 
rights as well as an explanation about the system functionalities and the process of 
enrolment and authentication. Instruction manuals ‘guide booklets’ and ‘video demos’ 
that practically describe the registration and login sequential steps were made available 
for the participants as training materials. As shown in Table 6-3, nearly two-thirds of the 
users benefited from the booklet guides and a quarter of them used the video materials to 
explore the new system. A few participants liked to experience both materials mainly by 
using one material for the registration process and the other for the authentication. 
However, in reality users are not always expected to read a guide but it is assumed that 
they may look for some guides whenever they could not understand the scheme’s process 
from the on screen tips or explanations.        
User guide material Number of users  
Guide booklets  51 
Guide videos 20 
Both videos & booklets 10 
Table 6-3: User preferences of information guide materials 
After gaining the required understanding of the system and how it works, participants 
started the registration phase to create their own accounts.  
Once the users were registered, they were requested to fill out a short online pre-test 
questionnaire on demographic and authentication experience. This acted as a separator 
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role between phases to distract the user’s attention away from the registration process to 
aid a better evaluation of memorability during the next phase. This is similar to the Mental 
Rotation Tests (MRTs) procedure used in (Chiasson, Biddle & van Oorschot, 2007), 
which aims to clear the participants’ working memory. 
The final task of the first session was the login phase, where participants were asked to 
login (maximum 10 total attempts) under the following conditions: 
• Total of five correct authentication attempts = successfully completed this session.  
• Total of five incorrect attempts = receive the guide booklets or play the video demos, 
then try again. 
The decision on the appropriate number of attempts to be allowed for the participants in 
this study was made by visiting previous studies within this domain (Table 6-2). The 
study found that the required successful authentication attempts varied between 3 and 10. 
However, some other studies requested the participants to login for 10 successful times 
as well, but that had a negative impact on some participants who found it too repetitive 
(Wiedenbeck et al., 2006). Thus, to avoid the participants’ boredom and at the same time 
allow the study to attain sufficient analytical login data, a similar method to that used in 
(Citty & Hutchings, 2010) was adopted with some modifications to keep the required 
balance. The maximum number of allowed login attempts was limited to 10 while users 
can accomplish their task whenever they achieve 5 correct attempts.  
 
Since the proposed system was new to the participants, they were instructed to avoid 
clicking on the pass-images, instead they were encouraged to mentally locate the pass-
images and map them to the right axis to obtain the correct OTP codes.  
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B. Follow-up session (short-term memorability experiment) – One week later 
After a week of non-use, participants returned to the lab where they were requested to 
repeat the login task using the same procedures and conditions. 
By completing the login task, the security experiment takes place which will be explained 
in more details in the next chapter. 
 
C. Final session (long-term memorability experiment) – One month later 
The third and final session took place one month after the first session. The first task was 
again to login using the created account with the same rules and conditions as the first 
and second sessions. 
Lastly, each participant received an online post-test questionnaire to assess their 
impression of the GOTPass system, as well as finding out more about their opinion 
towards such a new system. 
 
Given the longitudinal nature of the study, and the necessity for those involved to remain 
available for each stage of the work, the participants were sourced from the local 
university staff/student, and recruited via several methods: including word-of-mouth, 
student portals, emails and posters. Participation did not require any specific level of 
computing ability. Each participant received reasonable compensation (£15) for their 
participation, payable upon the completion of the study at the end of the third session. As 
for the session duration, the allocated time for each session never exceeded 30 minutes. 
 
The experiment was conducted over five weeks and involved 81 participants (63 males, 
18 females) who attended all three separate sessions. Participants had a mix of educational 
levels ranging from undergraduate and postgraduate. Most participants were aged 
between 18 and 39 years. Fifty percent of the participants reported an intermediate level 
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of computer experience, yet 17% indicated a basic level. Almost all participants have 
used various types of one-time password and many of whom were satisfied with such 
technology. The majority of the participants indicated that they knew about at least one 
type of graphical technique. Draw-based graphical password was the most familiar type 
to the users, followed by recognition-based passwords, whereas only a few respondents 
had prior knowledge of the click-based technique. Many participants demonstrated 
several insecure behaviours associated with the way to manage their multiple passwords. 
Top rated methods were reusing the same password and saving in the browser or mobile 
phone note. In regard to the techniques they follow while creating their password, the 
responses were varied but the most frequent ones included choosing similar ones to other 
current passwords and easy to remember passwords. 
Beautement and Sasse (2010) highlighted two main points that may affect the 
generalisation of the results to other users’ performance. One is the small sample size of 
40 participants or less and the second is the over-reliance on students as participants. 
Thus, an effort was spent to avoid these points in this research by recruiting larger sample 
(nearly double the number) for the lab study and relatively mixed participants between 
students and staff. 
 
6.4 Study results and explanations 
As defined by the ISO 9241-11 (International Organization for Standardization, 1998), 
effectiveness, efficiency and satisfaction are the main components of usability in a 
particular context. However, according to Bangor, Kortum and Miller (2008), there are 
no absolute measures of usability. Nevertheless, major usability features from the ISO 
and previous studies (Table 6-2) were extracted to build usability evaluation criteria for 
the new graphical password system including efficiency, effectiveness, memorability, and 
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user satisfaction. This section reports the quantitative results for all usability components 
except user satisfaction, which reports qualitative results from the surveys regarding the 
user perceptions. 
 
6.4.1 Efficiency 
Usability 
element 
Measurements 
Assessment 
type 
Assessment 
method 
Average entry time 
for registration/ 
authentication 
	 = 
	Sum	successful_registration_timesnumber_of_successful_registrations  
 
	1 = 
	Sum	successful_login_timesnumber_of_successful_logins  
Objective/ 
quantitative 
Experiment/ 
user trial 
Table 6-4: Efficiency evaluation elements 
Table 6-4 descries the details of the measurements used to calculate the efficiency of the 
proposed scheme. As anticipated, creating a GOTPass account took longer than some 
other authentication forms, such as the traditional textual password and other types of 
graphical password schemes. The total amount of time taken to register for GOTPass 
included typing a username, drawing an unlock pattern, clicking the ‘Register Pattern’ 
button, initial thinking time (image viewing), selecting four pass-images, confirming the 
selection of images, choosing the security level and, finally, clicking the ‘Submit’ button. 
As shown in Table 6-5, the average registration time was 134 seconds. It can also be 
inferred that the time deference between the minimum and maximum time taken was 
massive (more than four folds).   
 Total attempts Total time  Average SD Minimum Maximum 
Registration 81 10,833 134 36.5 59 254 
Table 6-5: Registration entry time details (in seconds) 
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The analysis of the breakdown of the registration entry time (Table 6-6) showed that the 
last step of the registration process (GOTPass input format) consumed slightly more time 
than the image selection step. Interestingly, unlock pattern step took only less than 5% of 
the total time taken for registration, which confirms being a user-friendly scheme even in 
a web-based form using computer mouse.  
 Username  Pattern  Image 
selection 
GOTPass  Total 
time 
Registration 
2,317 488 3,866 4,162 10,833 
21.4% 4.5% 35.7% 38.4%  
Table 6-6: Breakdown of the registration entry time (in seconds)  
It is worth mentioning that participants were totally new to the system and, while they 
were creating their accounts, spent quite a lot of time talking and asking questions about 
the prototype, trying to start discussions about several aspects, such as the potential 
advantages and disadvantages of the system and the way it was implemented which might 
justify the differences between the minimum and maximum time as shown in Table 6-5. 
Although the registration time was relatively high, it was considered generally acceptable 
for most participants, as indicated later in the post-test questionnaire result, where 80% 
of the users stated that they managed to complete the required tasks quickly. In contrast, 
only one participant disagreed with this statement. 
 
In the analysis of the time taken to enter the correct submission, the average was 24.5 
seconds, as presented in Table 6-7. The long input time was also expected in the login 
phase, since the login task involves a number of keystroke and mouse activities. There 
was a slight variation in the average login time taken in each trial: 23.6, 25.5 and 24.3 
seconds respectively. 
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 Total attempts Success Total time Average SD Minimum Maximum 
Login 1,302 1,215 29,754 24.5 11 8 83 
Table 6-7: Entry time details for successful authentication (in seconds) 
Additionally, the time taken to mentally locate the correct pass-images and their 
associated codes is also considered to be a significant factor that increased the login time 
which consumed more than half of the total time (Table 6-8). 
 Username  Pattern  Image recognition 
& GOTPass  
Total 
time 
Login 
9,887 2,530 17,337 29,754 
33.2% 8.5% 58.3%  
Table 6-8: Breakdown of the authentication entry time (in seconds) 
 
6.4.2 Effectiveness 
Usability element Measurements 
Assessment 
type 
Assessment 
method 
Login success rate 21 = number_of_successful_logins	number_of_total_logins  
Objective/ 
quantitative 
Experiment/ 
user trial 
Table 6-9: Effectiveness evaluation elements 
The details of the measurements used to calculate the effectiveness of the proposed 
scheme can be seen in Table 6-9. The study looked at the proportion of all successful 
login attempts across all trials to calculate the overall success rate of the proposed system. 
In total, data from 1,302 login attempts carried out by all participants were analysed. 
Table 6-10 provides details of the success and failure rates for the authentication phase 
over the three trial sessions. The results showed a relatively high success rate, as over 
than 93% of the attempts were successful. Although the first trial was preceded by MRTs, 
to distract the users after the registration task and free up their working memory, this did 
not seem to have any clear impact on the success rate of the first trial in particular. In the 
final session (Trial 3), there seems to be some associations of the GOTPass credentials in 
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the participants’ memory, as the number of incorrect inputs was lower than that in Trial 
2. Moreover, it appears that there is a slight fluctuation in the login success rate between 
trials where the success rate decreased from Trial 1 to Trial 2 and then increased again in 
Trial 3. According to Catuogno and Galdi (2014), a justification of such behaviour can 
be the confidence that the users gained in the first session that they were able to use and 
remember credentials easily. Such feeling reduces the level of attention and, thus, 
increases the user tendency to errors. As a result, they make some improper responses in 
the second session. Nevertheless, those errors trigger their attention and increase the 
success rates during the final session. 
 Total attempts Successful Failed 
Trial 1 429 405 94.4% 24 5.6% 
Trial 2 438 405 92.5% 33 7.5% 
Trial 3 435 405 93.1% 30 6.9% 
Total 1,302 1,215 93.3% 87 6.7% 
Table 6-10: Login success and failure rates 
Interestingly, the study showed that none of the users were completely unable to login 
within the given number of attempts. Approximately 40% of the participants managed to 
complete their login tasks without error. Moreover, since many systems limit the number 
of consecutive incorrect attempts a user is allowed to make, this measure was enabled to 
determine the highest number of repeated failed attempts. The results showed that only 
one user failed to login within three consecutive incorrect login attempts, and seven others 
failed for two logins. In addition, only one participant was responsible for the maximum 
non-consecutive failed attempts by a user (five attempts), as shown in Chart 6-1 below.  
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Chart 6-1: Number of users and their non-consecutive failed attempts 
One of the observations from the trials highlighted that almost all failures occurred within 
the recognition part of the authentication process, more precisely the wrong codes or 
inputting codes in the wrong order, since the majority of the participants claimed that they 
were sure about recognising their pass-images correctly but might have entered the codes 
in an incorrect order or made a typographical mistake. 
 
6.4.3 Memorability 
Usability element Measurements 
Assessment 
type 
Assessment 
method 
Memorability over time intervals  
Short (one week),  
Extended (one month) 
Matched at first attempt 
Matched within three 
login attempts 
Objective/ 
quantitative 
Experiment/ 
user trial 
Table 6-11: Memorability evaluation elements 
The above Table 6-11 shows the details of the measurements used to calculate the 
memorability of the proposed scheme. Participants carried out a memorability experiment 
twice. The first took place after one week of non-use (Trial 2) and the second was one 
month later (Trial 3). The results showed that all users (100%) managed to login 
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successfully to their GOTPass accounts, but the number of attempts to do so varied. There 
was no lockout event since all consecutive incorrect attempts were three or less. 
  Trial 2 Trial 3 
Attempt sequence  1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th 6th 1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th 6th 
Failure frequency 12 6 6 4 3 2 15 3 5 4 2 1 
Total 33 30 
Table 6-12: Details of the frequency of the failed attempts based on trials and attempts 
Table 6-12 illustrates the number of failed login attempts in each sequence. It can be 
inferred from the table that 85% of the participants in Trial 2 managed to login 
successfully on their first attempt. In addition, the number of failed attempts seems to 
reduce over time. One month later, in Trial 3, when participants tried to re-enter their 
GOTPass secrets, only 19% were unable to correctly login at the first attempt. However, 
during all trials almost all users logged in successfully within three attempts, which shows 
an encouraging outcome from a password recall perspective.  
According to Renaud (2004), the frequency of use is an important factor of memorability 
which means how often the user will access the system. The categorisation of usage can 
be either high (daily), medium (once a week) or low (once a month). The more frequent 
the system is used the more easier the credentials become to remember, since the repeated 
use can ease the credentials memorability for users. On the other hand, when the system 
is used less frequently it is even more essential for the secrets to be easily memorable. 
Therefore, GOTPass scheme can suit systems in any of the three usage categories as it 
showed a relatively high memorability level over time.  
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6.4.4 User satisfaction 
Usability element Measurements 
Assessment 
type 
Assessment 
method 
Overall satisfaction 
(simplicity, ease of use, 
understandability and 
perception of using GOTPass) 
- Satisfied 
- Neutral 
- Unsatisfied 
(7-point Likert scale/ 
multiple choice) 
Subjective/ 
qualitative 
Questionnaire/ 
attitude scale 
Table 6-13: User satisfaction evaluation elements 
The details of the measurements used to analyse the level of user satisfaction of the 
proposed scheme is shown in Table 6-13. User satisfaction was measured through a post-
test questionnaire, which was given to the users at the end of their final session of the 
study. The aim was to discover the users’ feelings towards the perceived aspects of 
usability and security of the proposed system.  
The survey was carried out online and consisted of 35 questions in 5 main sections 
organised as follows: (1) Training/Instruction - ask about the effectiveness of the way the 
study was presented, (2) Usability aspects - analysis of the user experience of various 
usability factors, (3) Security aspects - investigate how secure the system is from the 
respondents’ viewpoints, (4) Design aspects - analysing respondents’ experience of the 
system's design, and finally (5) Overall opinions - analysis of the overall users’ 
satisfaction level of the proposed authentication mechanism. 
The survey questions were mainly derived from IBM Computer Usability Satisfaction 
Questionnaires – The post-study usability questionnaire ‘PSSUQ’ (Lewis, 1995). 
However, there are some other valuable evaluation tools such as the System Usability 
Scale ‘SUS’ (Brooke, 1996) but it was not used in this research because it produces a 
single scoring number representing the overall usability measure. None of the 
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similar/competitor schemes to GOTPass has used SUS to measure the usability which 
made it difficult to compare the outcome of compared schemes.  
Most measurements were carried out using a 7-point Likert scale, ranging from 1 
(strongly agree) to 7 (strongly disagree), whereas some others used multiple-choice 
measurements. All 81 participants of the user study took part in the survey. The results 
indicated that 86% of the respondents agreed that learning how to use the system and how 
to create a GOTPass account was simple, with the remaining 14% showing an average 
response. Almost 91% of the participants stated that this authentication method would 
become easier and quicker to use with practice. The vast majority of the participants 
(98.7%) stated that they would be confident using the GOTPass system. Ninety-four 
percent of the participants thought that the GOTPass system could be used for sensitive 
web authentication. The overall level of user satisfaction with the GOTPass system was 
very high, as 98% were in support of the idea. Note that the results of all responses were 
mostly in the positive half of the scale, which, in turn, reflects positive outcomes towards 
a prospective solution. 
 
6.4.5 Other usability-related questionnaire results 
Beside the above reported results from the post-test questionnaire, this section continues 
to present results of other aspects of usability that were covered in the questionnaire. For 
an easier presentation of the result data, the average value of each survey statement was 
used and arranged into tables based on its related section.  
In the first section (Table 6-14), the majority of the participants showed that the provided 
guide materials were useful and helpful which made the learning task easier.  
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Section (A) - Training/Instructions 
(1) Strongly disagree – (7) Strongly agree 
Average % 
Learning how to use this system was simple 6.25 89.2 
Support information was clear and understandable 6.47 92.4 
Support information was effective in helping me complete the tasks 6.54 93.5 
Table 6-14: Questionnaire results: Training/Instructions 
Section (B) was concerned about various usability features that ensure the suitability of 
the proposed scheme for use from the participants’ viewpoints. The results in Table 6-15 
show that the creation and authentication processes using GOTPass was simple and quick 
for most participants. In addition, they agreed that this authentication method would 
become easier and quicker to use after gaining experience with practice. In regard to 
memorability, a question was asked about the ability to remember GOTPass after a few 
weeks of non-use, 88% of the participants were confident that they will remember their 
password correctly. The responses about the introduction of the keyboard as an input 
means with graphical password scheme were mostly positive. Also the utilisation of the 
unlock pattern technique on the web was supported by a high number of participants. 
Finally, users were asked to rate each part of their GOTPass based on what they think 
might cause the remembrance/recall difficulty. The results showed a moderate impact 
was caused by the input format and pass-images respectively. 
Section (B) - About the usability aspects 
(1) Strongly disagree – (7) Strongly agree 
Average % 
It was easy to create my GOTPass account 6.44 92.1 
Logging in using GOTPass was easy 6.36 90.8 
I was able to complete the required tasks quickly 6.15 87.8 
This authentication method would become easier and quicker to use 
after gaining experience (practice). 
6.58 94.0 
It was difficult to enter my GOTPass even though I thought I 
remembered it 
2.12 30.3 
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If I didn’t login to my account for a few weeks, I would still remember 
my password 
6.16 88.0 
Using keyboard as an input means with 
graphical password scheme seems: 
(Convenient) 6.06 86.6 
(Practical) 6.26 89.4 
(Secure) 6.64 94.9 
Using unlock pattern on the web was: 
(Convenient) 6.36 90.8 
(Practical) 6.43 91.9 
(Secure) 6.27 89.6 
Rate each part of your GOTPass based on 
what you think might cause the 
remembrance/recall difficulty?   
(1) No impact – (6) High impact 
(Username) 1.73 28.8 
(Unlock pattern) 2.09 34.8 
(Pass-images) 2.7 45.1 
(Input format) 2.81 46.9 
Table 6-15: Questionnaire results: usability aspects 
In respect to the design aspects, section (D) reported users’ views about different system 
characteristics. Table 6-16 shows that the majority of responses pointed out that the 
number of images and themes used by the system were adequate.  
Section (D) - About the design aspects High 
% 
Adequate 
% 
Low 
% 
The number of pattern nodes (16) on a matrix of size (4×4) was: 6.2 92.6 1.2 
The number of images within each theme (30/theme) in the 
registration page was: 
17.
3 
80.2 2.5 
The number of images (16) on a matrix size (4×4) in the login 
page was: 
3.7 93.8 2.5 
The number of pass-images (4 images) that users need to 
remember was: 
1.2 96.3 2.5 
Table 6-16: Questionnaire results: design aspects 
Furthermore, almost half of the participants found that randomising (shuffling) images 
locations on the grid has a slight effect on performance (causing longer time to identify 
pass-images) and one-third of the users said it had no effect. The convenience level of 
assigning the image themes by the system was about 89%. As for the partial assigning of 
the GOTPass input format (code location) by the system, the convenience level was 
around 90%. As part of the design aspects questions, the participants were asked about 
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their views regarding the generated codes where 84% of them thought that generating 
alphanumerical codes would provide more security while 83% stated that the current 
numerical codes would be more usable. In regard to the length of the GOTPass code (8 
characters long), the majority of the participants (90%) found it adequate.  
Section (E) - Overall opinion 
(1) Strongly disagree – (7) Strongly agree 
Average % 
This system has the functions and capabilities I expect it to have 6.53 93.3 
Using GOTPass system was convenient 6.52 93.1 
I would use GOTPass confidently 6.75 96.5 
I think GOTPass can be used for sensitive web authentication 6.54 93.5 
Overall, I am satisfied with GOTPass system 6.75 96.5 
Table 6-17: Questionnaire results: overall opinion 
The last section of the post-test questionnaire was about the overall opinion to find out 
how satisfied the participants were with various parts of the system. As shown in Table 
6-17, the overall satisfaction throughout was considerably high. 
 
6.4.6 Prototype analysis results  
This section analyses some of the result data of the conducted user trials and reports 
general observations in respect to the usage behaviour. 
 
A. Unlock pattern  
The chosen unlock patterns by users were examined against bias selection. Table 6-18 
presents the repeated pattern shapes that were chosen by several users. It can be inferred 
that most frequent shapes were formed by English letters (i.e. L, N, Z) with some 
variations in orientation. Although the results revealed that the bias selection does exist, 
but the ratio of its occurrence is relatively low which did not exceed 9% by maximum.  
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Selection 
frequency 
Pattern shapes 
7 
 
8.6% 
 
(1) 
 
(2) 
4 
 
4.9% 
 
(3) 
 
(4) 
3 
 
3.7% 
 
(5) 
 
(6) 
Table 6-18: Frequently chosen patterns 
In this prototype implementation, the restriction policy on the minimum number of nodes 
that the user must select was not activated, which is supposed to be 5 as previously 
mentioned in Chapter five (5.3.1). The reason behind that was to investigate the normal 
unrestricted users’ preferences towards the length of the pattern. For instance, the pattern 
shape (2) that appears in Table 6-18 was formed in a straight line connecting 4 nodes 
only. 
The following Table 6-19 presents the different pattern lengths and the number of users 
chosen the same length regardless of the similarity of shapes. It can be depicted that the 
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majority of participants (89%) complied with the policy that limits the minimum number 
of nodes without enforcement. More than 60% of the users chose their patterns with 7, 
10, 5 points long respectively.  
Pattern length Frequency % 
7 24 29.6 
10 16 19.8 
5 10 12.4 
4 9 11.1 
6 7 8.6 
8 5 6.2 
13 4 4.9 
9 4 4.9 
12 1 1.2 
16 1 1.2 
Table 6-19: The frequancy of the chosen pattern length 
B. Themes  
Since GOTPass scheme introduced a new way to reduce the bias selection through the 
use of system-assigned themes and user-selected images approach, this part of the study 
analysed the distribution of the themes and its effectiveness.  
 Theme name Frequency % 
1 Computer 33 10.2 
2 Transportation 29 9.0 
3 House 29 9.0 
4 Sport 28 8.6 
5 Stationery 27 8.3 
6 Sign 27 8.3 
7 Clock 26 8.0 
8 Flag 26 8.0 
9 Earth 26 8.0 
10 Paint 25 7.7 
11 Food 24 7.4 
12 Animal 24 7.4 
Table 6-20: The frequancy of the assigned theme 
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Table 6-20 demonstrates the frequency of assigning each theme to the users. As each user 
is assigned four themes, the distribution ratios are considered close.    
One of the interesting findings in this regard was to realise that there were four sets of 
duplicated themes assigned to different users regardless of their sequence. However, the 
chosen pass-images by users were different as the records showed no duplication in the 
pass-images portfolios for all users. This is a significant sign that support the effectiveness 
of such approach in reducing the chance of having the same pass-image portfolios for 
several users. 
 
C. Images  
This subsection collected data about images chosen 4 times or more by different 
participants. The goal was somewhat related to that discussed earlier in the theme 
analysis. Finding out whether particular images were chosen more than others raises the 
alert of having hot-images that may lead to security issues such as easy to guess images.  
Table 6-21 illustrates the number of times each pass-image was chosen by users. There 
was a total of 23 pass-images each of which was chosen by 4 users or more. It can be 
inferred that the amount of images selected repeatedly more than 4 times constitutes 
approximately 7% of the entire selected pass-images (324 images). The most frequent 
pass-image was selected 10 times, that is just 2.5% of the total available images while the 
4 time-selected pass-images were only 1% each. Generally, these percentages seem very 
low to help attackers determine or even guess the correct pass-images of other users. 
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House 10 2.5 13 
 
Computer 5 1.3 
2 
 
Clock 8 2.0 14 
 
Transportation 5 1.3 
3 
 
Sign 8 2.0 15 
 
Stationery 4 1.0 
4 
 
Flag 7 1.8 16 
 
Animal 4 1.0 
5 
 
Computer 6 1.5 17 
 
Earth 4 1.0 
6 
 
Sport 6 1.5 18 
 
Transportation 4 1.0 
7 
 
Animal 6 1.5 19 
 
House 4 1.0 
8 
 
Flag 6 1.5 20 
 
Earth 4 1.0 
9 
 
Computer 5 1.3 21 
 
Stationery 4 1.0 
10 
 
Sport 5 1.3 22 
 
Sign 4 1.0 
11 
 
Flag 5 1.3 23 
 
Paint 4 1.0 
12 
 
Food 5 1.3  
Overall % = percentage of chosen image 
based on the total available images (400 
images) 
Table 6-21: The repeatedly selected pass-images 
 
 
 
179 
D. General trials observations  
During the experiments time, participants were observed in order to realise any 
unexpected usage behaviour. From the results presented in Table 6-22, it appears that 
some users tried to click directly on their pass-images instead of looking for the associated 
random codes. Others just pointed at either the pass-images or their related codes. Both 
behaviours make the system vulnerable to observation attacks. It was also noticed that 
some users were practicing insecure activities even with the new system, such as writing 
down login information. Not only that but also some users were found dragging and 
dropping their random codes into the designated field instead of writing them, which 
indeed reveal part of their login information for any peepers.  
Observed behaviours FRQ Notes 
Clicking on images to select 15 Usually in the first attempt 
Pointing at images or codes (by mouse or finger) 4  
Thinking that pass-images will be displayed in rounds 2  
Trying to write down information  2  
Using laptop touchpad for drawing  2 Found hard 
Copy & past username, drag & drop codes  5  
Table 6-22: Observed user behaviours  
 
6.5 Discussion   
At first glance, many users thought that using GOTPass scheme might be too complex; 
however, learning and practising the system created an opposite impression, as the 
majority found it easy to use and adoptable. Longer account creation time is a 
disadvantage of the system, but, at the same time, it is worth mentioning that GOTPass is 
a multi-layer authentication approach which employs several graphical password 
techniques into a single robust mechanism. That, in turn, might justify the longer time 
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taken to create user accounts or login to the system. In order to register or login, users 
need to complete multiple steps which have an obvious impact on the complexity of the 
registration and authentication process. That is specifically clear when compared to the 
traditional textual password which takes 25 second to create a new password and 24 
second to login after one week (Dhamija & Perrig, 2000). However, although GOTPass 
scheme seems complex and takes longer time, the user study showed that, overall, users 
were satisfied – there were no complaints about the duration of the registration process 
or the level of difficulty. Furthermore, it is worth spending an extra little time using 
GOTPass scheme to be protected against various common security attacks, which is one 
of the primary objectives of this system. 
In a study by Beautement and Sasse reported that many users encounter difficulties 
recalling their credentials correctly with infrequent authentication (once a week or less). 
In that case, the ability to correctly recall the credential is more important for performance 
than fast execution. Whereas in the frequent authentication (once a day or more), fast 
execution becomes a priority as recalling the credential becomes automatic for most users 
(Beautement & Sasse, 2010). This implies that GOTPass would best serve within the first 
category of infrequent authentication. However, that does not necessarily mean that 
GOTPass scheme is inappropriate for the frequent authentication but rather suggests 
further investigation on its suitability for such type of authentication. 
Although the combination of several security methods may yield a higher level of 
security, it may also affect the usability of the system. However, that is not the case with 
the GOTPass scheme, as it aims to keep a reasonable balance between security and 
usability and avoid any trade-off. According to the results of the user study, there is no 
evidence of a negative impact on usability as a result of combining multiple security 
methods. Additionally, reporting a high success rate even after a period of time, as well 
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as the users’ positive perception regarding the simplicity of the system, prove that multi-
security layers do not hamper the usability of GOTPass. 
 
Comparing the login time of the GOTPass scheme to other graphical schemes that are 
similar in nature, such as (Khot, Kumaraguru & Srinathan, 2012) (Komanduri & 
Hutchings, 2008) (Gao et al., 2009b), GOTPass showed that the login time still appears 
to be sensible (see Chart 6-2). As mentioned earlier, a significant reason that influences 
the performance time of an authentication scheme is the involvement of multiple steps, 
which also justifies the longer time taken to register and login using GOTPass scheme. 
However, GOTPass is still comparable to other two-step authentication approaches, and 
is even superior within its category (three-step).  
 
Chart 6-2: Comparison of the mean login time and steps to login 
In terms of comparing GOTPass with its closest scheme, GOTP, a direct comparison is 
not straightforward, given that the evaluation data for GOTP are limited to post-test 
survey responses and not experimental data (Ku et al., 2012). Nonetheless, a brief 
comparison between the two schemes is presented next. The data of the survey had to be 
adjusted from a 7-point Likert scale to a 5-point Likert scale to enable a direct 
comparison. In order to gain comparable results, the response values of the relevant 
questions were converted using the following method (IBM Support, 2010):  
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1. Li = Multiply the response value by its frequency (e.g. 7-point Likert scale × 
number of selected times). 
2. S = Sum, the total of all points (L7 + … + L1). 
3. P = Divide S by the number of participants (S ÷ 81) [the mean value in a 7-point 
Likert scale]. 
4. Q = Divide P by 7 (P ÷ 7) [the value should be in the range between 0 and 1]. 
5. R = Multiply Q by the new Likert point number (Q × 5) [the mean value in a 5-
point Likert scale], the value of R represents the original result but using a 5-point 
Likert scale.  
 
 
Chart 6-3: Comparison summary of GOTP and GOTPass 
Chart 6-3 highlights the differences between the compared schemes based on the 
available evaluation data of the GOTP scheme. Although GOTP scored highly regarding 
the level of memorability, GOTPass showed even better results, which satisfies one of 
the main requirements of any prospective alternative authentication system. In relation to 
that, ease of use is another important feature, and GOTPass achieved a higher result than 
that of GOTP. However, across all comparison parameters GOTPass has performed very 
well, with over than four out of five in all aspects. A major advantage of GOTPass was 
the larger number of participants, which increases the accuracy and reliability of the 
result.      
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In addition, GOTP scheme requires the user to memorise four alphanumeric codes 
obtained by identifying the pass-images over four rounds. That, in turn, would require 
memory recall from the user, posing possible usability issues. In contrast, the GOTPass 
scheme does not involve codes memorisation, since they are visible on a single screen. In 
addition, GOTP is designed for smartphone platform that can be used as an out-of-band 
channel authentication, which is usually carried out away from the browser, whereas 
GOTPass utilises an in-session/in-band authentication system using the existing browser. 
In other words, there is no need for additional devices, such as a token or mobile phone, 
to use the GOTPass scheme. Regarding the length of the OTP code, GOTP submits a 
four-character-long code while GOTPass offers an eight-character code. Themes and 
images used in GOTP are static and unchangeable, but in GOTPass they are dynamic and 
shuffling.  
 
Figure 6-1: A screenshot of the GOTP login screen 
The letters and numbers in the top corner of each GOTP image are barely readable on a 
mobile phone screen (Figure 6-1), which can be considered to be a major usability 
drawback of the system. In this respect, I must acknowledge the authors of the GOTP 
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scheme (especially Okkyung Choi) for their cooperation and making the GOTP 
application available for me to test and have a real experience with it.   
In a quick comparison to the most common authentication techniques utilising OTP in 
online banking, the login time and number of steps needed for login were compared. All 
these accounts involved in this test belong to the researcher who carried out each test 
individually. The first step involved noting down each and every step throughout the login 
process. Secondly, a stop watch of a smartphone was used to record the time taken from 
the beginning of the login till the end. However, it was ensured that all login prerequisites 
such as the tokens and mobile phones were present before the start. Therefore, the 
consumed time does not include searching/bringing in a token or mobile phone.   
E-banking  HSBC SAMBA SAMBA GOTPass 
OTP method Soft-token Hard-token SMS Graphical 
No. of steps 8 8 7 4 
Steps details Username/ID,  
select login method,  
enter memorable 
question,  
move to soft-token, 
enter security key, 
generate OTP,  
go back to bank 
website,  
enter OTP 
Username,  
password,  
select OTP method,  
move to hard-token,  
enter PIN,  
generate OTP,  
go back to bank 
website,  
enter OTP 
Username,  
password,  
select OTP method,  
move to mobile 
phone,  
receive SMS 
message,  
go back to bank 
website, 
enter OTP 
Username,  
pattern,  
recognise 
pass-
images,  
enter OTP 
Average 
login time 
3 logins  
(seconds) 
74, 58.9, 51.9 
 
 
61.6  
32.6, 31.2, 30.4 
 
 
31.4 
50.24, 34.21, 37.23 
 
 
40.56 
18.7, 21.6, 
16.1 
 
18.8 
Table 6-23: Login process of GOTPass versus common online banking authentications 
Table 6-23 shows the results of the comparison between GOTPass scheme and various 
OTP techniques provided by some online banking systems. Overall, GOTPass scheme 
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required nearly half of the steps needed for login by other compared techniques. As far 
as the login time is concerned, GOTPass performed well among others demonstrating the 
shortest duration time. However, a factor of these approaches is not just how long they 
take to perform the task but how friendly they feel in process. Apart from the GOTPass 
scheme, all compared schemes required some instant disruption while logging in since 
the user needs to be diverted away to pick the authentication device (token or mobile) to 
obtain the OTP code.  
 
6.6 Summary 
This chapter presented the results of the experiments conducted to evaluate the usability 
of the system. The results indicated that the GOTPass scheme has achieved a high level 
of effectiveness and user satisfaction as well as an acceptable level of efficiency. 
Moreover, the impact of being a multi-layer authentication approach on the duration time 
taken for registration or login was obvious but did not affect the overall level of user 
satisfaction. The study showed that GOTPass has the potential to succeed and contribute 
towards the adoption of graphical password technologies. In respect to the analysis of the 
prototype data, the results showed that the approach of system-assigned theme with user-
chosen images was effective and reduced the personalised selection of images. 
Furthermore, there was a few repetitions in the theme assigning process but nevertheless, 
that did not cause any duplicates in the image portfolios among all users. In connection 
to that, the number of pass-images that were selected repeatedly by several users was 
reasonably low which fortify the system against guessing attack by decreasing the image 
probability. 
In conclusion, the study indicated that most of the main usability characteristics that the 
proposed scheme aimed to satisfy in the first place as mentioned at the beginning of this 
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chapter were achieved. Overall, the GOTPass was uncomplicated multi-step scheme, 
simple to recall, easy to use, acceptably efficient in terms of registration and 
authentication time duration, and does not require any additional devices to carry. 
However, the last requirement was the ease of recovery, but was not included in the study 
since it was assumed that implementing one of the existing techniques (i.e. email the login 
reset procedure to the registered email address) would satisfy such requirement.  
As this chapter discussed the usability aspects of the GOTPass scheme in details, the 
security aspects need to be investigated with more elaboration as well. Thus, the next 
chapter will be dedicated for the security-related experiments and analysis. 
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7 Chapter Seven 
Security Evaluation of the 
GOTPass System 
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7.1 Introduction   
The primary goal of an authentication system must be to provide sufficient security for a 
target environment. The satisfaction of security requirements of any proposed system 
should be evaluated against common security attacks. Focusing on one particular security 
strength and leave the system vulnerable to other types of attacks would not fulfil the 
security requirements adequately. For security systems, it is essential to assess the design 
of the system in a controlled lab prior to any deployment plan for field study or in the 
wild. That should enable observation of any potential security issues that can be easier to 
control and amend in lab but would be difficult if occurred in a field study. 
The strength of the GOTPass scheme is mainly derived from the incorporation of several 
security characteristics including the protection layer of unlock pattern, dynamic pass-
images portfolio, pre-determined input format, and codes randomness. This chapter 
addresses the security capabilities of the GOTPass scheme based on a user study 
conducted to assess the potential of the scheme to withstand common security threats. 
Attack-alike simulations were designed, including guessing, intersection, and shoulder-
surfing attacks, to enable a proper security evaluation and to measure the system reaction 
against various attacks. An in-depth analysis of the security evaluation is reported which 
shows a high resistance capability of GOTPass scheme against common graphical 
password attacks. Other essential security measures were also included such as the 
theoretical security assessment and the full size of password space. Participants of all 
experiment types were requested to use the same test machine to try compromising the 
system using different attack methods. Towards the end of this chapter, the results of the 
complementary study is presented which applies a minor modification to the design of 
the system that resulted in a valuable security enhancement without affecting the system 
usability nor the user experience.  
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In this research, attacks exploiting software flaws for entire bypassing the authentication 
technique are out of scope which limit the discussion to those common attacks seeking 
direct obtainment of user’s credentials.         
 
7.2 Security concerns and threats to Graphical authentication 
The security of an authentication system is mainly related to the difficulty of cracking the 
secret key. There are several threats that attackers may exploit to break the authentication 
system and gain an unauthorised access. According to De Angeli et al. (2005), the three 
basic security dimensions considered for the security evaluation were guessability, 
observability and recordability. A brief overview of the common attacks against graphical 
authentication systems to obtain user’s credentials is provided next: 
7.2.1 Guessability  
Guessability is a measure of how simple it is for an attacker to guess the authentication 
secret of a legitimate user. In recognition-based authentication, “Prioritised guessing 
attacks” aims to increase the probability of selecting the correct image through the 
prioritisation of the most commonly selected images (English & Poet, 2011a). 
7.2.2 Observability: 
7.2.2.1 Shoulder-surfing 
When authenticating in public places, shoulder-surfing attack is of real concern since it 
enables an attacker to capture an individual’s password by direct observation or by 
recording the entire authentication session (Lashkari et al., 2009). A general goal of 
resisting shoulder-surfing attack should be to harden the attacker’s task of learning 
enough key images that lead to a successful future replay attack (Dunphy, Heiner & 
Asokan, 2010). According to Wu et al. (2014), shoulder-surfing attacks can be classified 
into two types; (1) Weak shoulder-surfing that does not utilise any video equipment and 
190 
(2) Strong shoulder-surfing that make use of video equipment to capture the entire login 
process including keystrokes and the mouse clicks. However, several conditions like the 
required shooting angle and lighting have showed that video shoulder-surfing seems less 
practical than expected (Schaub et al., 2013). 
7.2.2.2 Intersection attack  
Intersection attack is possible when the role of an image as either a pass-image or a decoy 
can be determined by the frequency of its appearance at each login. That in turn allows 
the attacker to use the most frequently viewed images to pass the challenge screen and 
gain access (English & Poet, 2012). In addition, a source intersection attack is an attack 
that possibly occur when pass-images and decoys are each drawn from distinguishable 
image sources such as personal images and drawings (Dunphy, Heiner & Asokan, 2010).  
7.2.3 Recordability:  
7.2.3.1 Replay attack through eavesdropping  
Intercepting the communication between authentication client and server can enable 
attackers to capture the transmitted image portfolios and the user selection. Afterwards, 
the copied login data can be replayed again to the server to potentially obtain a false 
positive access (English & Poet, 2011b) (van Oorschot & Wan, 2009).  
A different form of such attack can be carried out using nearby high-quality smartphone 
camera that aim to capture sensitive data from devices in the vicinity (Marquardt et al., 
2011). 
7.2.3.2 Phishing  
Phishing attack is based on tricking users into submitting their login information at a 
fraudulent website that records users’ input. The need for presenting a correct set of 
images to the user prior to password entry makes this type of attack difficult with 
recognition-based systems. In schemes with variant responses, multiple server probes 
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would be necessary since only a portion of the user’s secret is exposed on each login 
attempt (Biddle, Chiasson & van Oorschot, 2012). 
7.2.3.3 Spyware 
7.2.3.3.1 Keystroke-loggers 
Some graphical password schemes utilise the keyboard to input login information. By this 
means, user’s input can be captured using keystroke-loggers unless the input’s content is 
varied at each login time (Gao et al., 2013). 
7.2.3.3.2 Screen-scrapers 
Screen-scrapers install software on a computer to record the user’s operational activities. 
Under normal circumstances, the difficulty of installing spyware on a user’s computer 
without being noticed makes screen-scrapers a less serious threat (Gao et al., 2013). 
7.2.3.3.3 Other spyware 
Combining keystroke-loggers and screen-scrapers is a method of attack that can obtain 
both the screen content with the keyboard input information. It is clear that this type of 
threat can be of an increased risk to the development of graphical password security (Gao 
et al., 2013). 
7.2.4 Dictionary attack  
The idea of the dictionary attack is based on trying all possible passwords from a 
relatively short pre-assembled list (dictionary) of high probability candidate password 
collected from experimental data or assumptions about user behaviour (Biddle, Chiasson 
& van Oorschot, 2009).  
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7.3 GOTPass security features 
In this scheme, users must enter the correct OTP provided through the recognition-based 
graphical password. In addition, a number of advantages are offered to strengthen the 
proposed technique such as providing dynamic secrets with no reliance on static password 
nor pass-images, implicit authentication feedback in which the scheme does not reveal 
any indication about the status of the login session. However, the inability to spot the 
correct pass-images by the legitimate users is a type of alert that something went wrong 
with that login attempt which require the user to go back to make the necessary correction. 
As far as the security of the proposed system is concerned, GOTPass aims to be equipped 
with high security features without sacrificing the usability of the system. Table 7-1 
contains a list of these security features with a brief description of the anticipated 
advantages of each feature.  
Security Features Advantage 
Shuffling images  
Reduce the risk of observation attack, which observes several login 
sessions to look for unchanged pass-images if always located in the 
same position.  
Online verification 
Utilising the unlock pattern technique as a proactive check to act as a 
first line of protection. 
System assigned 
themes 
Decrease guessing chances caused by hot-images or known personal 
image preferences. However, user will have the chance to select the 
preferable images from among the assigned themes to avoid affecting 
the usability by keeping good memorability level. 
Pass-image 
portfolio 
The system randomly presents a subset of the user’s pass-images (2 
out of 4) in each authentication session. That should mitigate the 
observation, phishing, and replay attacks. 
Distractor-images 
portfolio 
Ensure that recording multiple challenge screens to figure out the high 
frequent images is ineffective through maintaining constant distractor-
images for each given pass-image. 
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Account lockout 
Limit the number of consecutive incorrect attempts and apply a delay 
between login attempts to prevent excessive guessing tries and 
dictionary attack. 
Implicit 
authentication 
feedback 
The status of the login session is not revealed until after the final 
submission. Attacker will have no indication of which part of the 
scheme went wrong. That should resist guessing and trial & error 
attacks. 
One-Time-
Password 
Resist eavesdropping attacks and credential theft. 
Shoulder-surfing 
resistant 
The use of multi-layer authentication makes it hard to record multiple 
login techniques. The transparency level of the unlock pattern drawing 
disguises the correct pattern shape and thus makes it harder to capture.  
No indicator of image selection, so onlooker cannot identify password 
images.  
Difficult to guess 
Guessing various login techniques is made hard by implementing a 
multi-layer authentication. 
OTP is changeable every time. 
Authentication feedback is only given at the end of the login session. 
That is also called implicit feedback which should only be recognisable 
and useful for the legitimate user.  
Dictionary attacks 
resistant 
The use of multi-layer authentication makes it hard to conduct an 
online dictionary attack on multiple login techniques, e.g. unlock 
pattern should protect the primary authentication method (image 
recognition). On top of that, the use of OTP should mitigate this type 
of attack. 
Safe against 
Spywares 
Both keystroke logger and screen recording are needed to gain enough 
knowledge of the secret components, which is mostly time, effort, and 
cost overhead for attackers.    
Anti-phishing and 
replay attack 
The need for presenting a correct set of images to the user prior to 
password entry makes such attacks difficult. 
The implementation of variant responses reveals only a portion of the 
user’s secret on each login attempt. 
Table 7-1: GOTPass security features 
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7.4 Security evaluation    
Various general evaluation criteria have been proposed to assess different aspects of the 
authentication system’s security. Among these proposals, De Angeli et al. (2005) have 
considered three basic dimensions for security evaluation. Guessability which measures 
the impostor’s ability to guess the password, Observability that measures the impostor’s 
ability to monitor the password while it is being entered by the user, and Recordability 
which measures the impostor’s ability to record/capture the user’s password. Moreover, 
Gao et al. (2013) discussed spyware as an additional password capturing-based attack.  
 
Furthermore, English and Poet (2011b) have taken advantage of the same categorisation 
with further expansion that result in 4-tuple evaluation metric. Potential attacks against 
recognition-based graphical password were classified under one of the main related threat 
categories which are presented in Table 7-2. The security evaluation criterion is 
determined by whether the identified countermeasure/security benefit is provided by the 
scheme or not. Eventually, the scheme can present the overall level of resistance against 
particular types of attack by the number of applied countermeasures.  
 
In this section, the security evaluation of GOTPass scheme is discussed including two 
types of the evaluations; the first is ‘theoretical’ based on assessment criteria and the 
second is ‘empirical’ where several attacks were simulated and tested. 
 
7.5 Preliminary ‘theoretical’ security evaluation 
The main security threats of recognition-based graphical authentication have been 
gathered alongside the suggested countermeasures to form a scoring table. By adopting a 
similar evaluation approach as that proposed by English and Poet (2011b), the scoring 
procedure can be slightly enhanced to suit a hybrid scheme like GOTPass. Appropriate 
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weights for the countermeasures are provided by a 4-point scoring method motivated by 
the ranking framework of Bonneau et al. (2012). The scoring technique is adapted to 
present the overall level of resistance against particular types of attack based on whether 
the countermeasure is being implemented or not using the following scale points [No (0), 
Partially (1), Almost (2), Yes (3)].  
The result of the ‘theoretical’ security evaluation is shown in Table 7-2, which contains 
the threats alongside a list of the countermeasures and their scores.  
Category Security 
concern 
Threat Countermeasure Score 
P
as
sw
o
rd
 C
ap
tu
re
-b
as
ed
  
Observability 
Shoulder-
surfing 
Show no or disguised indicator of selection 3 
Greater pass-images number than that of 
challenge screens 
3 
Variable response 3 
Indirect input 3 
Intersection 
analysis 
Constant display of distractors and pass-
images, or 
 
Present a small constant subset of distractors 
for each given pass-image 
3 
Display distractors only in subsequent 
challenge screens following any incorrect 
attempt  
3 
Limit the number of attempts for 
unsuccessful authentication  
3 
No pass-image portfolio implementation, or   
Implement pass-image portfolio + distractor 
portfolio 
3 
Pass-images and distractors are not drawn 
from distinct sources 
3 
Recordability 
Replay 
attack 
Random image location  3 
Submit different value each time 3 
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Implement pass-image portfolio 3 
Phishing 
attack 
SSL implementation 1 
Protect images database (without knowledge 
of user’s images beforehand, it would be 
difficult to present correct images to extract 
user’s graphical password)  
2 
Spyware 
Keystroke-
loggers 
Varied input’s content at each login time 3 
Screen-
Scrapers 
Use shielded input characters 3 
No indication of selection 3 
P
as
sw
o
rd
 S
p
ac
e-
b
as
ed
 
Guessability 
Guessing 
attack 
Disallow user choice of images 2 
Select distractors from random categories 3 
Wide range of image categories 3 
Display images from same categories   3 
Provide implicit feedback for incorrect input 3 
Online dictionary attack 
Limiting the number of incorrect attempts 3 
Increase the delay between any 2 consecutive 
error logins 
3 
Total 68 
Table 7-2: The result of the ‘theoretical’ security evaluation 
The GOTPass scheme has scored 68 points out of 72 (94%), which seems encouraging 
result but also needs to be supported by an empirical proof that reflects the same high 
security level. Among all the countermeasures listed in Table 7-2, GOTPass scheme 
scored the maximum except three of them. First was ‘Disallow user choice of images’, as 
mentioned previously this issue was avoided by assigning random themes to the users and 
allow them to choose from the images inside each theme which should somewhat restrict 
user choices. Second was ‘SSL implementation’, it can be assumed that the connection is 
secured by an SSL implementation but since there was no actual implementation of that 
countermeasure in the prototype, it was given one score only. Third was ‘Protect images 
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database’, securing the database was taken into consideration while implementing the 
system, however, there is a chance for security improvement by storing images directly 
into the database in the form of BLOBs data type then try to apply appropriate encryption. 
In fact, that might have an effect on the performance of the image retrieval which requires 
further investigation and testing. 
 
7.6 Password space and entropy 
In this section of the chapter, the password space of each part of the GOTPass scheme is 
discussed.    
i. Unlock Pattern:  
In order to approximate the full password space of a draw-based scheme, Tao and Adams 
(2008) used a method based on the observation that a new password with the length (L + 
1) could be derived from connecting an additional node to any password with length of L 
or extending the last stroke by one unit in each available direction (the least 3 and the 
most 8). 
With the consideration of the grid size of the GOTPass scheme (4×4) the lower bound 
(the minimum number of neighbours for a node is 5 as shown in Figure 7-1) of the full 
password space will be:          
3 4 5 4 6 578
9:;<
7=
 
 
Figure 7-1: Lower bound: minimum number of node’s neighbours 
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The upper bound (the maximum number of neighbours for a node is 12 as shown in Figure 
7-2) will be: 
3 4 5 4 6 1278
9:;<
7=
 
 
Figure 7-2: Upper bound: maximum number of node’s neighbours 
The lower bound of the password space was used to approximate the actual password 
space since there was no significant difference between the lower bound and the upper 
bound. 
In case of GOTPass and to calculate the password space for the unlock pattern using the 
lower bound equation when Lmax = 5 (number of connected nodes) and grid size is 4×4 
(G=4): 
Password space (Unlock pattern) => 4 5 4 6 5787=   =  3,267,280 
Password Entropy (Unlock pattern) = log	3,267,280	≈		22 bits 
Another possible way to calculate the theoretical password space for the pattern-based 
graphical authentication is presented by Schneegass et al. (2014). For a pattern lock of 
minimum nodes of 5 chosen from a grid of total size of 16, the password entropy is 
calculated as follows: 
The minimum = log	16 5 15 5 14 5 13 5 12	≈		19 bits 
The maximum = log	16!	≈		44 bits 
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ii. Image choice: 
In a study by Vorster and van Heerden (2015) to analyse the key-space of graphical 
passwords, they suggested that the password space is not Nk as assumed by most 
researchers, but rather close to N!/(N-k)!. In the same way, van Oorschot and Wan (2009) 
calculated the password entropy of the recognition-based graphical scheme using the 
following equation when the order of the image selection is necessary: 
A	number	of	rounds	×	log C		 D	EFGHIJKE	FLIKG!	MD	EFGHIJKE	FLIKG − O	HIGGFLIKGP!	Q 
For the GOTPass scheme, r = 1, n = 16, k = 2, which means there is one round of 
verification and 2 images need to be selected in the correct order from an image panel of 
size 16.  
1	×	 log C	 16!	14!	Q 
Password Entropy (Image choice) = 1	×	logR240S  ≈ 8 bits 
 
iii. GOTPass input format:  
One-time password can be randomly guessed from the code cells above or aside the image 
panel since the user can select any 2 cells from the top or left axis of the challenge set. To 
find the password space for this part of the scheme, the method of Khot, Kumaraguru and 
Srinathan (2012) to compute the guessing success probability was applied. 
A	number	of	rounds	×	log C		 D	TEK	TKG!	MD	TEK	TKG − O	AKUVFAKE	TEK	TKGP!	Q 
The parameters above, r = 1, n = 8, k = 2, mean that there is one round of verification and 
2 code cells need to be selected in the correct order from the edges of the image panel of 
size 8. 
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1	×	 log C	8!6!	Q 
Password Entropy (GOTPass input format) = 1	×	logR56S ≈  6 bits 
 
Parameters Range of available 
selections 
Length of password 
entry 
Password Entropy 
(Bits) 
Pattern:  
4×4 grid size 
16 nodes 5 connected nodes 22 
Image choosing: 
4×4 images panel 
16 images / 1 round 2 images 8 
GOTPass input 
format 
4 combination 
options 
8 cells of code 
1 combination 
 
2 cells of code 
6 
Total Entropy 36 
Table 7-3: GOTPass password entropy 
Table 7-3 highlights the size of the password entropy of GOTPass authentication 
mechanism, considering a number of parameter settings and details. GOTPass scheme 
has approximately 36 bits of password entropy, which also represents 236 possible values 
(password space). The probability of successfully guessing random chosen GOTPass 
secrets by an attacker with no prior knowledge of the secrets except the username of the 
target account is 

WX	(1 in 68,719,476,736). However, guessing the image-based step 
separately would not be securely sufficient since it would only need 

Y		(1 in 256) chances 
to succeed. Although the password space size is not long enough, as most schemes of the 
recognition-based are, compared with that of the conventional textual password (Suo, Zhu 
& Owen, 2005), but GOTPass scheme leverages of multi-layer authentication which 
should complicate any potential attack that may exploit the password space size. 
Furthermore, Florêncio, Herley and Coskun (2007) found that adding login rules such as 
account lock-out to a relatively weak passwords of 20 bits or so is considered sufficient 
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protection against relevant attacks. According to van Oorschot and Wan (2009), security 
can be increased by choosing different parameters, yet that also affects usability.  
 
7.7 Security empirical evaluation  
Experiments to evaluate the security of the GOTPass approach were conducted in a 
controlled lab environment since the physical attendance for all users was required. Due 
to the difficulty of hiring expert testers to undertake the attacks on the proposed system, 
ordinary participants were recruited and asked to take part in this security experiment. 
For that reason, the activities of the study were simplified to suit typical users, who do 
not necessarily require hacking tools or special experience. The same 81 participants who 
took part in the usability experiment were recruited to participate in the security 
experiment as well. An advantage of recruiting those participants was that they were 
already familiar with the new scheme with a prior experience gained from their 
participation in the usability experiment.   
Three security attacks were planned and simulated (guessing, intersection, and shoulder-
surfing) to evaluate the capability of the proposed system to withstand these types of 
attacks.  Participants were asked to devote attention to the task of each given attack and 
act as attackers to try to break into the system. In all security experiments, there was no 
direct interaction between the actual victim and the attacker (participant) since the victim 
was simulated in a form of recorded videos. The security experiment trials were 
conducted using the same GOTPass prototype application but using a different database 
instance to avoid interfering and affecting the data of another parallel experiment focusing 
on usability aspects of the approach. All participants used the same computer to perform 
the study tasks. Only the research investigator and the participant were allowed in the lab 
to avoid any possible disruption and to observe any security issues as well as noting 
participants’ comments.  
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During the experiment and while the participants performing their tasks, the experimenter 
used to have a special form for each experiment and for every user to allow following up 
with the participants and record important information about each part of the experiment.       
The study collected a total of 690 login attempts carried out by 81 participants. These 
were divided into 3 groups based on the assigned security attack experiment, as shown in 
Table 7-4.  
Attack Type Number of users Number of attempts 
Guessing  27 235 
Shoulder-surfing 27 210 
Intersection 27 245 
Total 81 690 
Table 7-4: Number of users & attempts in each experiment 
 
7.7.1 Guessing attack 
In this type of attack, attackers try to guess the authentication secrets of a legitimate user. 
In order to successfully guess GOTPass credentials, the attacker must guess 3 combined 
steps: unlock pattern shape, 2 pass-images, and finally the input format of GOTPass code 
combination, which is computationally hard.   
A group of 27 participants, who were already familiar with the system, took part in this 
trial. Their task was to act as attackers to guess a particular account credentials. An 
additional account was created for this purpose, and some general information about that 
account was documented and revealed to help attackers guess it correctly. The given 
information was the username, the shape of the pattern, and the selected security level of 
that account. The details of the created account and the information revealed was as 
follows: 
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• Username: guesscscan (given) 
• Pattern: shape of number ‘2’  
(Partially given – only the shape was revealed, then after 5 attempts the exact 
pattern was given) 
 
Figure 7-3: The shape of the correct unlock pattern to guess (shape of number 2) 
• Pass-images: Chosen from the following themes: flag, stationery, computer, and 
paint  
(Partially given – only the themes that pass-images belong to were revealed) 
    
Figure 7-4: The pass-images portfolio for the ‘guessing attack’ account 
• Input format (Code location): Basic security level: First pass-image from TOP, 
Second pass-image from TOP  
(Partially given – only the security level was revealed but not the exact option) 
 
In order to validate participants’ guesses, they were given the chance to use the GOTPass 
system and try to login with the information they managed to gather. Each user was 
allowed maximum of 10 attempts unless they decide to give up after their fifth attempt.  
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That in turn allowed further investigation of two points: 
 The level of difficulty to guess user credentials. 
 The effectiveness of revealing GOTPass secrets to others. 
 
Participants Attempts Success Coincident Total Success with aid 
27 235 
2 4 6 6 
0.9% 1.7% 2.6% 100% 
Table 7-5: Details about the guessing attack trial 
The total number of break-in attempts in this attack trial was 235 (Table 7-5). Only 2 
attempts were successful which is considered less than 1% whereas, 4 other attempts were 
deemed as coincidence due to part of the correct credentials being incorrect but succeed 
by chance (i.e. missing one of the pass-images but submit the correct associated codes). 
According to Wiedenbeck et al. (2006), the accidental login (i.e. an attacker select the 
correct codes by chance) in challenge-response authentication is always possible. 
However, all of these successful guessing attempts occurred within the last 5 attempts in 
which the participants gained some help from the experimenter. The aid was in a form of 
solving the unlock pattern in order to facilitate the guessing task for the remaining parts 
that include the pass-images and the input format. Users who failed to make any 
successful login during the first 5 attempts were offered this type of help.   
Correct pattern 
without aid 
Correct pattern 
with aid  
Correct single 
pass-image 
Correct 2 
pass-images 
Correct input 
format 
4 100 47 7 123 
1.7% 42.6% 20% 3% 52.3% 
Table 7-6: Breakdown of each correct part of the guessing attempts 
It is worth mentioning that within the first 5 attempts for all users (135 attempts), only 4 
attempts (3%) succeeded on guessing the correct unlock pattern (Table 7-6). However, 
those successful pattern guesses were followed by unsuccessful ones since users were 
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uncertain about the correctness of their guesses due to the implementation of the implicit 
feedback. After the first 5 attempts, the experimenter helped the users by solving the 
unlock pattern for them. Thus, a significant finding can be inferred that implementing the 
unlock pattern in the scheme is effective since it proves its ability to act as a first line of 
defence to protect the main recognition-based graphical password. In addition, in about 
less than a quarter of the total attempts, participants managed to correctly guess only one 
pass-image but failed to do so for the second pass-image. In very few occasions (3%), 
participants guessed the two pass-images correctly but that does not necessarily mean that 
they managed to complete their login successfully as they still need to enter the correct 
associated GOTPass codes in the correct order. In regard to the input format, participants 
were able to guess the correct input format for more than half of the attempts. Although 
this guessing percentage appears high but it should be noted that there are only two 
options for the user to choose from as the security level was given.   
 
Another investigated point was the effectiveness of revealing GOTPass secrets to others. 
The analysis of this attack experiment showed that passing account secrets (unlock pattern, 
pass-images, input format) to another person was not easy and thus ineffective. At first, 
users could not manage to guess the correct pattern which was given as a shape of number 
2. Due to the high number of variations of that shape, it was clearly hard to determine the 
correct pattern. One of the possible additions to ease this part was to provide the starting 
point of the shape and the size (how many points) to the attacker, which needs further 
investigation to ensure its validity. With regard to the pass-images, since the system might 
display images from the same category or even similar images with different colours, that 
should complicate the accuracy of the information revealed as well as increase the 
uncertainty. Revealing the security level whether Basic or Advanced would also require 
the user to choose from the two available sub options. Thus, passing the exact input format 
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(e.g. the code of the 1st pass-image from Top & 2nd from Left) should be more useful than 
knowing the security level. In addition, users were asked in the post-test questionnaire 
about what they think about the simplicity of passing their account information to friends 
and their ability to use this information to login on their behalf. Over than 70% of the 
participants thought that their friends would still have difficulty logging in correctly using 
the given information about the GOTPass secrets.   
Pass-image 
    T
o
ta
l 
FRQ 23 18 11 9 61 
Figure 7-5: Frequency of identified pass-images in the guessing attack experiment 
The analysis of the frequency of identifying pass-images during the guessing attack 
experiment showed that some images were identified more often than others (Figure 7-5). 
However, the use of distractor-images in association with each pass-image was effective 
in obscuring the correct pass-images that led attackers to select distractor-images instead.  
 
7.7.2 Observability – Shoulder-surfing attack (SSA)  
Assuming that the attackers managed to pass the first defence technique (unlock pattern), 
they will still be confronted by another security barrier that is the image recognition and 
its associated OTP technique. Selecting pass-images is done only mentally which means 
that there is no need for clicking on the required images. Determining the pass-images is 
only used to find the respective code positions that the user needs to enter in the OTP text 
field. Consequently, the attacker who tries to peep over the shoulder or record with hidden 
cameras could only manage to capture random numbers being entered. However, 
observing multiple login sessions where the entered codes are also visible might enable 
the attacker to discover the pass-images based on the intersection and correlation among 
the observations.  
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In this part of the experiment, the system resistance against the shoulder-surfing attack 
was examined. This simulation involves the experimenter acting as a victim with an 
arrangement for the participants to watch multiple login trials to gain as much information 
as possible to try using it to gain an unauthorised access. An additional account was 
created then used to login to the system for 3 times. During that time, the scene of the 
experiment machine was being filmed (the camera was intentionally placed at a location 
less immediately adjacent to the user entering the login data). A different group consisting 
of 27 users participated in this study in which they were displayed the captured video of 
the login attempts for two times and were allowed to take notes while watching the video 
to help them gather information about the user account that they need to break into. The 
details of the target account to be captured was as follows: 
• Username: sscscan (shown) 
• Pattern: shape of number ‘2’ (shown) 
 
Figure 7-6: The shape of the unlock pattern to be captured (shape of number 2 in reverse) 
• Pass-images: (Required)  
    
Figure 7-7: The pass-images portfolio for the shoulder-surfing account 
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• Input format (Code location): (Required – can be extracted by analysing the 
keyboard captured data during entry) 
 
In order to validate the captured information, users were given the chance to use the 
GOTPass system and try to login with the information they managed to collect. The 
allowed login attempts were limited to 10, however, in case users want to give up earlier 
they have the right to stop after completing the fifth attempt.  
 
Figure 7-8: A screenshot from the shoulder-surfing attack simulation video 
In this experiment, users carried out 210 attempts in total. As shown in Table 7-7, users 
managed to gain correct access 6 times (equivalents to 3%) and 5 other attempts were 
reported as coincidence. Although the rate of break-in using shoulder-surfing attack was 
about 5% but that might be due to the nature of filming the scene for the attack simulation, 
which involved the screen and keyboard as shown in Figure 7-8. That, in turn, allowed 
easier capturing for the needed information since the challenge set data and the entered 
codes via the keyboard were all available. In addition, the majority of the successful 
attempts (82%) occurred within the last 5 attempts which might mean that users started 
to build their knowledge by combining some of the gathered information from the 
captured video and the analysis of the real data of each login session.    
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Participants Attempts Success Coincident Total 
Success within last 
5 attempts 
27 210 
6 5 11 9 
2.9% 2.4% 5.2% 4.3% 
Table 7-7: Details about the shoulder-surfing attack trial 
Drawing the unlock pattern was designed to be less visible (semi-transparent) for peepers 
but visible enough for the close legitimate user as illustrated in Figure 7-6. The data 
shown in Table 7-8 supported such implementation since some participants failed to 
capture the correct pattern shape even after playing the captured video multiple times 
which resulted in 12.4% incorrect attempts. Moreover, identifying one single correct 
pass-image was successful in about 38% of the attempts whereas recognising the two 
pass-images together was achieved in approximately 4% of the attempts. As for the input 
format, participants identified the correct input format of over than 50% of the attempts. 
However, this type of attack seems less complicated than others as the attackers can gain 
more information that might facilitate the break-in task and with some intensive analysis, 
the attempt might succeed. 
Correct 
username 
Correct 
pattern 
Correct single 
pass-image 
Correct 2 
pass-images 
Correct input 
format 
200 184 79 9 109 
95.2% 87.6% 37.6% 4.3% 51.9% 
Table 7-8: Breakdown of each correct part of the shoulder-surfing attempts 
Analysing the frequency of identifying pass-images during the shoulder-surfing attack 
experiment indicated that pass-images were identified almost evenly (Figure 7-9). 
However, the uncertainty about the correct combination of pass-images and the input 
format beside the use of distractor-images played a vital role in confusing the attackers.  
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Pass-image 
    
T
o
ta
l 
FRQ 26 25 25 21 97 
Figure 7-9: Frequency of identified pass-images in shoulder-surfing attack  
 
7.7.3 Observability – Intersection attack (ISA) 
Using intersection analysis by its own will not reveal much information as portfolios for 
both pass-image and distractor-image are implemented. An attacker would face 
difficulties distinguishing between pass-images that are valid to locate the code positions 
and the distractor-images that are linked to each pass-image. However, in case the 
attackers succeeded in finding the correct pass-images they will still need to guess the 
correct input format (code location) correctly. 
Another security experiment task was to inspect the system resistance against intersection 
attack. Simulating this attack used similar approach as that described previously in the 
shoulder-surfing attack subsection (7.7.2). An additional account was used and a set of 
27 participants were displayed a video of screen capturing the login attempts of that 
specific account for 3 times (Figure 7-10). Watching the video was repeated two times 
for each user. Note taking was allowed and then participants were given 10 login attempts 
at maximum, where they need to identify the pass-images of that account at first then 
guess the correct input format. 
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Figure 7-10: A screenshot from the intersection attack simulation video 
The details of the target account to be captured was as follows: 
• Username: iscscan (shown) 
• Pattern: shape of number ‘2’ (shown) 
 
Figure 7-11: The shape of the unlock pattern to be captured (shape of number 2 in reverse) 
• Pass-images: (Required)  
    
Figure 7-12: The pass-images portfolio for the intersection account 
• Input format (Code location): (Required – totally hidden by shielding the 
entered data) 
212 
Despite the fact that the screen capturing of all login components were clearly visible and 
easy to note down except the entered data, which was shielded, none of the 245 attempts 
to break into the system using intersection attack was successful apart from 6 attempts 
that succeeded accidentally (Table 7-9). It can be inferred from this result that carrying 
out a successful attack would need information from both the challenge set as well as the 
keyboard which proves the effectiveness of separating the challenge mean and the data 
entry mean to mitigate such attacks. That corresponds to the findings of the study by Tari, 
Ozok and Holden (2006), which indicated that replacing regular mouse click by a 
keyboard for data entry was very effective in reducing the threat of shoulder-surfing 
attack. The implementation of a keypad entry adds an extra challenge before an attacker 
which requires capturing information from two distinct sources; keystroke-logger and 
screen scraping.   
Participants Attempts Success Coincident Total Success within 
last 5 attempts 
27 245 
0 6 6 3 
0 2.4% 2.4% 1.2% 
Table 7-9: Details about the intersection attack trial 
The data in Table 7-10 shows that all attackers succeeded in capturing the correct pattern 
shape which implies that direct recording of the login screen by some types of spyware 
can unveil the pattern very clearly. Moreover, participants managed to identify one single 
correct pass-image of nearly half of the attempts, however, they failed to recognise the 
two pass-images together, except for a few times of about 3%. Additionally, choosing the 
correct input format was successful in less than one quarter of the attempts. Overall, 
intersection attack seems to be a complex attack as a significant part of the information 
needed to complete the attack is always absent which is the input format. Without the 
knowledge of the input format (code location) the attacker can only randomly guess one 
of the four available options that lead to the correct code combination.  
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Correct 
username 
Correct 
pattern 
Correct single 
pass-image 
Correct 2 
pass-images 
Correct input 
format 
244 245 105 7 58 
99.6% 100% 42.9% 2.9% 23.7% 
Table 7-10: Breakdown of each correct part of the intersection attempts 
By examining the result of the frequency of identifying pass-images during the 
intersection attack experiment, Figure 7-13 showed that the number of identified pass-
images was relatively high and there was a variation in the number of times each image 
was identified. However, that might indicate that viewing a captured video of the login 
screen is somewhat useful for partial recognition of the pass-images but nevertheless that 
is not enough to break-in successfully since the input format is still unknown.  
Pass-image 
    T
o
ta
l 
FRQ 52 35 20 12 119 
Figure 7-13: Frequency of identified pass-images in intersection attack 
 
7.8 Experiment results and discussion   
Table 7-11 shows a summary of the experiment results where the total number of the 
successful break-in attempts was only 8 out of 690, which represents only 1.2%. When 
considering the coincident attempts, the total number of break-in attempts was raised to 
23 that is only 3.3%. This rate is relatively low and the results are encouraging since 
attack simulations were deliberately designed to facilitate misuse. In reality, it seems very 
difficult to capture several login sessions from a close distance as in the conducted 
simulations which means an attack in a real environment should be more complicated 
than that in the lab. In addition, almost all attackers used the “Trial and Error” method to 
solve the break-in tasks.  
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 Success Coincident Total Percentage 
Guessing  2 4 6 6/235×100 = 2.6 
Intersection 0 6 6 6/245×100 = 2.4 
Shoulder-surfing 6 5 11 11/210×100 = 5.2 
Total 8 15 23 23/690×100 = 3.3 
Percentage 
8/690×100
= 1.2  
15/690×100  
= 2.2 
23/690×100 
= 3.3 
 
Table 7-11: Number of successful break-in attempts in all security experiments 
The number of the successful attempts of the shoulder-surfing attack trial was higher than 
that of the other attacks. The success rate for shoulder-surfing attack occupies about half 
of the total successful attempts whereas the other half is divided nearly equally between 
guessing and intersection attacks. One reason behind the high break-in rate in the 
shoulder-surfing attack is the availability of the main authentication components of this 
scheme; username, unlock patter, pass-images, and random codes. Capturing and 
analysing the entered codes would lead to discovering the rows and columns of the pass-
images which reduces the image options and therefore increases the probabilities of 
identifying the correct pass-images.    
A few observations about exceptional incidents were reported. Table 7-12 contains 
interesting results that summarise the exceptional incidents that resulted in unexpected 
outcomes or the so-called coincident attempts. In general, the results indicated that similar 
incidents were performed by attackers in spite of the type of the attack. Mainly, there 
were 4 incident types in which the first one has its users successfully identified two correct 
pass-images as well as the correct input format (code locations) but the codes were 
entered in the wrong order which ended up as incorrect attempt. In the second incident, 
the attackers recognised two correct pass-images but could not identify the correct input 
format (code locations), at the end, the attempt was unsuccessful. In the third incident, 
the user managed to identify only 1 correct pass-image and correct input format (code 
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location). The second chosen image was wrong but located on the same axis where the 
correct pass-image was residing which luckily resulted in entering the right codes. In the 
last incident, the attacker did not manage to identify any correct pass-images but managed 
to identify the correct input format (code location). Luckily, the chosen images were 
located on the same axes where the correct pass-images were residing which luckily 
resulted in entering the right codes for that particular attempt.  
It can be inferred from Table 7-12 that choosing the pass-images and their associated 
codes in the correct order can be considered a security feature that adds strength to the 
system. With regard to guessing attack, although coincident success is possible, but still 
did not exceed 1.7% of the carried out attempts which is deemed very low and unlikely 
to threaten the security of the GOTPass scheme. 
 Pass-
image1 
Pass-
image2 
Input format 
(Code location) 
Code 
order 
Login 
status 
Attack FRQ. Total 
Incident 
1 
     
Guessing  5 
6 
SSA 1 
Incident 
2    -  ISA 7 7 
Incident 
3 
     
Guessing 2 
9 SSA 4 
ISA 3 
Incident 
4 
     
Guessing 2 
6 SSA 1 
ISA 3 
Table 7-12: Breakdown of the login status for the exceptional incidents in the security attacks 
Other general observations were also noted, one of which was the capture of only the 
random codes from the displayed video by a few participants who thought that they would 
be asked to enter the exact codes for the experiment while some others used the 
intersection strategy to guess the pass-images while performing different type of attack. 
It was also noticed that attackers tried to choose images from the same axis which is 
incorrect by design while some others tried to choose images from the same theme which 
is obviously impossible. 
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Focusing more on one of the chained steps and neglecting the others by choosing weak 
passwords should not be a major issue, as the success of breaking one of the 
authentication steps will not compromise the entire credentials. In addition, the 
employment of the implicit feedback technique plays an important role in hiding which 
step is actually incorrect. In this way, it is difficult for an attacker to find out whether the 
stronger or weaker step went wrong. In other words, GOTPass works as a package where 
each part or feature complements the other. Another important factor is the 
implementation of the challenge-response (or dynamic pass-images portfolio) which keep 
challenging the user with a subset of the pass-images portfolio at each login time. 
 
At the end of each security trial, participants were interviewed and asked a few questions 
regarding the trial they just undertook. Mainly, they were asked to determine which part 
of the GOTPass scheme has made the system difficult to break into. A request was made 
for the users to sort their answers in descending order based on the difficulty level. In the 
guessing attack experiment, the answers were almost close but pattern-related factors 
were selected more. The majority of users admitted that it is a chain of factors and looking 
at each one aside makes you think it is causing more difficulty than others.   
 
There are two important factors that may influence the quality of the user performance in 
such specialised experiments that are the expertise and the personal interest. Thus, in an 
attempt to measure the user’s interest to conduct these types of security experiments, they 
were asked whether they have the interest to take part in a similar activity in the future or 
not. Over than 80% of the respondents were positive and keen to participate again which 
gives an indication that they were motivated and enjoying their attacking tasks. 
 
217 
7.9 Results of user perception and questionnaire 
The security-related data of this section was derived from the same data source of  the 
usability study. Away from the security attacks, the idea was to find out about the user 
attitudes towards security while using the scheme. During the registration phase, users 
were asked to select their preferable security level at the final step. Table 7-13 shows that 
nearly two-thirds of the participants selected the basic security level. That might be due 
to either less concern about security or maybe the caution of using a new scheme. Still, 
choosing the advanced level by more than the third of the participants for a newly 
introduced authentication system is considered good sign of user attitude towards security. 
In respect to the input format, the random assigning of the various input formats by the 
system seems fair for the basic level but uneven for the advanced level. 
Security level Input format option FRQ. Percentage 
Basic  
Option 1 (Top-Top) 24 29.6% 
Option 2 (Left-Left) 25 30.9% 
Total 49 60.5% 
Advanced 
Option 3 (Top-Left) 22 27.2% 
Option 4 (Left-Top) 10 12.3% 
Total 32 39.5% 
Table 7-13: The frequency of the chosen security level & the assigned option 
A complete section of the post-test questionnaire was dedicated for the security aspects 
of the scheme. A major part of this questionnaire was discussed earlier in chapter 6 
especially sections related to usability and design aspects of the system. As far as the 
GOTPass security is concerned, participants were asked some questions regarding how 
they feel about several security points of the system as highlighted in Table 7-14. At first 
and as the main purpose of such authentication system is to secure the users accounts, 
participants were asked whether they would trust GOTPass scheme to do so or not. The 
result showed that most of the responses were positive in that matter. Meaningful 
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passwords can be easily linked to a particular user and thus easy to guess but that is not 
the case with GOTPass, as 91% of the participants stated that their GOTPass secret is 
unlikely to be meaningful to others. In regard to the ability to guess the GOTPass, only 
less than quarter of the responses thought that this scheme would be easy to guess by 
attacker. Another issue of passwords is the ease of revealing secrets to others, but over 
than 80% of the responses thought that disclosing the secrets would not allow their friends 
to reproduce the GOTPass secrets correctly. One important security feature was the 
ambiguity of the feedback in which the user is not informed when making mistakes during 
password entry until after the final login submission. Although implementing such 
technique can possibly confuse legitimate users, but conversely the majority of 
participants considered it as a good security practice. Participants were asked to rate the 
impact level of each part of their GOTPass on increasing the security. The result showed 
that pass-images and their associated input format formed the highest security impact 
whereas unlock pattern scored above average.    
Section (C) - About the security aspects 
(1) Strongly disagree – (7) Strongly agree 
Average % 
I would trust GOTPass system to secure my accounts 6.68 95.4 
My GOTPass is unlikely to have any meaning to other people  6.37 91.0 
This type of authentication would be easy for attackers to guess  1.58 22.6 
If I briefly explain to my partner/close friend what my GOTPass 
secrets are, I think they will still have difficulty reproducing my 
GOTPass correctly 
5.85 83.6 
I think that the ambiguity of the feedback, when a wrong 
username or pattern is entered, is a good security practice.  
6.75 96.5 
Rate the impact level of each part of your 
GOTPass on increasing the security:  
(1) No impact – (6) High impact 
(Username)  2.73 45.5 
(Unlock pattern) 4.65 77.6 
(Pass-images) 5.62 93.6 
(GOTPass input 
format - Code 
location) 
5.60 93.4 
Table 7-14: The results of the security section of the post-test questionnaire  
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Participants were asked some additional questions in relation to security such as how they 
feel about the implementation of variable response through pass-images portfolio.  Two-
thirds of the participants felt that this technique has added security to the system while 
quarter of them felt that it has added both security and complexity. Despite the fact that 
many participants thought that using mouse click to select pass-images can provide 
convenience to users, only a few of them of less than 5% thought that it can provide more 
security. That means that they feel that the use of mouse click is insecure and instead 
using keyboard can be better option to enhance the security. A large number of users 
thought that it would be more secure if the system generates alphanumerical codes as an 
alternative to the numerical codes. Finally, the majority of participants agreed to use 
GOTPass for sensitive web authentication. 
 
7.10 The protection against other attacks    
There are other attacks that can threaten the graphical password schemes such as spyware, 
phishing, replay and dictionary attacks. The effect of such attacks can be theoretically 
analysed as follows. In order for a spyware attack to succeed, enough information about 
the password components must be gained. Installing a keystroke logger to collect the 
entered data may help in revealing the username and possibly the unlock pattern, but it is 
practically useless beyond that. The reason is that the image recognition step of the 
GOTPass scheme is carried out mentally without the need for clicking on the pass-images, 
besides the use of OTP which is changeable at every login time. The other type of spying 
is through the screen recording in which all visual information is made available for the 
attacker. This attack is able to disclose login information about username, unlock pattern, 
and the challenge set images with their random codes but fails to catch the entered codes 
since the GOTPass scheme uses shielded input characters. Thus, using any type of the 
aforementioned spywares in its own would not compromise the system. However, 
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utilising both techniques; keystroke logger and screen recording would be needed to 
gather enough knowledge of the different authentication steps, which is mostly time, 
effort, and cost overhead for attackers.     
Phishing and replay attack against GOTPass scheme would require a prior acquisition of 
the system images as well as the victim pass-images in particular. This is needed in order 
to display the correct set of images that the user can recognise and then make the right 
selection. However, this is infeasible since the original purpose of such attack is to 
discover the victim’s pass-images and once it is known then there is no point of carrying 
out the attack in the first place. In addition, the system is designed to use assorted 
responses approach (pass-image portfolio) which ensures that only a subset of the user’s 
secret is exposed on each login attempt not the whole secret. 
Dictionary attacks on a multi-layer authentication system like GOTPass is hard due to the 
difficulty of conducting an online dictionary attack on multiple login techniques, e.g. 
unlock pattern should protect the primary authentication method (image recognition). 
Building such a dictionary is even more difficult since it presumably involves a 
combination of several distinct techniques. There is no way to verify the correct or wrong 
step of the submitted login information. Moreover, the use of OTP should mitigate this 
type of attack. Another effective protection technique is the implementation of the system 
lockout which limit the number of incorrect attempts before the system suspend the 
account for a particular period of time. Besides, increasing the delay before reactivating 
the account would add extra security as well as usability since it ensures that the legitimate 
user is not permanently locked out in case several incorrect attempts were made.  
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7.11 Additional security study  
This supplementary study is initially concerned about the intersection attack mitigation. 
Although the result of the primary security experiment of this attack was encouraging, 
but the analysis of the result led to a design enhancement that may potentially increase 
the resistance against intersection attack in particular and other attacks in general.  
The idea was to increase the number of the distractor-images linked to each pass-image 
from 3 to 7. In this case the challenge grid will contain 2 pass-images and 14 distractor-
images which eliminate the use of decoy images. The prospective advantage of this 
modification was to prevent the attacker from analysing the login screens seeking to 
identify the images that appear more frequently. In other words, the displayed images in 
the grid would be constant across all login sessions depending on the system selected set 
of pass-images from the user portfolio. That, in turn, should decrease the guessing 
probability of combining two correct pass-images.  
7.11.1 Study procedure 
This study was conducted offline where the physical attendance of the participants is not 
required, taking part in this study can be done at the participant’s end at anytime and 
anywhere. It was intended for those who already participated in the GOTPass user trials 
and were familiar with the system. The study was prepared in a document and sent to 
participants by email with an invitation letter describing the required task and the 
approach to complete and submit the answers. Initially, the study involved only the image 
recognition and the input format determination steps. Thus, the study assumed that the 
username and unlock pattern were successful and focused only on the remaining steps. In 
order to have an appropriate experiment setup, four images were selected randomly as 
pass-images for the given account beside a random input format as highlighted in Figure 
7-14. The study document was organised in a way that the 10 login sessions were 
simulated to cover all possible pass-images combinations.    
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Pass-images 
    
Input format 1st pass-image (LEFT) + 2nd pass-image (TOP) 
Figure 7-14: Details of the experimental account for break-in 
Participants were given two weeks to answer and respond to the study. In order to 
motivate participants to take part in this additional experiment and to encourage them to 
spend more effort to find the right answers, a prize of £20 cash was allocated for one 
lucky winner under the following conditions: 
1. The break-in is considered successful when both pass-images and the associated 
codes are all correct. 
2. To enter the prize draw, at least one successful attempt is required out of the total 
10 attempts. 
3. Successful participants will enter the prize draw and the winner will be chosen 
randomly to earn the prize. 
Participants were presented with screenshots of 10 login attempts for a single GOTPass 
account (see Figure 7-15). The task was to identify the most frequently appeared images 
that likely to be the correct pass-images for the given account in each login session. They 
were also reminded that the total pass-images for this account is 4, but the system displays 
only 2 random correct pass-images in each challenge grid. After identifying the pass-
images, they must determine the codes associated with each pass-image – top or left. 
Underneath each challenge grid there is a table in which the participant needs to fill-in by 
specifying the pass-image number and the code from top axis or left axis of each image. 
Once all answers of the 10 login sessions were completed, the user was requested to save 
the study document in his/her name and send it back to the experimenter email address or 
alternatively it can be printed out and hand in a hard copy.  
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Figure 7-15: Sample of the login session of the additional security experiment 
 
7.11.2 Results and analysis  
By the end of the allowed period of study that last for two weeks, 22 responses from the 
participants were received that forms a total of 220 attempts. The result showed that none 
of the participants managed to break-in successfully. Thus, there was no winner, but still 
the prize was randomly awarded to one participants amongst all. 
The results in Table 7-15 indicated that some participants managed to identify one single 
correct pass-image in almost one quarter of the attempts. In 16% of the attempts, they 
successfully selected a single correct code. Three participants managed to submit the 
correct codes for the login session which is equivalent to only 1.4% of the total attempts. 
However, these successful attempts were not completely correct but coincident since the 
selected pass-images were wrong. Lastly, the input format was chosen correctly in less 
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than 10% of the attempts. From the above results, having a full set of distractor-images 
alongside the subset of the pass-images has proved its value in mitigating the intersection 
attack and consequently the shoulder-surfing attack which sometimes utilise intersection 
technique to complete the attack.    
 Correct single  
pass-image 
Correct both 
pass-images 
Correct 
single code 
Correct 
both codes 
Correct input format 
(code location) 
FRQ. 53 0 36 3 21 
% 24.1 0 16.4 1.4 9.5 
Table 7-15: The outcome details of the additional security trial 
For broader investigation about the validity of the initial results obtained above, the study 
reanalysed the received answers based on different scenarios of input format options. In 
this part of the study, the data was revisited again several times but with the assumption 
that another input format option was in place each time instead of the one originally 
assigned when this additional study was initiated. Table 7-16 presents the outcomes of 
the study in cases where other input formats were used. It can be inferred that there were 
more correct elements than that in the primary setup but that does not mean a complete 
correct attempt. Among these cases, the highest rate (30%) of identifying a single pass-
image was reached when using the other input format option of the advanced security 
level. The most successful attempts in submitting the correct codes was with the first 
basic security level. Only 4% of the total attempts entered the correct codes which is 
almost three times the rate in the primary setup, but even though, it is still considered low. 
The correct input format was successfully guessed in more than one third of the attempts 
when applying the second basic security level.   
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Security 
level 
Input format Correct 
single code 
Correct 
both codes 
Correct input format 
(code location) 
Advanced 1 
1st pass-image - top  
2nd pass-image - left  
66 
(30%) 
7 
(3.2%) 
69 
(31.4%) 
Basic 1 
1st pass-image - left 
2nd pass-image - left 
49 
(22.3%) 
9 
(4.1%) 
45 
(20.5%) 
Basic 2 
1st pass-image - top  
2nd pass-image - top 
56 
(25.5%) 
5 
(2.3%) 
77 
(35%) 
Table 7-16: The outcome details for the other input formats  
 
7.11.3 The original GOTPass design versus modified design  
Despite the fact that there was no significant pattern found in the additional study to 
distinguish between the security levels or even the input formats, but there was an added 
security value. Comparing the results of the intersection attack experiments in the original 
design of GOTPass and the modified one showed a substantial advantage gained by the 
implementation of a constant set of distractor-images. Adopting the 7 distractor-images 
approach improved the security of the GOTPass scheme as highlighted in Table 7-17 
where participants of the original design managed to identify almost twice as many ‘single 
pass-image’ as the participants of the modified design did. Not only that but also 
participants of the modified design were unable to identify any combination of the two 
pass-images.      
 Correct single  
pass-image 
Correct both 
pass-images 
Original GOTPass implementation 
3 distractor-images  
47.3% 2.9% 
Modified GOTPass implementation 
7 distractor-images 
24% 0% 
Table 7-17: Results comparison between the original and modified GOTPass design  
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7.12 Summary 
To conclude, this chapter has demonstrated how secure the GOTPass scheme is in 
resisting guessing and observation attacks. The security evaluation provided deep insight 
on the resistance level of different types of attacks including guessing attack, intersection 
attack, and shoulder-surfing attack. The GOTPass scheme underwent two types of 
security evaluation: theoretical and empirical. The security experiment involved three 
different attack simulations designed for the participants to carry out. One of the 
important evaluation factors to increase the result’s accuracy was the large sample size of 
participants for such a security experiment. The empirical study included 690 break-in 
attempts divided into three different attacks trials. The results were encouraging as they 
showed only 3.3% of the total conducted attempts were successful which is considered a 
relatively low rate. The overall solution was therefore found to be both secure and usable. 
In addition, another supplementary study was conducted concerning mainly about 
intersection attack. This study involved changing a fundamental attribute of the system 
that is increasing the number of the distractor-images and eliminating the use of decoys. 
The results were encouraging as none of the participants succeeded to identify the 
required set of pass-images which proves its effectiveness. Furthermore, other types of 
possible attacks including spyware, phishing, replay, and dictionary attacks were 
discussed. The analysis of the outcome showed that the GOTPass scheme has the 
necessary defence techniques in place to mitigate the threats of such attacks. Overall, this 
system has shown a considerable potential and capability to contribute in enhancing 
current usable security.  
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8 Chapter Eight 
Conclusions and Future Work 
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This chapter concludes the work of this thesis by presenting an outline of the research 
contributions, followed by a summary of the thesis and the research limitations. Finally, 
several potential future works are discussed. 
 
8.1. Research contributions and achievements  
This thesis has made several original contributions to the research in regard to the usable 
security of graphical password authentication as follows: 
• A new data-entry classification within the field of graphical authentication was 
suggested. This classification utilises keyboard-typing entry as a way to submit 
the secret information. In addition, the study also suggested adding some 
distinguishing details for better clarification which involved several design 
aspects, such as the input approach (draw, click, choice, keyboard-typing entry) 
and the display style (grid, image, icon). 
• Developing a hybrid multi-layer authentication system (GOTPass) which 
combines multiple graphical password methods (draw-based and recognition-
based) along with the one-time password technique (OTP). The new composite 
scheme provides an in-browser/in-band OTP which is totally independent of any 
additional devices. Moreover, GOTPass scheme showed significant usability and 
security capabilities that fulfil the need for a secure usable alternative 
authentication scheme.    
• Employing a dynamic one-time password combination obtained through a multi-
layer graphical password. That enables the production of a number of one-time 
codes, but requires an additional step to realise the correct ones. Knowing the 
correct graphical password components along with the input format (code 
location) leads to the right combination of codes.   
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• Implementing a web-based unlock pattern showed an effective proactive 
protection. The level of safeguarding provided by the integration of the unlock 
pattern into the other steps of the scheme was very high. 
• Adopting a new approach to reduce the selection of hot-images by using system-
assigned themes with user-chosen images. This approach distributes the selection 
of pass-images by assigning users with random themes which restrict the direct 
selection of preferable images that are likely to become hot-images.  
• Evaluating the security of a hybrid graphical authentication using two methods. 
The first method is ‘theoretical’, based on assessment criteria, while the second is 
‘empirical’, in which several attacks were simulated and examined. The results of 
the two evaluations were both supportive and positive.  
 
The research aims were achieved through satisfying the following research objectives:  
Objective 1: Review the common user-authentication mechanisms to highlight their 
strengths and weaknesses, and then conduct a comprehensive review of graphical 
password schemes in order to explore their characteristics and try to find an opportunity 
for enhancement. 
Reviewing the main user-authentication mechanisms in Chapter 2 helped to recognise the 
drawbacks that need to be overcome while proposing a new authentication technique. 
 Chapter 2 managed to answer the following questions: 
- Having identified the core problems related to the conventional text-based 
passwords, what are the alternatives? Do the alternatives offer a better solution?   
- Is there still need for a new alternative authentication?  
- What are the requirements of such an alternative? 
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In terms of graphical password authentication, reviewing the related literature has resulted 
in comprehensive comparisons between different aspects of the existing schemes. The 
advantages and limitations of each category were addressed in Chapter 3.  
A number of key features to be included into the new proposal were derived from the 
conducted reviews. These features are summarised below: 
- Generating an OTP using detour (indirect input) techniques, where the knowledge of 
the actual password is used for login while the actual password remains hidden to 
increase the security level. 
- Spyware and observation problems can be overcome by separating the challenge 
operation from the response operation. 
- Avoiding any visual clicking or selection (none, deception, or transparent entry) in 
the authentication process is effective mitigation against observation attacks. 
Chapter 3 managed to answer the following questions:  
- Are there any significant strengths within the graphical password that can be 
leveraged to produce an enhanced secure/usable authentication method? 
- What are the challenges that face the current graphical password techniques?  
 
Objective 2: Assess the authentication mechanisms offered by online banking systems 
by exploring the authentication limitations. Investigate the users’ perception of the idea 
of carrying around multiple authentication tokens and how they perceive the adoption of 
the graphical password method as an alternative authentication method to protect their 
accounts. 
Having investigated the existing online authentication methods currently in use by some 
leading financial firms, Chapter 4 confirmed that the majority of the online banking 
231 
systems do not offer a secure alternative authentication if the main authentication method 
cannot be satisfied. In addition, this chapter presented the results of the online user survey, 
which sought the views of users regarding carrying around multiple authentication tokens 
and what they thought about graphical passwords as a possible alternative. The results 
demonstrated that approximately two-thirds of the participants had experienced failure in 
fulfilling the login requirements for various reasons – more than half were related to the 
unavailability of the authentication devices. A large number of the participants stated that 
carrying around multiple tokens is inconvenient, and almost half of them supported the 
use of graphical passwords as an alternative means of authentication.  
Chapter 4 managed to answer the following questions: 
- Do online banking systems offer secure alternative ways for authentication in 
situations where the main authentication method cannot be satisfied due to the 
unavailability of the security token? 
- Is carrying around multiple security tokens convenient for online banking clients? 
- Would users accept the idea of having graphical passwords in place for authentication 
when their security tokens are unavailable? 
 
Objective 3: Design and develop a novel authentication scheme and then empirically 
evaluate its security and usability. 
The aim of the thesis was to fill the research gap to enable users secure access to their 
accounts in situations where the use of an authentication device is not possible.  In doing 
so, the thesis introduced a novel authentication scheme called Graphical One-Time 
Password (GOTPass), which combines two types of graphical passwords, namely draw-
based and recognition-based methods along with the utilisation of the one-time password 
technique. This was presented in Chapter 5, which described the registration and 
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authentication procedures, with an emphasis on the significant characteristics of the new 
scheme.   
Chapter 5 managed to answer the following questions: 
- Does the proposed system have the capability to work independently of any devices? 
- Can the proposed system work with an online banking system or similar?   
 
Initially this scheme underwent two main evaluations related to usability and security to 
ensure its suitability for critical systems. Chapter 6 presented the outcome of the empirical 
usability evaluation which involved 81 participants over a 5-week time period. 
Participants carried out a total of 1,302 login attempts with a 93% success rate and an 
average login time of 24.5 seconds. Overall, the new scheme showed an acceptable level 
of efficiency as well as a relatively high level of effectiveness and user satisfaction. 
Furthermore, memorability was also evaluated where all participants managed to 
remember their new credentials and login successfully within three login attempts after 
one month of non-use.  
Chapter 6 managed to answer the following question: 
- Does the new scheme provide the main usability characteristics, in terms of 
effectiveness, efficiency, memorability and user satisfaction? 
- How effective is the system-assigned themes with user-chosen images approach in 
reducing the bias selection and hot-images? 
 
The security evaluations were discussed in Chapter 7, which presented the initial 
theoretical evaluation followed by the simulation of three types of attacks: guessing, 
shoulder-surfing and intersection. The theoretical assessment revealed that most of the 
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countermeasures to protect against common attacks were taken into account by the 
proposed system. The outcomes of the empirical evaluations demonstrated that the new 
scheme managed to mitigate both guessing and observation attacks. The experiments 
included 690 break-in attempts divided into three different attack trials. Only 3.3% of the 
total conducted attempts were successful which is considered to be a relatively low rate. 
Looking at the overall results from both experiments (usability and security), they qualify 
the new scheme and show that it can contribute to enhancing the current state of usable 
security. 
Chapter 7 managed to answer the following questions: 
- Does the new scheme offer the main security characteristics?  
- Is the new scheme capable of withstanding the major types of attacks? 
 
Objective 4: Investigate the users’ perception of the security and usability aspects of the 
new proposed authentication scheme.    
Measuring the users’ satisfaction of the new scheme, including security, usability and 
design aspects, was discussed in Chapter 6 and Chapter 7. The qualitative results of the 
post-test questionnaire were used to assess the overall level of user satisfaction which was 
very high, as 98% of the participants supported the idea of the new scheme.  
Chapter 6 and 7 managed to answer the following question: 
- Would end users find the new scheme acceptably usable and capable of protecting 
their accounts? 
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8.2. Research limitations 
The thesis has reported some research/approach limitations as enumerated below. 
• Users with certain sight disabilities are out of the scope of this study, as it is mainly 
based on visual elements, which is considered to be an approach limitation. 
• The use of the unlock pattern technique may add a practical constraint to this 
approach, due to the fact that it has been patented by Google. 
• The difficulty of hiring expert testers to undertake the security attacks on the 
proposed system led to the task being carried out by ordinary participants. 
To mitigate this obstacle, the empirical security evaluations were designed to be 
simple that help non-expert participants to break into the system. In other words, 
the experiments did not require any hacking skills or specific tools. 
• The recording of the activity logs for the GOTPass input format in particular, was 
not as effective as expected. The details of the input format selection made by the 
user were not recorded sufficiently, and thus no further analysis was possible. In 
a typical case, each part of the entered code (four-digits) should be logged first 
and then checked to ensure it matches any of the displayed codes on the edges of 
the challenge grid. That, in turn, would also allow the identification of the 
combination option of the GOTPass input format. If no match was found, that 
would mean that the entered codes were mistyped.   
Although this point has imposed some data analysis limitations, it apparently has 
no significant impact on the main findings of the research. However, 
implementing this modification would result in better outcomes for more accurate 
analysis.  
 
In spite of the limitations described above, the work is still considered to be valid, as 
shown in the results of the evaluations in the earlier chapters.  
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8.3. Future work 
The thesis has contributed to the literature of usable security in general and graphical 
passwords in particular. However, during the work of this thesis, new research directions 
have also arisen. This section highlights a number of potential future research 
opportunities. 
8.3.1. GOTPass design improvements  
Depending on the desirable balance of security and usability for users or organisations, 
there are several ways in which the GOTPass scheme could be further modified to provide 
various improvements (i.e. a number of design alterations are possible to boost either side 
of the system, namely security or usability, after examining their viability). Some 
suggestions are outlined below: 
• Further investigation into combining several graphical password categories (i.e. 
recognition, draw, and click) is suggested. This could be achieved by adding one 
more system-assigned image to the GOTPass challenge and requesting the user to 
create click points on the image. In the login phase, during image selection step, 
the system will display two random pass-images, as usual, as well as the click-
based image. Users will then need to click on the image’s secret points, then 
identify their pass-images, and finally, enter the corresponding GOTPass codes. 
• Assigning the GOTPass input format (final registration step) automatically by the 
system might be worthy of exploration. This aims to bring several benefits to the 
system, such as reducing the registration time and, more importantly, reducing the 
impact of the process of partially assigning the input format. During the post-test 
questionnaire, this was rated by the users as having a high impact on causing recall 
difficulty. 
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• There is also the opportunity to increase the number of code options. Currently, 
only two edges are utilised (top and left), but this could be extended to use the 
four edges surrounding the challenge grid (top, bottom, right, and left). This, in 
turn, should increase the password space and, therefore, the system security; 
however, the usability (memorability) of the system might be affected, and this 
should be carefully examined.  
• Attempting to improve the registration and authentication times of the current 
GOTPass design is an essential step. Removing several unnecessary clicks in the 
current design, such as moving directly to the next step immediately after the pen-
up at the end of the pattern drawing in both phases the registration and 
authentication should be effective. Also eliminating the confirmation screens in 
the registration phase should significantly reduce the time spent creating a 
password.  
• Studying the feasibility of other interface designs. This research was established 
using a single interface design. Therefore, a variety of other interface designs 
could be investigated taking into account the possible effect on security and 
usability. For example, the impact of the dynamic display layout (i.e. 4×4, 6×6, 
8×8) could be investigated, which can increase the password space and complicate 
the task for the attackers, since different users may have different-sized grids 
which adds an additional step in front of the attackers, who need to discover 
further information to undertake a successful attack.  
• Another interesting design improvement can be through offering different system 
configurations related to the generated OTP, such as the use of numeric/ 
alphabetic/ alphanumeric codes and the length of the password (4, 8 or 12 
characters long). 
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• Merging the unlock pattern and the image-recognition panels into one embedded 
screen can be a significant design enhancement that can enable the system to work 
with different platforms, such as a smartphone. In other words, the unlock pattern 
screen should be superimposed over the image-based screen. 
• By adopting the modified design described in the additional security experiment 
(Chapter seven – 7.10) which showed positive results, it might be worth 
investigating the optional deployment of GOTPass scheme without the unlock 
pattern step or even replace it by some other frontline approaches in cases where 
the multi-step technique is less important. That should reduce the time taken for 
login, however the security of the system should be ensured and not to be affected 
by this modification. 
 
8.3.2. Security improvements 
• Instead of implementing a distractor-images portfolio for each pass-image, 
implementing it based on a user’s account would confuse the attacker, meaning 
that the attacker would be unable to determine the correct pass-images. In this 
way, each account will have a distractor-images portfolio that should appear each 
time the user tries to login. For example, for each login attempt there should be 
14 distractor-images derived from the account’s portfolio of distractors, which is 
typically a slightly larger set of distractor-images.  
• Another interesting variation of the proposed solution can be the implementation 
of an Out-of-Band technique. In this version, the user does not need to select the 
input format during the enrolment phase, but instead it will be sent to the 
registered mobile number or email address of the user, prompting them to enter 
one of the available input format options – for instance, the code of the 1st pass-
image from the top axis & the code of the 2nd pass-image from the left-hand axis. 
238 
Adopting such a technique would have advantages for security as well as 
usability, since it eliminates the final step of the registration process. As a result, 
users will need to remember less information related to their credentials. On the 
other hand, one drawback of such a system would be the dependency on devices 
(mobile phone) and service providers (network operation), unless the email option 
is used instead.   
• The impact of the image and code ordering on the security and usability of the 
GOTPass scheme is another aspect that needs further investigation. 
• Investigate the security impact of adding a new system attribute that allows the 
GOTPass codes to be entered in different pre-determined directions. In other 
words, the codes can be entered in two ways (forward ordering – left to right or 
backward ordering – right to left), aiming to further complicate the attacker.    
• Study the feasibility of utilising the background colour feature to make it easier 
for users to spot their pass-images and the likelihood of increasing the password 
space of the system. 
 
8.3.3. General improvements 
• Enlarging the sample of participants and running the user study for an extended 
period of time are suggestions that will allow a more conclusive analysis of the 
data.  
• One of the recommendations of this research is to arrange to conduct a field study 
in an actual environment where the proposed scheme can constitute part of the 
security requirements in that organisation. That should help to gather more 
representative results and feedback for further assessment and enhancement.  
• It is also suggested to investigate the compatibility and effectiveness of the current 
design on different platforms, especially handheld devices. 
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• Examining the memory interference of multiple GOTPass passwords is one of the 
factors that may affect the future deployment of this scheme. 
• Enhance the recording of the experimental data to include the input data (any 
typed-in data) and the pass-images on that row or column, if possible, for better 
analysis and to enable a more precise investigation towards the cause of the failed 
attempts, which also lead to an automated way to identify the coincident 
successful attempt. 
 
 
8.4. Discussion 
Although GOTPass scheme has been demonstrated to be a valid secure/usable alternative 
authentication system; but, nonetheless, it has not been given the chance to be evaluated 
and examined in a critical environment such as online banking. Preliminary evaluations 
findings from the evaluations presented in chapter 6 and 7 showed that the GOTPass 
scheme would need further usability and security improvements to suit sensitive systems. 
For instance, the usability assessment in (Chapter six – 6.4.2) indicated that only 40% of 
the users completed the authentication tasks without error and the time consumption 
nature of the mechanism was reasonably high; both aspects would not be sufficient 
enough for such systems. From the security prospective, the assessment in (Chapter seven 
– 7.8) showed that successful break-in rate was (3.3%) which is deemed high specially 
for financial systems. In addition, the conducted experiment to evaluate the user 
perception of this new technique was not ecologically valid because participants were not 
asked to access a system they cared about or await a certain service in return such as 
authenticating for the purpose of accessing module materials, timetables or marks. In 
regards to the prototype design, the images used in this prototype might be suboptimal 
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because of the similarity between some of them which was due to the difficulty of 
acquiring suitable images for the authentication purposes.  
 
8.5. Final words 
GOTPass has received a positive media coverage that was started by the Press Office of 
Plymouth University, where an interview was held at the Centre for Security, 
Communications and Network Research. The media & communications officer (Mr Alan 
Williams) led the interview, where he was explained, in detail, how the GOTPass system 
works and then discussed some of the research outcomes (Williams, 2015). Following the 
press release, the coverage has expanded to reach several types of media*. In addition, 
the GOTPass system has been overwhelmed by the techrepublic.com report that included 
GOTPass in “10 of the latest security products that can help you fight the bad guys” 
(Forrest, 2016). However, despite the encouragement triggered by the media interest, 
overall, the message does not claim that GOTPass is the best solution.  
 
Efforts to find alternative authentication mechanisms for electronic banking are 
continuing. Recently, some financial services providers, such as HSBC and First Direct, 
are investing in using voice and fingerprint biometrics as part of their mobile banking 
systems. The launch of these biometrics aims to make accessing bank accounts even 
quicker and easier for customers (HSBC News and Media, 2016). However, such 
technology would only be available for some customers, since it is only enabled on mobile 
banking apps with touch ID on Apple devices, which limits the expected wide/universal 
use of the services. 
*  
http://www.eurekalert.org/pub_releases/2015-12/uop-iac122215.php 
www.techrepublic.com/article/good-bye-weak-passwords-hello-gotpass-graphical-authentication/ 
https://twitter.com/search?&q=GOTPass 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=s37_H7y1nAc 
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Furthermore, MasterCard has announced that online payments would accept selfies and 
fingerprints to authenticate customers instead of passwords and codes. A specific app 
needs to be installed on the customer’s PC, tablet or smartphone. The verification of the 
customer’s identity will take place whenever further authentication is required, by looking 
at the phone’s camera or using the fingerprint sensor of the phone. While taking the selfie, 
the user will be asked to blink into the camera, to ensure that the presented user is a real 
and not a photo (Kennedy, 2016). The use of such integrated biometrics on user’s devices 
for authentication is tying down the authentication to the mobile device which, for some 
users, can be considered a downside of such a mechanism. However, this type of news 
shows that the authentication trend of online financial services is not confined to hardware 
tokens or similar, but it is appealing to other alternative authentication mechanisms that 
can not only provide security but are also usable. Therefore, utilising a diverse range of 
techniques within such critical systems motivates the research domain of graphical 
authentication to find its respected position within the field of secure authentication 
technology.   
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Appendix A Review of additional graphical password schemes and list of 
scheme names with references  
 
i. Graphical password schemes names and references 
A list of all graphical password schemes that have been discussed in this thesis along with their 
bibliography for easy reference. 
Recall-based scheme Reference 
Syukri Algorithm – (draw a signature) Syukri, Okamoto and Mambo (1998) 
Draw-A-Secret (DAS) Jermyn et al. (1999) 
Grid Selection Thorpe & van Oorschot (2004) 
Multi-Grid DAS (MGDAS) Chalkias, Alexiadis & Stephanides (2006) 
Qualitative Draw-A-Secret (QDAS) Lin et al. (2007) 
Background Draw-A-Secret (BDAS) Dunphy & Yan (2007) 
DAS with Rotation (R-DAS) Chakrabarti, Landon & Singhal (2007) 
Pass-Go Tao and Adams (2008) 
Background Pass-Go (BPG) Por, Lim & Kianoush (2008) 
Multi-Grid Background Pass-Go (MGBPG) Por & Lin (2008) 
Yet another Graphical Password (YAGP) Haichang et al. (2008) 
Blonder Scheme Blonder (1996) 
PassPoints Wiedenbeck et al. (2005) 
Cued Click Points (CCP) Chiasson, van Oorschot and Biddle (2007) 
Persuasive Cued Click-Points (PCCP) Chiasson et al. (2008) 
Click Buttons according to Figures in Grids 
(CBFG) 
Liu et al. (2011) 
Multi-Factor Graphical Authentication Sabzevar & Stavrou (2008) 
Multitouch Image-Based Authentication on 
Smartphones (MIBA) 
Ritter et al. (2013) 
Tri-Pass Yesseyeva et al. (2014) 
Inkblot Authentication  Stubblefield and Simon (2004) 
Zheng (Shape & Text) Zheng et al. (2010) 
 
 
 
259 
 
Recognition-based scheme Reference 
PassFaces Passfaces Corporation, (2015) 
Déjà vu Dhamija and Perrig (2000) 
Triangle scheme,  
Moveable frame scheme,   
Other special geometric configurations 
Sobrado and Birget (2002) 
Visual Identification Protocol (VIP) De Angeli et al. (2002) 
Picture Password Jansen et al. (2003) 
Story Davis, Monrose and Reiter (2004) 
PassImages Charruau, Furnell & Dowland (2005) 
Colorlogin Gao et al. (2009) 
Graphical Password with Icons (GPI) & 
Graphical Password with Icons suggested by 
the System (GPIS) 
Bicakci et al. (2009) 
CDS Gao et al. (2010) 
Where You See is What You Enter 
(WYSWYE) 
Khot, Kumaraguru and Srinathan (2012) 
AuthentiGraph Pierce et al. (2003) 
Cognitive Authentication Weinshall (2006) 
Mohd’s Scheme Mohammed et al. (2008) 
Komanduri & Hutchings Picture Password Komanduri and Hutchings (2008) 
Gaze-Contingent Dunphy, Fitch & Olivier (2008) 
Image Based Registration and Authentication 
System (IBRAS)  
Akula & Devisetty (2004) 
Convex Hull Click scheme (CHC)  Wiedenbeck et al. (2006) 
Shoulder-Surfing-Proof (SSP)  Wu et al. (2014) 
Weinshall approach  Weinshall (2004) 
DynaHand  Renaud & Olsen (2007) 
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Hybrid schemes References 
Hong scheme Man, Hong & Matthews (2003) 
Recall-a-Formation (RAF) Suo, Zhu and Owen (2006) 
TwoStep van Oorschot and Wan (2009) 
Touch-screen Authentication using Partitioned 
Images (TAPI) 
Citty and Hutchings (2010) 
Enhanced Graphical Authentication System 
(EGAS) 
Jali, Furnell and Dowland (2011) 
Deshmukh’s scheme Deshmukh and Devale (2013) 
 
 
Graphical OTP schemes References 
GrIDsure (Blair, 2007) 
Enhanced-GrIDsure with Background Dimitropoulos (2011) 
GrIDsure with 4 Patterns (GS4) Jhawar et al. (2011) 
Gao CAPTCHA Gao et al. (2009b) 
Passblot Gupta et al. (2011) 
ImageShield 
Roman Yudkin - Confident Technologies® 
(2011) 
Graphical One Time Password (GOTP) Ku et al. (2012) 
Zangooei Hybrid approach Zangooei, Mansoori and Welch (2012) 
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ii. Review of additional schemes  
a. Draw-based schemes 
(Weiss & Luca, 2008) came up with a novel idea for authenticating users with stroke-
based drawings called "PassShapes". The simple geometric shapes of this system are 
composed of a different combination of eight diverse strokes. A PassShape may possibly 
be comprised of several stroke sequences, each of which consists of several strokes drawn 
sequentially without lifting the pen. An alphanumeric string representation is utilised as 
an output of the PassShape password for the internal processing. A character 
representation is assigned for each stroke, where the directions of the stroke are indicated 
by the letters (e.g. ‘U’ means Up, ‘D’ means Down, etc.), whereas the numbers represent 
the direction equivalent to the position of the number on a standard number pad (i.e. ‘3’ 
refers to ‘lower right’). Two stroke sequences can be separated by a pen-up event marked 
with an ‘X’. However, an exact redrawing of a PassShape in the same size or position is 
not required since only the strokes and their order are calculated. Since PassShape 
contains only straight lines, reproducing the password should be easy and effortless even 
for non-artistic users. 
  
PassShapes: eight different possible strokes The internal representation of PassShape: 
U93DL9L3XU3U 
Figure 1: "PassShape" design (Weiss & Luca, 2008) 
Another user-drawn scheme called "Touchscreen Multi-layered Drawing" (TMD) was 
designed by (Chiang & Chiasson, 2013). The aim was to encourage more complex 
passwords through the use of multiple layers of grids with large detached cells. Beside 
the commonly used types of “cells”: Unselected and Selected cells, there is a new type 
called Warp cells. The way to display the next layer is by touching any of the four Wrap 
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cells which allows users to draw longer secrets across several layers. The usability of 
TMD on mobile devices was assessed by a user study that involved 90 users. After one 
week of the password creation, the TMD showed superior result with login success rate 
of 86% within the first attempt and 15-18 seconds of average login time.   
 
Figure 2: "TMD" interface 
 Studies related to Android Unlock Pattern: 
 An attempt to mitigate the Smudge attack was conducted by (Schneegass et al., 2014) 
who introduced "SmudgeSafe" system that depends on geometrical transformations of 
the image. The transformations may include translation, rotation, scaling, shearing, or 
flipping. The password security is significantly improved as the images appear differently 
in each login time. Hence, smudge traces are overlapped which makes guessing or 
inferring the original password very difficult. The proposed method was made available 
through Google Play store for evaluation. Over five months, the application was 
downloaded by 374 users and 130,000 logins were collected. The result of the study 
showed that the SmudgeSafe performed best and provided more security in comparison 
with PINs and original lock patterns. 
In a field study across 3 weeks, (Von Zezschwitz, Dunphy & De Luca, 2013) compared 
the performance of personal identification numbers (PIN) and pattern locks. The study 
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designed two Android-based prototypes to be installed on the participants’ smartphones. 
Participation was divided into two groups; the pattern group which consisted of 29 users 
and the second PIN group with 24 users. Participants were requested to use the respective 
prototype to login once every day and were allowed a maximum of 3 attempts each time. 
The study analysed 504 PIN entries and 609 pattern entries. The result showed a 
significant difference in the overall error rate between the PIN group (0.08%) and pattern 
group (16.3%). However, according to the relevant questionnaire answers, users of the 
pattern system were not irritated by the failure rate but conversely they appeared to have 
a strong preference for the pattern lock approach. An additional task was assigned to the 
participants after 14 days of non-use to rate the memorability of the given system. In this 
recall test, users needed to recall their PIN or pattern using printed copy of the prototypes. 
The result indicated that both approaches performed fairly equally with 92% successful 
recall in the PIN group and 90% in pattern group. One interesting finding was that 
assigning secure complex patterns did not affect the memorability of the drawings.      
 
The security of Android unlock pattern was also studied by (Uellenbeck et al., 2013). 
Instead of the theoretical password spaces, they measured the actual user choices of 
patterns. It was found that the process of the pattern selection is not a bias free. To 
improve the security of such scheme, some changes to the points’ arrangement were 
proposed that should increase the space of the passwords actually in use. The first 
alteration was the ‘Leftout Small Pattern’, which reduces the bias by omitting the upper 
left point. The second alteration was the ‘Leftout Large Pattern’ where the overall point 
count is increased by adding two points to the bottom row. The third alteration was the 
‘Circle Pattern’ which removes corner points. The final alteration was the ‘Random 
Pattern’ in which the points are arranged randomly. A user study was conducted that 
involved 366 participants over several weeks. The result indicated that the Circle Pattern 
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approach was better in performance and security as well, in contrast to the Random 
Pattern approach which was hard to use. The study concluded that the implementation of 
different approaches for different smartphones might reduce the risk of building an attack 
dictionary.      
 
(Andriotis et al., 2013) conducted another study on user practices when creating a pattern 
lock and to find out about users’ perceptions towards producing a secure pattern. As a 
result, a behaviour-based attack and physical attack methods were established aiming to 
retrieve full or part of a pattern by reducing the search space of possible combinations. 
The best ways to produce quality results while performing physical attacks turned out to 
be through optical cameras or microscopes. In 2014, (Andriotis, Tryfonas & Oikonomou, 
2014) introduced an enhancement to Pattern-Lock graphical authentication method. They 
found that users of this method were not informed about the strength of their chosen 
pattern. Thus, they proposed displaying a feedback to emphasize the lack of security of 
the user’s initial choice which allow users to revise their pattern to make it stronger. The 
result of the research showed that users selected fewer ‘Weak’ passwords after 
propounding the feedback. Informing the users about their password strength resulted in 
changing the choice of patterns for almost quarter of the participants. 
 
(Song et al., 2015), came up with a new strength meter to indicate how strong a user’s 
pattern lock is in the face of shoulder-surfing or guessing attacks. In order to design an 
effective meter, different factors were carefully considered to measure the strength of a 
pattern lock. These factors include the length of a pattern lock, the number of connected 
points, and the number of lines connecting point-to-point. The meter is designed visually 
as a slider located on the top of the screen which shows real time pattern strength while 
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users create their patterns. There are three scales to represent the strength; weak, medium, 
or strong.     
The correctness and accuracy of the designed meter was evaluated through a user study 
that involved 101 participants. Users were presented with pattern locks categorised as 
weak, medium, or strong using the meter and were asked to perform shoulder-surfing 
attacks on them. The study tested 606 pattern locks, among which nearly 71% were 
successfully compromised patterns. However, the result showed that compromising 
pattern locks that were indicated as strong by the meter were harder than those indicated 
as medium or weak.  
A second experiment was conducted through a field study to investigate how effective 
the meter is in assisting users to select stronger pattern locks. The experiment made use 
of an Android application called “EnCloud” which was equipped with the proposed meter 
and made available via Android Play store. To use the application, users need to create a 
pattern lock for authentication, some of whom were offered with the strength meter. The 
analysis of the collected data confirmed that the meter assistance was beneficial for the 
majority of the users which resulted in generating more secure pattern locks.   
 
Figure 3: Pattern Lock Strength Meter (Song et al., 2015) 
In another research by (Zezschwitz et al., 2015), a systematic evaluation to quantify the 
susceptibility of unlock patterns against shoulder surfing was presented. Various 
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influencing parameters on observation resistance were examined including: length of 
patterns, visibility of lines, knight moves, overlaps and intersections. In order to weigh 
the impact of a single parameter, an online study was conducted that used an algorithm 
to generate patterns and simulate the human behaviour to unlock those patterns. During 
the experiment, the display of the device is perfectly located within the sight of the 
attacker who can view the authentication attempt once. Afterwards, the attacker gets hold 
of the device in which he needs to redraw the captured pattern for verification. The study 
involved 5960 patterns of different lengths and strengths, which were attacked by 298 
participants. The results revealed that attackers managed to correctly shoulder surf 51.7% 
of the patterns, out of which 57.9% had visible lines. The length of the successfully 
attacked patterns was shorter (M=5.7) than the unsuccessful ones. The influence of all 
parameters was highly significant, however the line visibility and pattern length were of 
particular importance. The observation risk was reduced by 67% when lines were 
invisible. The observers’ chance was decreased by 45% when increasing the pattern 
length by one. The addition of other parameters like knight move brought the risk down 
by 32%, overlaps 20%, and intersections 12%. The study concluded that attacking 
Android patterns is easy even when observed once. However, it suggested using this 
prediction model as a proactive security checker that estimates the risk of a given pattern 
to help users to avoid weak patterns.   
 
(Siadati et al., 2015) presented two persuasive methods that should expand the effective 
password space by urging users to select stronger patterns. The first mechanism is called 
"BLINK", which suggests the starting point of the pattern for the user without 
enforcement. As a result, the bias selection of starting points should be significantly 
reduced and be less predictable. During registration, BLINK will recommend a random 
point out of the 9 points by adding an extra circle around it and blink until the user starts 
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drawing a pattern. The second mechanism is called "EPSM": Embedded pattern strength 
meter, where users receive continuous feedback about the strength of their patterns during 
the creation process. The system provides feedback to help users adjusting their weak 
patterns by updating the pattern’s colour according to the strength level. A weak pattern 
appears in red colour, moderate pattern in yellow, and a strong pattern in green. 
A user study to evaluate security and usability of the proposed designs was conducted on 
270 participants. Each participant was randomly appointed to one of the three different 
user interfaces: (NORMAL) the traditional Android Patterns, the BLINK, and the EPSM. 
The task involved creating a new pattern and confirming it then complete a survey. The 
result indicated that choosing strong patterns was increased to 60% when using BLINK 
and 77% when EPSM is used. The use of BLINK managed to eliminate the bias selection 
of starting point by distributing the selections almost evenly. The suggested points by the 
system was accepted by 85% of the users. In addition, the study confirmed that the created 
patterns using EPSM and BLINK are more secure than NORMAL. In regards to the 
accuracy of the pattern recall, the result showed no significant difference in the recall 
rates between either NORMAL and BLINK or NORMAL and EPSM. 
 
 
EPSM: colours of the strength levels BLINK 
Figure 4: "EPSM" & "BLINK" interfaces (Siadati et al., 2015) 
 
b. Click-based techniques 
(Sabzevar & Stavrou, 2008) proposed a new multi-factor authentication scheme based on 
a graphical password. To that end, the user’s own handheld device is utilised as a decoder 
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for the password and a second factor for authentication process. Authentication is based 
upon two images (Password Image and Key Image). The user is firstly challenged with 
an image password sent to their terminal by a service provider. Next, a corresponding key 
image containing some hint information is transmitted to the user’s handheld device to 
enable an appropriate determination of the required click points and the correct ordering. 
The approach takes advantage of the increased popularity of handheld devices, such as 
cell phones, so there is no more need for memorising different passwords or carrying 
different hardware tokens. The proposed method is capable of protecting against a diverse 
range of threats, such as key-loggers, brute-force and shoulder-surfing. Unfortunately, 
evaluation experiment was not conducted and no data was published that prove the 
scheme’s performance and security in practice.   
 
(Ritter et al., 2013) took advantage of the multiple fingers used for password entry to 
enhance the security of their proposed technique. The new scheme is called "Multitouch 
Image-Based Authentication on Smartphones" (MIBA). In each login round, the user is 
allowed to mark multiple points on an image which thwarts the password observation by 
an adversary. The background images are used as cues and the next round’s image is 
determined depending on the user's input in the recent round. A semi-transparent grid of 
potential click points overlays the background image to help in placing fingers correctly. 
Clicking on any potential click point turns it into fully transparent. In addition, a shift 
  
Password Image Corresponding Key Image (Handheld) 
Figure 95: Multi-Factor Graphical Authentication (Sabzevar & Stavrou, 2008) 
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function was further introduced to increase the theoretical password space. The shift 
function extends the entropy of a round by providing an additional entry mode that is 
difficult for an observer to distinguish from a normal round. A shift round is activated by 
a slightly longer press which vibrates the phone as an indication of the shift function 
activation. MIBA is able to produce 14.7 bit of theoretical password space per round. An 
initial lab experiment was performed to evaluate the required entry time as well as user 
perception of MIBA usability. 75% of all password entry attempts carried out by 30 
participants took less than 10 seconds. As for the usability, initial difficulties when using 
multiple fingers for input were reported by some participants. Nevertheless, the user 
experience of MIBA was overall satisfactory and participants considered it useful.  
 
Figure 6: Selecting click points with multiple fingers in "MIBA" (Ritter et al., 2013) 
(Yesseyeva et al., 2014) proposed a new scheme called "Tri-Pass" that was adopted from 
two earlier techniques named PassPoint and Triangle. The registration starts by choosing 
an image from a set of pictures and then click on any three points on the image as 
“password points”. The authentication process is based on clicking on any three points 
that will form a triangle around each password point. It means that inside each area of the 
invisible triangles there is one password point. To login, there should be three clicks per 
password point, that is a total of nine clicks for the entire three password points. The 
sequence of inputting points is a condition for successful authentication. The usability of 
the Tri-Pass method was evaluated by survey. Over 60% of the responses viewed the 
method as reliable and trustworthy and more than 70% of the users considered the system 
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as simple to use, register and login. However, only half of the respondents found the 
system easy to memorize and learn. As for the time efficiency, registration time was 
satisfactory whereas login time took much longer compared with textual password.    
 
Figure 7: "Tri-Pass" algorithm: Login phase (Yesseyeva et al., 2014) 
c. Choice-based techniques 
In 2008, (Dunphy, Fitch & Olivier, 2008) introduced a new joint method between 
PassFaces (as the main graphical authentication scheme) and eye tracker (as the input 
means) to resist shoulder-surfing. The system was deployed over a simulated ATM 
machine. Despite the known limitations of the eye trackers technique such as failing to 
enrol errors, the study showed good initial results in regards to user performance and skill 
improvement in using the eye tracker technique.  
 
Figure 8: "Gaze-Contingent" login challenge (Dunphy, Fitch & Olivier, 2008) 
 
(Akula & Devisetty, 2004) proposed a similar technique to Déjà vu named "Image Based 
Registration and Authentication System" (IBRAS). In this technique the registration 
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process starts by selecting an image which is user’s choice followed by displaying the 
selected image on the window for user verification. The system requires the users to carry 
the secret image with them for future use. The user is requested to submit a combination 
of the unique user ID and the secret image chosen earlier as credentials to the system. The 
authentication request is approved when the image matches with the one already stored 
in the system. Interestingly, only the hashed value of the image is stored in the system not 
the image itself. Moreover, the images are hashed using a secure hashing function SHA-
1which does not seem to have an impact on the system’s memory since it produces only 
20 byte secure output. 
In a similar way to the Triangle scheme (Sobrado & Birget, 2002) which was mentioned 
earlier, (Wiedenbeck et al., 2006) proposed their Convex Hull Click scheme "CHC" 
which is a multi-rounds challenge-response authentication. In this scheme, creating a 
password requires the user to choose and remember some icons (pass-icons) from a larger 
set of icons. At login time, the system challenges the user by displaying a number of 
randomly arranged icons, a few of which are pass-icons. The user is required to recognise 
three or more of the corresponding password icons and then use those pass-icons to 
virtually create a convex hull, which is the area in between the edges that join several 
pass-icons. Responding to the challenge is done by clicking anywhere within the convex 
hull. However, the window’s size and the user’s ability to identify the pass-icons among 
many other icons are considered two practical limits. 
A usability study was carried out by fifteen participants in two sessions, a first day session 
and a week later follow-up session. In the initial session, the task for the participants was 
to login for ten successful logins. The result indicated that 90.35% of the password inputs 
were correct with an average time of 71.66 seconds. The follow-up session involved 
showing the participants a printed list of 112 randomly ordered icons and were requested 
to spot the five pass-icons. The result of this session showed a high level of memorability 
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as 14 participants managed to identify the five pass-icons correctly whereas the remaining 
participant failed to remember only one of the pass-icons. However, looking for the pass-
icons in the screen requires more scanning and can be even confusable if icons are small 
and look similar. Another weak aspect of CHC is the longer time taken for password 
entry.  
Two probabilistic attacks against the CHC scheme were reported later in 2013 by Asghar 
et al. (Asghar et al., 2013). The attacks statistics addressed some weaknesses in the 
convex hull protocol against a passive eavesdropping attack. The result of the observation 
of a few authentication sessions in those attacks simulations revealed a high probability 
of obtaining secret icons. Thus, impersonating other users is simple once some secret 
icons are obtained. 
 
Figure 9: "CHC" login interface (Wiedenbeck et al., 2006) 
Later in 2014, (Wu et al., 2014) proposed a new graphical password authentication system 
called "Shoulder-Surfing-Proof" (SSP). The new proposal improved the Triangle scheme 
(Sobrado & Birget, 2002) and CHC scheme (Wiedenbeck et al., 2006) by using a number 
of colour balls moving on the screen instead of clicking on a fixed region. At registration, 
users need to remember password icons and their colours. In SSP, the way to enter 
passwords is changed. To authenticate, the user just presses the space key to confirm 
when one matching ball is moving into the authentication region. The addition of dynamic 
moving colour balls to the screen complicates the chosen locations. That will make 
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comparing and analysing the screen snaps of an entire captured authentication process to 
find out password icons even more difficult. Attackers cannot distinguish the correct 
colour and icons even when recording the location of each moving ball while a user 
presses the space key.  
The experiment included attack simulations of login attempts using the mouse-clicking 
approach and SSP approach. The results of the comparison showed that the success 
probability of guessing the correct passwords for both approaches was almost similar due 
to the use of the same convex-hull algorithm. As far as the feasibility of SSP scheme is 
concerned, fifteen users participated in the trial where each individual was requested to 
register with the system by selecting one colour five icons. During the authentication 
performance, the user spent an average of 25.71 seconds to find out the convex hull 
formed with the pre-selected icons, while completing the authentication process 
consumed 35.29 seconds in average. 
 
Figure 10: Login interface of "SSP" scheme (Wu et al., 2014) 
(Weinshall, 2004) introduced a protocol based on the human ability to recognise pictures. 
This protocol aims to ensure secure authentication even in cases where eavesdroppers 
manage to overhear some of the successful authentication sessions. The system is 
composed of two sets of pictures: 240 pictures of public set B and a secret subset F of 60 
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familiar pictures selected for each user. The protocol was designed as a 4x5 grid 
presenting a random selection of 20 pictures from set B. Next to each picture there is an 
assigned random bit (0 or 1). There are two possible methods to identify the users. In the 
first variant, users are required to recognise the first and last familiar pictures from subset 
F and compare the associated bits, determining whether they are equal or not. In the 
second variant, the first, second and last familiar pictures from subset F must be identified 
by the user and then their 3 associated bits are compared to check whether their majority 
is 0 or 1.  
A user study, that involved 20 queries to answer, was carried out on small scale of three 
users and over various time periods. The result showed a high success rate and suggested 
that this protocol has the chance to practically authenticate users.   
 
Figure 11: "Weinshall approach" An example of one query panel  (Weinshall, 2004) 
 
(Renaud & Olsen, 2007), proposed their authentication approach "DynaHand" utilising 
graphical mechanism and relying on the ability of the users to recognise random five-
digit numeral strings of their own handwriting. The system involves three rounds that are 
required to complete the authentication process each of which displays nine images while 
randomising the sequence of its five-digit content. That means that remembering the PIN 
is no longer required where users only need to recognise their own handwritten numbers. 
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A successful authentication is achieved through a correct identification of the handwritten 
numerals for all three sequential stages. 
 
Figure 12: "DynaHand" authentication system (Renaud & Olsen, 2007) 
(Bicakci et al., 2009) proposed a solution to overcome the hotspot problem through two 
novel recognition-based graphical password methods. Graphical Password with Icons 
"GPI" and Graphical Password with Icons suggested by the System "GPIS" are the 
proposed systems that utilize icons as points of click on the graphical password interface. 
In the first system GPI, the common idea of clicking on particular locations on a 
background image to form a graphical password is replaced by clicking on a number of 
displayed icons. The second system GPIS uses the same concept except that the set of 
password icons are generated randomly and assigned by the system to the user who can 
accept that given icons or reject them by requesting a new set. Both schemes contain 150 
icons selected from 15 categories. Each line presents icons from the same category and 
each user receives random display of categories and their instances. Users of these 
schemes need to select their passwords by clicking on six icons in sequence. However, a 
different kind of hotspot can be also generated when using icons (hot-icons) since some 
can draw users’ attention. To overcome this issue, GPIS scheme should be selected as it 
uses system assigned icons instead. 
The usability and security of GPI and GPIS were compared with a conventional click-
based graphical password scheme (PassPoints) through a lab experiment. Sixty-nine 
participants took part in this study which divided them into three groups. The result 
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revealed that the registration time for GPI was longer than that of PassPoints. 
Approximately 20% of the users of all groups forgot their password which means that 
there is no significant difference in the memorability level between the compared 
schemes. Although users of GPIS scheme were assigned the icons by the system, but that 
had no substantial impact on the usability and memorability. As far as the entry time is 
concerned, the proposed schemes performed slower than PassPoints scheme.     
  
GPI interface GPIS interface 
Figure 13: "GPI" & "GPIS" interfaces 
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Appendix B Images licences 
Image License Note  
All images displayed on this web site are the property of their respective owners.  
For security purposes we have summarized and grouped the images based on their license 
type to avoid any possible disclosure of the images used in this prototype for further 
protection from various types of security attacks such as 'phishing attack'. 
 
Image 
Qty  
License Type BY  
136  Free for 
personal use  
Iconshock - http://www.iconshock.com  
Icons Land - http://www.icons-land.com  
Jesper Andersson - http://www.sortitoutsi.net  
Custom Icon Design - http://www.customicondesign.com  
Andrea Austoni - http://www.cutelittlefactory.com/  
Eighty8four - http://eighty8four.com  
TPDK design - http://blog.tpdkdesign.net/  
Artua - http://www.artua.com/  
Turbomilk - http://www.turbomilk.com  
Kyo Tux - http://kyo-tux.deviantart.com  
Bart Kowalski - http://bartkowalski.com/  
Icebabee - http://icebabee.deviantart.com/  
Artdesigner.lv - http://www.artdesigner.lv  
Babasse - http://babasse.deviantart.com  
Gakuseisean - http://gakuseisean.deviantart.com/  
Harwen Zhang - http://harwen.net/  
Jonas Rask - http://jonasraskdesign.com  
Itzik Gur - http://itzikgur.deviantart.com  
http://mebaze.com  
Everaldo Coelho - http://www.everaldo.com/  
Reynaldo Ramos - http://xenturion.deviantart.com/  
Google - http://www.google.com  
MayoSoft - http://mayosoft.deviantart.com  
Mike Beecham - http://mikebeecham.deviantart.com/  
Fasticon - http://www.fasticon.com/  
Ramotion - http://www.ramotion.com  
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Tatice - http://tatice.deviantart.com/  
109  Free for 
commercial 
use  
Mysitemyway Design Team - http://icons.mysitemyway.com  
Icons Land - http://www.icons-land.com  
IconEden - http://www.iconeden.com  
Nishan Sothilingam  
I love colors - http://www.ilovecolors.com.ar/  
Sebastien Durel - http://www.crystalxp.net/galerie/en.id.3751-
bagg-a-png.htm  
Aha-Soft  
Aleksandra Wolska - http://www.olawolska.com  
Dellustrations - http://dellustrations.com/work_icons.html  
Icojam - http://www.icojam.com  
Cyberella - http://www.cybertronical.com  
PC Unleashed - http://pcunleashed.com/  
Artdesigner.lv - http://www.artdesigner.lv  
Zen Nikki - http://zen-nikki.deviantart.com/  
IFA  
Rimshotdesign - http://rimshotdesign.com  
Media Design - http://mediadesign.deviantart.com  
IconBlock - http://www.iconblock.com/  
Bharathp666 - http://bharathp666.deviantart.com/  
Navdeep Raj - http://dezinerfolio.com  
Double-J designs - http://www.doublejdesign.co.uk/  
Ozturk - http://www.hadibe.com  
MazeNL77 - http://mazenl77.deviantart.com/  
Vlademareous - http://vlademareous.deviantart.com/  
Denis Sazhin  
Morcha - http://morcha.blogbus.com/logs/30886671.html  
Webdesigner Depot - http://www.webdesignerdepot.com  
LazyCrazy - http://lazycrazy.deviantart.com/  
DryIcons - http://dryicons.com  
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56  Creative 
Commons  
Oxygen Team - http://www.oxygen-icons.org/  
Kidaubis Design - http://www.kidcomic.net  
IconFinder - http://www.iconfinder.net  
Mathieu - http://www.mat-u.com/  
Aha-Soft  
Kyo Tux - http://kyo-tux.deviantart.com  
VistaICO.com - http://www.vistaico.com  
Double-J designs - http://www.doublejdesign.co.uk/  
Limpa (Björn Lindberg) - http://www.limpa.net  
PCconsultants.co.uk - http://www.pcconsultants.co.uk  
Milanioom - http://milanioom.deviantart.com  
Wallpaper FX  
Kendra Schaefer - http://www.kendraschaefer.com  
Kyle Van Essen - http://kylevanessen.com/  
Pack Yuuyake - http://dunedhel.deviantart.com/art/Pack-
Yuuyake-96029071  
Dunedhel - http://dunedhel.deviantart.com/  
Raadius - http://raadius.deviantart.com/  
Javier Aroche - http://www.javier-aroche.com/  
Neurovit - http://neurovit.deviantart.com  
r3dlink13 - http://r3dlink13.deviantart.com/  
Ahmad Hania  
Maja Bencic - http://www.fritula.hr  
Eray Zesen  
Omercetin - http://omercetin.deviantart.com/  
Interactivemania - http://www.interactivemania.com 
Svengraph - http://svengraph.deviantart.com 
Wwalczyszyn - http://wwalczyszyn.deviantart.com/  
Visual Pharm - http://icons8.com/  
Cyberchaos05 - http://cyberchaos05.deviantart.com  
BlueMalboro - http://bluemalboro.deviantart.com/art/Micro-
Icon-Set-42295693  
Kidaubis - http://kidaubis.deviantart.com/  
Delacro - http://delacro.deviantart.com/ 
Pica-ae - http://pica-ae.deviantart.com/  
Arrioch - http://arrioch.deviantart.com  
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41  Free for non 
commercial 
use  
Oliver Scholtz (and others) - 
http://linux.softpedia.com/developer/Oliver-Scholtz-93.html  
Babasse - http://babasse.deviantart.com  
Aha-soft - http://www.aha-soft.com  
Louis Harboe - http://graphicpeel.com  
Susumu Yoshida - http://www.mcdodesign.com/  
Everaldo Coelho - http://www.everaldo.com/  
Tuziibanez - http://tuziibanez.deviantart.com  
Capital18 - http://capital18.deviantart.com  
Jommans - http://jommans.deviantart.com/  
Custom Icon Design - http://www.customicondesign.com  
Blackblurrr - http://blackblurrr.deviantart.com  
Seanau - http://www.seanau.com  
Nikolay Verin - http://ncrow.deviantart.com/ 
Dan Wiersema - http://danwiersema.com  
PixelPirate - http://pixelpirate.deviantart.com  
Benbackman - http://benbackman.deviantart.com/  
Panoramix - http://panoramix-.deviantart.com/art/Xi4Dox-
36612582  
32  GPL  Alessandro Rei - http://www.kde-
look.org/usermanager/search.php?username=mentalrey  
Sergio Sánchez López - http://www.kde-
look.org/usermanager/search.php?username=Sephiroth6779  
Pavel InFeRnODeMoN - http://www.kde-
look.org/usermanager/search.php?username=InFeRnODeMoN  
Lothar Grimme - http://www.grafixport.org  
Alexandre Moore - http://sa-ki.deviantart.com/  
New Mooon - http://code.google.com/u/newmooon/  
Walrick - http://walrick.deviantART.com  
23  LGPL  Everaldo Coelho - http://www.everaldo.com/  
Alexandre Moore - http://sa-ki.deviantart.com/  
David Vignoni - http://www.icon-king.com/  
Marco Martin  
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Legal consultation about the licencing of using free images  
 
 
From: Ed Bremner 
Sent: 20 May 2014 10:49 
To: Hussain Alsaiari 
Subject: RE: Accepted: Consultation in image licensing 
Hi Hussain, 
  
Yes, I did talk to him and he agreed with me that on the following conditions: 
  
•         This work was not on a public server, but only on an internal Plymouth Uni server 
•         It was being made as part of your personal research work within your education 
here at the university 
•         Was not being used in any commercial context 
•         That you gave credits to all providers of images within the appendices explaining 
that specific link could not be given due to security worries 
•         That you offered to remove any image, if the owner wished 
  
There is no reason at all why you shouldn’t continue to use the images in this way. 
  
I look forwards to seeing it all working. 
  
Good luck 
  
Best wishes 
  
EIB 
  
  
******************************************************** 
Ed I Bremner 
Digital Learning Environment Advocate 
Associate Lecturer – Photography 
e: ed.bremner@plymouth.ac.uk 
m: 07973 335509 
s: ed.bremner 
  
If you are emailing about the DLE, send direct to dle.ah@plymouth.ac.uk 
 ******************************************************** 
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Appendix C List of invitation letters & Ethical approvals  
 
1) Invitation letters 
• Online survey 
Subject: Invitation to participate in a survey  
 
Dear, 
 
You have been invited to participate in a survey. 
 
The survey is titled: 
"Survey of Authentication Mechanisms for Online Banking" 
 
 
"The research is focused on the usable security within the field of user authentication in 
critical systems like financial institutes. These systems offer a variety of authentication 
mechanisms. Thus, the research aims to investigate the user experience with various types of 
user authentication methods in general and with online banking in particular besides 
understanding the attitudes of the users towards these authentication techniques." 
 
 
To participate, please click on the following link: 
https://www.cscan.org/surveys/index.php?sid=52849&lang=en 
 
Sincerely, 
 
Hussain Alsaiari (hussain.alsaiari@plymouth.ac.uk) 
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• GOTPass experiment (User trials) 
Invitation letter 
Dear, 
You have been invited to participate in a user trial as part of my PhD research “Graphical 
One-Time-Password authentication”.  
You will be kindly asked to come for three separate sessions at regular intervals as described 
below: 
Session 1 Session 2 Session 3 
Initial date 1 week later 1 month later 
 
The trial will require you to use a graphical authentication system in 3 sessions for the 
duration of approximately 30 minutes in each session. The task involves registering with the 
system to create a new user account, and then using that account to login to the system for 
several times.  
As part of the study, you will be asked to fill out online pre-test and post-test questionnaires 
that are used to investigate your views of the system in terms of security and usability. If you 
would like to participate, please sign up for your first session (please select one time slot 
only). Subsequent sessions will be on the same time slot in one week and one month time.  
Participation is open to anyone aged 18 years or older with any level of computing abilities. 
Each participant will receive £5 for each 30 minutes of participation (3 sessions = £15 in 
total) that is payable upon the completion of the study (end of session3). 
 
To participate, please use the following link to sign up for the time slot as convenient: 
http://www.signupgenius.com/go/10c0a4baaac2aabfc1-onetimegraphical 
 LOCATION: Plymouth University | 3rd Floor Portland Square Building 
 
• Tear off flyer 
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Earn £15 
 
You are invited to participate in a user trial as part of a PhD research “Graphical One-Time-
Password authentication”.  
You will be kindly asked to come for three separate sessions at regular intervals as described 
below: 
Session 1 Session 2 Session 3 
Initial date 1 week later 1 month later 
  
Participation is open to anyone aged 18 years or older with any level of computing abilities. 
Each participant will receive £5 for each 30 minutes of participation (3 sessions = £15 in total) 
that is payable upon the completion of the study (end of session3). 
For more information and to participate, please use the following link or scan the QR code to 
sign up for the time slot as convenient: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
http://qrs.ly/794hh5t 
LOCATION: Plymouth University |  Rolle 203 
 
Sincerely, 
Hussain Alsaiari | Principal Investigator 
The Centre for Security, Communications and Network Research (CSCAN)  
Plymouth University | Room A304 Portland Square Building 
Office: +44 (0)1752 586287 |  Email: hussain.alsaiari@plymouth.ac.uk 
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• Supplementary Security experiment   
 
Dear Participant*, 
  
I would like to invite you again to this additional GOTPass security experiment. This time, 
your physical attendance is not required; taking part in this study can be done at your end 
anywhere anytime. 
  
The experiment is about a security attack called “Intersection Attack” which utilises the most 
frequently viewed images to determine the correct pass-images. 
  
Your task: The attached file contains screenshots of 10 login attempts for a single GOTPass 
account. You are kindly requested to identify the most frequent images that are likely to be 
the correct pass-images in each login attempt. Note that the total pass-images for this account 
are 4, but the system displays only 2 random correct pass-images in each challenge grid. After 
identifying the pass-images, you will need also to determine the codes associated with each 
pass-image – TOP or LEFT. 
  
Please write your answers on the tables below each challenge grid by specifying the image 
number and the code from top axis or left axis of each image. Once you complete your 
answers, please save your document in your name and send it back 
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to  hussain.alsaiari@plymouth.co.uk or alternatively you can print a copy and fill it by hand 
and submit it in person to Hussain Alsaiari (PSQ - A304) 
  
  
Wining conditions: 
1. The break-in is considered successful when both pass-images and the associated codes are 
all correct. 
2. To enter the prize draw, at least one successful attempt is required out of the total 10 
attempts. 
3. Successful participants will enter the prize draw and the winner will take the prize of 
£20 cash. 
  
  
Submission Deadline: Midnight of Sunday 22 February 2015 
Winner announcement: Tuesday 24 February 2015  
 
  
Best Regards, 
Hussain Alsaiari 
  
  
* This participation is intended for those who already participated in the GOTPass user trials 
and are familiar with the system. 
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2) Ethical approvals 
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Appendix D List of questionnaires  
1) User authentication experience online survey 
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295 
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299 
 
300 
 
301 
 
302 
 
303 
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2) GOTPass Pre-test questionnaire   
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308 
 
309 
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3) GOTPass Post-test questionnaire  
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Appendix E Experiments task sheets  
 
1) Briefing document for the user experiment  
Graphical One-Time-Password (GOTPass) 
Briefing document for potential participants in user trial 
Hussain Alsaiari 
hussain.alsaiari@plymouth.ac.uk 
Centre for Security, Communications and Network Research (CSCAN), 
School of Computing and Mathematics,  
Plymouth University 
 
About the research: 
The main objective of this research is to investigate the usability and security of a graphical 
authentication method, which provides possible alternatives to traditional 
username/password authentication. 
 
What you are required to do? 
In this trial, you are kindly requested to use a graphical authentication system by simply 
creating a new user account and then use it to sign back into the system. The authentication 
task will involve entering a username, redrawing the unlock pattern, remembering the 
images that you chose within the given themes, and finally entering the OTP code in the 
correct pre-chosen format. The study involves three separate sessions distributed on first 
day, one week later, and after one month.   
 
Below is the series of the main tasks you need to perform on each session: 
D. Initialization session (Day 1) 
 
1) Register and confirm your username, unlock pattern, pass-images, OTP input 
format. (web application) 
2) Answer a pre-test questionnaire. (online survey) 
3) Login using your GOTPass credential. (web application) 
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E. Follow-up session (Week later) 
 
1) Login using your GOTPass credential. (web application) 
 
F. Final session (Month later) 
 
1) Login using your GOTPass credential. (web application) 
2) Answer a post-test questionnaire. (online survey) 
 
The process flow of the required tasks is as follows: 
For the registration task, you are required to create a new account by entering a unique 
username, drawing an unlock pattern shape, selecting 4 password images from 4 different 
system assigned themes, and lastly choosing one option of 4 available OTP input format.  
This authentication approach does not require you to remember the sequence of your 
password images. Please be noted that writing your password components down is unsecure 
practice. 
 
Before proceeding to the Login task, you need to answer a pre-test questionnaire. The 
purpose of doing this activity is to provide you with a divider time between the registration 
and the login task.  
 
During the Login task, you are requested to login by providing the correct username, 
redraw the unlock pattern, then the system will display a 4x4 grid that contains random 2 
password images out of your 4 previously chosen images, which you will need to identify 
and enter the associated OTP axis code as per the registration.  
The login conditions will be as follows: 
• 5 consecutive correct authentication tries > Successfully completed this session  
• 5 total incorrect attempts > receive the guide booklet or play the video demo, 
then restart again 
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Finally, at the end of last session you will receive a post-test questionnaire (Impression & 
Opinion). 
 
Notes: 
- You are recommended to go through the training (guide booklet/ video demo) before 
starting your trial as it will provide a clearer idea on how the new method works. 
- Please avoid clicking on the pass-images, just mentally locate them and map them to the 
right pre-chosen axis of the OTP code. 
 
How long will it take? 
The total amount of time will depend upon your experiences with the new method, but on 
average each trial session requires no more than 40 minutes. 
 
What will the results of the study be used for? 
The result of this trial will contribute towards PhD research that proposes an alternative 
authentication method, with the ultimate aim to enhance any current problems. 
 
All results from this trial will be used and reported anonymously in the ongoing research. 
You will be given an opportunity to find out the results of this trial by asking for a copy of 
the findings to be emailed to you after the full study has been conducted and analysed. 
 
Any further enquiries about how the study has been conducted, do not hesitate to contact 
the Secretary, Faculty of Science and Environment Research Ethics Committee, Mrs Paula 
Simson at paula.simson@plymouth.ac.uk 
 
 
Thank you very much indeed for your time and kind participation. 
__________________________________________________________ 
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Participant’s Informed Consent 
The objectives of this research have been explained to me. 
 
I understand that I am free to withdraw from the research at any stage, and ask for my data 
to be destroyed if I wish. 
 
I understand that my anonymity is guaranteed, unless I expressly state otherwise. 
 
Under these circumstances, I agree to participate in the research. 
_________________________ 
 
Name : 
Date : 
Email : 
 
2) Task sheet for Guessing attack study  
 
Guessing attack 
In this type of attack, attackers will try to guess the authentication secret of a legitimate 
user. In recognition-based authentication, “Prioritised guessing attacks” aims to increase 
the probability of selecting the correct image through the prioritisation of the more 
commonly selected images.   
 
Task: You will be provided some information about the user account that you will be 
required to guess the password of that account. 
In order to validate your guessing, you will be given the chance to use the GOTPass system 
and try to login with the information you managed to guess. The allowed attempts will be 
limited to 5 unless you think that you can manage to succeed if you were given more 
chances.  
 
Account information: 
Username: guesscscan 
Pattern: shape of number 2 
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Pass-images themes: flag, stationery, computer, paint 
Input format: Basic security level (both numeric codes are 
form same axis – Top/Left) 
 
 
 
 
Guessing attack experiment (observation form) 
Date Time  
   
 
Attempt # 1 
Pattern   
1st pass-image   
2nd pass-image   
1st code   
2nd code   
 
Attempt # 2 
Pattern   
1st pass-image   
2nd pass-image   
1st code   
2nd code   
 
Attempt # 3 
Pattern   
1st pass-image   
2nd pass-image   
1st code   
2nd code   
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Attempt # 4 
Pattern   
1st pass-image   
2nd pass-image   
1st code   
2nd code   
 
 
Attempt # 5 
Pattern   
1st pass-image   
2nd pass-image   
1st code   
2nd code   
 
 
 
What do you think might made GOTPass hard to guess? 
Pattern shape  Pattern start point & 
direction 
  
image shuffling  dynamic pass-images    
input format  other  
 
 
Do you have any interest in breaking in this system (for further research)? 
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3) Task sheet for Intersection attack study  
 
Intersection attack 
Intersection attack is possible when the role of an image as either a pass-image or a 
distractor can be determined by the frequency of its appearance at login. That in turn allow 
the attacker to use the most frequently viewed images to pass the challenge screen and gain 
access. 
 
 
Task: You will be displayed a video of screen capturing the login attempts for 3 times. You 
are allowed to take notes while watching the video to help you gather information about the 
user account that you will be required to login with the information of that account. 
In order to validate your captured information, you will be given the chance to use the 
GOTPass system and try to login with the information you managed to gather. The 
allowed attempts will be limited to 5 unless you think that you can manage to succeed if 
you were given more chances. 
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Intersection attack experiment (observation form) 
Date Time  
   
 
Attempt # 1 
Username   
Pattern   
1st pass-image   
2nd pass-image   
1st code   
2nd code   
 
 
Attempt # 2 
Username   
Pattern   
1st pass-image   
2nd pass-image   
1st code   
2nd code   
 
Attempt # 3 
Username   
Pattern   
1st pass-image   
2nd pass-image   
1st code   
2nd code   
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Attempt # 4 
Username   
Pattern   
1st pass-image   
2nd pass-image   
1st code   
2nd code   
 
Attempt # 5 
Username   
Pattern   
1st pass-image   
2nd pass-image   
1st code   
2nd code   
 
 
 
What do you think might made GOTPass hard to capture? 
image shuffling  input format   
dynamic pass-images  other  
 
 
Do you have any interest in breaking in this system (for further research)? 
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4) Task sheet for Shoulder-surfing attack study  
 
Shoulder-Surfing attack 
When authenticating in public places, shoulder surfing become of special concern since it 
enables attacker to capture individual’s password by direct observation or by recording 
the entire authentication session.  
 
Task: You will be displayed a video of login attempts being captured while an individual 
was entering authentication information for 3 times. You are allowed to take notes while 
watching the video to help you gather information about the user account that you will be 
required to login with the information of that account. 
In order to validate your captured information, you will be given the chance to use the 
GOTPass system and try to login with the information you managed to gather. The 
allowed attempts will be limited to 5 unless you think that you can manage to succeed if 
you were given more chances.  
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Shoulder-Surfing attack experiment (observation form) 
Date Time  
   
 
 
Attempt # 1 
Username   
Pattern   
1st pass-image   
2nd pass-image   
1st code   
2nd code   
 
Attempt # 2 
Username   
Pattern   
1st pass-image   
2nd pass-image   
1st code   
2nd code   
 
Attempt # 3 
Username   
Pattern   
1st pass-image   
2nd pass-image   
1st code   
2nd code   
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Attempt # 4 
Username   
Pattern   
1st pass-image   
2nd pass-image   
1st code   
2nd code   
 
Attempt # 5 
Username   
Pattern   
1st pass-image   
2nd pass-image   
1st code   
2nd code   
 
 
What do you think might made GOTPass hard to capture? 
image shuffling  input format   
dynamic pass-images  other  
 
 
Do you have any interest in breaking in this system (for further research)? 
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5) Task sheet for the supplementary Intersection attack study  
 
Intersection Attack Experiment #2 
 
Introduction: Intersection attack is possible when the role of an image as either a pass-image 
or a distractor can be determined by the frequency of its appearance at login. That in turn 
allow the attacker to use the most frequently viewed images to pass the challenge screen and 
gain access. 
 
Task: You will be presented with screenshots of 10 login attempts for a single GOTPass 
account. You are kindly requested to identify the most frequent images likely to be the correct 
pass-images in each login attempt. Note that the total pass-images for this account is 4, but 
the system displays only 2 random correct pass-images in each challenge grid. After 
identifying the pass-images, you will need also to determine the codes associated with each 
pass-image – TOP or LEFT, as per the following options: 
Option one:     1st pass-image (TOP) + 2nd pass-image (TOP) 
Option two:     1st pass-image (LEFT) + 2nd pass-image (LEFT) 
Option three:  1st pass-image (TOP) + 2nd pass-image (LEFT) 
Option four:    1st pass-image (LEFT) + 2nd pass-image (TOP) 
Please write your answers on the tables below each challenge grid by specifying the image 
number and the code from top axis or left axis of each image. Once you complete your 
answers, please save your document in your name and send it to 
hussain.alsaiari@plymouth.ac.uk or alternatively you can print a copy and fill it by hand and 
submit it in person to Hussain Alsaiari (PSQ - A304) 
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Login Session #1 
BD 1111 2222 3333 4444 
5555 
 
1 2 3 4 
6666 
5 6 7 8 
7777 
9 10 11 12 
8888 
13 14 15 16 
 
 
 
1. What are the pass-images and their codes? 
Pass-image #1  Code #1  
Pass-image #2  Code #2  
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Login Session #2 
BC 1111 2222 3333 4444 
5555 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
6666 
 
5 
 
6 
 
7 
 
8 
7777 
 
9 
 
10 
 
11 
 
12 
8888 
 
13 
 
14 
 
15 
 
16 
 
 
 
2. What are the pass-images and their codes? 
Pass-image #1  Code #1  
Pass-image #2  Code #2  
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Login Session #3 
AB 1111 2222 3333 4444 
5555 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
6666 
 
5 
 
6 
 
7 
 
8 
7777 
 
9 
 
10 
 
11 
 
12 
8888 
 
13 
 
14 
 
15 
 
16 
 
 
3. What are the pass-images and their codes? 
Pass-image #1  Code #1  
Pass-image #2  Code #2  
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Login Session #4 
AC 1111 2222 3333 4444 
5555 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
6666 
 
5 
 
6 
 
7 
 
8 
7777 
 
9 
 
10 
 
11 
 
12 
8888 
 
13 
 
14 
 
15 
 
16 
 
 
4. What are the pass-images and their codes? 
Pass-image #1  Code #1  
Pass-image #2  Code #2  
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Login Session #5 
AD 1111 2222 3333 4444 
5555 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
6666 
 
5 
 
6 
 
7 
 
8 
7777 
 
9 
 
10 
 
11 
 
12 
8888 
 
13 
 
14 
 
15 
 
16 
 
 
 
5. What are the pass-images and their codes? 
Pass-image #1  Code #1  
Pass-image #2  Code #2  
 
 
344 
Login Session #6 
CD 1111 2222 3333 4444 
5555 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
6666 
 
5 
 
6 
 
7 
 
8 
7777 
 
9 
 
10 
 
11 
 
12 
8888 
 
13 
 
14 
 
15 
 
16 
 
 
6. What are the pass-images and their codes? 
Pass-image #1  Code #1  
Pass-image #2  Code #2  
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Login Session #7 
BC 1111 2222 3333 4444 
5555 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
6666 
 
5 
 
6 
 
7 
 
8 
7777 
 
9 
 
10 
 
11 
 
12 
8888 
 
13 
 
14 
 
15 
 
16 
 
 
 
7. What are the pass-images and their codes? 
Pass-image #1  Code #1  
Pass-image #2  Code #2  
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Login Session #8 
AD 1111 2222 3333 4444 
5555 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
6666 
 
5 
 
6 
 
7 
 
8 
7777 
 
9 
 
10 
 
11 
 
12 
8888 
 
13 
 
14 
 
15 
 
16 
 
 
 
8. What are the pass-images and their codes? 
Pass-image #1  Code #1  
Pass-image #2  Code #2  
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Login Session #9 
BD 1111 2222 3333 4444 
5555 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
6666 
 
5 
 
6 
 
7 
 
8 
7777 
 
9 
 
10 
 
11 
 
12 
8888 
 
13 
 
14 
 
15 
 
16 
 
 
 
9. What are the pass-images and their codes? 
Pass-image #1  Code #1  
Pass-image #2  Code #2  
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Login Session #10 
AC 1111 2222 3333 4444 
5555 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
6666 
 
5 
 
6 
 
7 
 
8 
7777 
 
9 
 
10 
 
11 
 
12 
8888 
 
13 
 
14 
 
15 
 
16 
 
 
10. What are the pass-images and their codes? 
Pass-image #1  Code #1  
Pass-image #2  Code #2  
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Appendix F Implementations of GOTPass prototype  
1) GOTPass Registration & Login user guides  
A. Registration guide 
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B. Login guide 
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2) GOTPass Database  
 
Database Design Document 
 
 
Introduction 
This document describes the database design, data model, and database interfaces. The 
scope of this document covers the database objects involved in registration and login of 
users based on GOTPass principles.  
 
 System Information 
System Overview Details 
System name Graphical One Time Password System 
System type User authentication prototype 
Operational status Research experiment 
Environment / Special 
conditions 
Can be integrated with any web application that 
requires authentication 
 
 Acronyms and Abbreviations 
Acronym / Abbreviation Meaning 
GOTPass Graphical One Time Password System 
GOTPassDB Graphical One Time Password Database 
 
 
System Overview: 
  Database Management System Configuration 
Vendor Hardware Version Comments 
Microsoft 
SQL Server  
Processor type   Intel® Core™ i7 
3537U @2.00 GHz 2.50 GHz  
System Type  64-bit Operating 
system  
Memory  8 GB  
SQL Server 
2012 
SQL Server 
Management 
Studio V.11 
 
 Support Software 
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Product Version Purpose 
.NET Framework 4.5  
Internet Information Services 
(IIS) 
8.5  
 
 Data Stores  
Data store for GOTPass system is a database named “GOTPassDB” which is a repository 
of a set of integrated objects as defined below. 
 
 Object Name Object Description Utilisation 
1 User 
Information 
Keeps basic information of user who wants to 
register to the system. The component consists 
of user full name, username and drawn 
password pattern. 
Registration/Login 
2 User Images Stores registered/selected images used for login 
into the system database. This object saves 
information about the user images, whether 
pass-images selected by user or their associated 
distractor-images. 
Registration/Login 
3 User Axis 
Order (input 
format) 
User select X (Top) or Y (Left) axis of each 
image to enter the combination code as a final 
password. 
Registration/Login 
4 Themes A library of themes. Every theme has its own list 
of related images. 
Registration/Login 
5 Registration 
Log 
Records time details of the user’s activity during 
the process of registeration to the system. 
Registration  
6 Login Logs Records time details of the user’s activity of 
each login session. Moreover, this object is used 
also to lock users out when exceeding a number 
of wrong attempts. 
Login 
7 Lookup 
Information 
Contains multiple lookup information that is 
used to support application processes. 
Registration/Login 
8 Exception Various types of system and user exception are 
recorded by this object.  
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Database administrative functions: 
 Naming Conventions 
Type Guideline 
Style Example: Use lowercase characters 
Table names % NAME-ABBREVIATION%_%MAJOR %_%MINOR % 
Example: UM_USER_MASTER 
Use singular names. Never plural 
Field/Column 
names 
%TABLENAME-ABBREVIATION%_%FIELD-SCOPE-
NAME% 
Example: UM_USER_MASTER 
 
If column is primary key 
%TABLENAME-ABBREVIATION%_%FIELD-SCOPE-
NAME%_ID 
Example: UM_USER_ID 
 
If Name Foreign key fields the same name as the primary 
key to which they refer 
Stored Procedure / 
Function 
%MAJOR %%ACTIVITY_NAME%  
Activity Name is Get/Insert/Update 
Example: UserImageGet 
 
 
 Database Design 
The main logical components of GOTPassDB database are tables, stored procedures, and 
views. There are four major designs which are described as follows:  
 
a) Theme Lookup: 
Theme lookup was designed to contain theme library. This library is used in random 
selection of theme during registration process. Every theme has multiple images. Theme 
library and associated images are designed and mapped once and is used in user 
registration. Note: There is no application interface for adding themes or images into the 
database. The design is as follows: 
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[1] TM_THEME_MASTER 
Field Name Description 
TM_THEME_ID  Numeric unique ID 
TM_NAME  Name of the theme 
 
 
[2] TI_THEME_IMAGES 
Field Name Description 
TI_IMAGES_ID Numeric unique ID 
TM_THEME_ID Numeric ID linked to TM_THEME_MASTER 
TI_IMAGE_NAME Name of the image on file 
TI_STATUS 
Image status is used to enable or disable images. 
Initially same number of images for each theme was 
entered but due to variation in the number of images 
inside each theme, image status was used to indicate 
whether the image does exist (value=1) otherwise 
(value=0) to avoid displaying empty images in 
registration pages. (This is used only if the number of 
images of a spacific theme is less than 30 which is 
the number needed to fill in the matrix of images). 
TI_IMAGE_SERIAL Serial number of the image within its relevant theme 
 
 
b) User Registration: 
This design contains all the tables involved in the GOTPass registration process. User is 
registered into the system once the data is inserted successfully into the designated tables. 
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[3] UM_USER_MASTER 
Field Name Description 
UM_USER_ID Numeric unique ID 
UM_FULL_NAME Full name of the user 
UM_USERNAME Unique username  
UM_PATTERN_STR Pattern underlying code  
 
 
[4] UI_USER_IMAGE 
Field Name Description 
UI_IMAGE_ID Numeric unique ID 
UM_USER_ID Registered user ID linked to UM_USER_MASTER 
TI_IMAGES_ID Numeric ID linked to TI_THEME_IMAGES 
LKDCODE_TYPE 
Lookup code to indicate image type (PASSIMG = 
pass-image, MASKIMG = distractor-image) 
UI_PARENT_IMAGE_ID 
Numeric ID referring to the associated parent pass-
image (number of distractors to each pass-image) 
 
 
[5] UAO_USER_AXIS_ORDER 
Field Name Description 
UM_USER_ID Registered user ID linked to UM_USER_MASTER 
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UAO_IMG_SHOW_ORD The numeric order (1=first, 2=second) 
UAO_AXIS Associated axis (X, Y)  
 
 
c) System Lookup: 
System lookup design contains tables that are required to maintain setup information of 
the system. These tables contain multiple lookup information including image types, 
timeout for the login attempts, and number of failed attempts before lockout, and time 
duration for denying access etc.  
 
 
 
[6] LKM_LOOKUP_MASTER 
Field Name Description 
LKM_ID Numeric unique ID 
LKM_NAME Name of lookup field 
LKM_DESC Description of lookup field 
 
 
[7] LKD_LOOKUP_DETAIL 
Field Name Description 
LKD_CODE Unique Code 
LKM_ID Numeric ID linked to LKM_LOOKUP_MASTER 
LKD_NAME The name of lookup data 
LKD_DESC 
Detailed description of lookup field – This is optional field to 
understand the purpose of lookup data. This is normally required 
by developer in future to remember the purpose of that data.  
 
 
d) Activity Logs:   
The design ensures logging every user activity in GOTPass system including each stage 
of registration as well as each login event. Similarly, in case of system error and 
exception, system logs full inner exception thrown by the system and its timestamp. 
Following tables are included in this design: 
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[8] RT_REGISTRATION_TRACE 
Field Name Description 
RT_REG_ATTEMPT_ID Numeric unique ID 
UM_USER_ID Registered user ID linked to UM_USER_MASTER 
RT_USER_BEGIN Start time of registering username 
RT_USER_END End time of registering username 
RT_PATTERN_BEGIN Start time of registering pattern 
RT_PATTERN_END End time of registering pattern 
RT_IMAGE_BEGIN Start time of registering images 
RT_IMAGE_END End time of registering images 
RT_OTP_BEGIN Start time of registering OTP input format 
RT_OTP_END End time of registering OTP input format 
 
[9] ULL_USER_LOGIN_LOGS 
Field Name Description 
ULL_ID Numeric unique ID 
ULL_USERNAME The username used for login (either correct or wrong) 
ULL_AUTHEN_STATUS Authentication status (Success/Failure) 
ULL_TIME_ATTEMPT Date/time of the login attempt 
UM_USER_ID 
Numeric ID for correct/existing username linked to 
UM_USER_MASTER 
ULL_USER_BEGIN Start time of login username 
365 
ULL_USER_END End time of login username 
ULL_USER_SUCCESS Username success status (1 OK, 0 No) 
ULL_PATTERN_BEGIN Start time of login pattern 
ULL_PATTERN_END End time of login pattern 
ULL_PATTERN_SUCCESS Pattern success status (1 OK, 0 No) 
ULL_OTP_BEGIN Start time of login OTP input format 
ULL_OTP_END End time of login OTP input format 
ULL_OTP_SUCCESS OTP input format success status (1 OK, 0 No) 
 
[10] CM_EL_EXCEPTION_LOG 
Field Name Description 
CEL_ID Numeric unique ID 
CEL_TIMESTAMP Date/time of the event log 
CEL_TYPE Error message type that shows the title of error 
CEL_MESSAGE Error message text that shows .NET inner exception  
CEL_STACKTRACE 
Error details that shows complete stack of error from 
class/methods; that means error is thrown back from 
many methods 
 
 
Details of stored procedures are described as follows: 
 
S.
# 
Stored Procedure 
Name 
Parameters Purpose 
1 TRG_THEME_RAND
OM_GET 
@EXCLUDE_THEMEI
D_STR 
To get a random theme for 
image selection. This 
procedure is used in 
registration process for 
system theme selection.  
2 ImagesRandomByThe
meGet 
@ThemeID To fetch random images for 
system selected themes in 
registration process. 
3 UserMaskImageInsert @UserID 
@UserImageXml  
To insert random distractor-
images (mask) with each user 
selected pass-image as 
associated distractor-images.  
4 UserLoginTraceInsert @UM_USER_ID 
@RT_USER_BEGIN    
@RT_USER_END 
@RT_PATTERN_BEGI
N       
@RT_PATTERN_END 
@RT_IMAGE_BEGIN   
@RT_IMAGE_END 
@RT_OTP_BEGIN 
To insert the registration 
activity logs of the user into 
database. 
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S.
# 
Stored Procedure 
Name 
Parameters Purpose 
@RT_OTP_END 
5 UserLogsForLocking
Get 
@UserName 
@RecordCount 
@Interval  
To get the log of the user’s 
previous attempts. 
6 UserInsert @fullname 
@username 
@pattern 
@userid out 
To create new user in the 
registration stage, insert the 
details of the user 
information. 
7 UserImageInsert @UserID 
@ImageID  
@UserImageID out 
To insert the user selected 
images (pass-images). This 
procedure is part of 
registration. 
8 UserAxisOrderInsert @UserID 
@ImageShowOrder 
@Axis 
To insert the system selected 
axis order of images based on 
the user selected security 
level; basic or advanced. This 
process is part of registration. 
9 UserLoginLogsInsert @ULL_USERNAME  
@ULL_AUTHEN_STAT
US  
@UM_USER_ID 
@ULL_USER_BEGIN 
@ULL_USER_END  
@ULL_USER_SUCCES
S 
@ULL_PATTERN_BEG
IN 
@ULL_PATTERN_END  
@ULL_PATTERN_SUC
CESS 
@ULL_OTP_BEGIN 
@ULL_OTP_END 
@ULL_OTP_SUCCESS 
To record the activities of 
each login step and then 
insert the complete log of the 
login attempt into the 
database. 
10 UserInformationGet @UserName To fetch user information.  
11 UserImageGet @UserID To get the images of the 
registered users. This 
procedure is part of login 
process. 
12 MaskImageGet @UserImageID To get distractor-images 
associated with each pass-
image during login process. 
13 ImagesRandomByThe
meGetForLogin 
@ThemeID 
@UserID  
@top 
To get the pass-images of a 
registered user along with 
distractor-images and other 
random images. This 
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S.
# 
Stored Procedure 
Name 
Parameters Purpose 
procedure is used in login 
process. 
14 UserAxisOrderGet @UserID To get image axis order to 
place the generated random 
password. This procedure is 
part of login procedure. 
15 SetupDataGet @SetupId To get lookup data (e.g. 
number of failed attempts, 
lockout time, timeout). This 
procedure is generic 
procedure created for generic 
table of lookup. 
16 CM_EI_EXCEPTION
LOG_INSERT 
@CEL_TYPE  
@CEL_MESSAGE  
@CEL_STACKTRACE  
@CEL_ID OUTPUT   
To record and insert error 
/exception that occur when 
running the system. This 
procedure is called by system 
unnoticeably whenever the 
user experience irregular 
behaviour when using the 
system.  
  
Dependencies 
Table and column in 
[application] schema 
Schema the table/ 
column refers to 
Table 
TM_THEME_MASTER/ 
TM_THEME_ID 
TM_THEME_ID TI_THEME_IMAGES 
TI_THEME_IMAGES/ 
TI_IMAGES_ID 
TI_IMAGES_ID UI_USER_IMAGES 
UM_USER_MASTER/ 
UM_USER_ID 
UM_USER_ID 
UAO_USER_AXIS_ORDER 
UI_USER_IMAGE 
UI_USER_IMAGE/ UI 
_IMAGE_ID 
UI_PARENT_ 
IMAGE_ID 
UI_USER_IMAGE 
UI _IMAGE_ID UIO_USER_IMAGE_ORDE
R 
LKM_LOOKUP_MAST
ER/ LKM_ID 
LKM_PARENT_LKMID LKM_LOOKUP_MASTER 
LKM_ID LKD_LOOKUP_DETAIL 
LKD_LOOKUP_DETAI
L/ LKD_CODE 
LKD_LOOKUP_DETAI
L/ LKM_ID 
LKD_PARENT_LKDCO
DE 
LKD_PARENT_LKMID 
LKD_LOOKUP_DETAIL 
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3) GOTPass application components  
A. Application pages 
1) FrmHomePage.aspx 
 
1.1 Identification 
             Hierarchy:   OTGP_ PAGESWebpages 
             Namespace:  OTGP_PAGES.Webpages 
 
1.2  Definition 
The purpose of this page is to provide user choices either to register (create a 
new user) or to login into the system if he/she is a returning user. 
 
1.3  Methods and Events 
Page Events     
1.3.1 Page_Load: This event checks the user session which is sent to this 
webpage. If the session is expired the system shows the message to user 
that your session has been expired.   
1.3.2 IbRegister_Click: This event is related to the ‘Register’ image click. 
In this event, the system redirects the user to the registration step 
number 1. 
1.3.3 LbRegister_Click: This event is for the ‘Register’ link click. In this 
event, the system redirects the user to the registration step number 1. 
1.3.4 IbLogin_Click: This event is for the ‘Login’ image click. In this event, 
the system redirects the user to the login step number 1. 
1.3.5 LbLogin_Click: This event is for ‘Login’ link click. In this event, the 
system redirects the user to the login step number 1. 
 
2) FrmRegisterA.aspx 
 
2.1. Identification 
  Hierarchy:    System.Object   OTGP_ PAGES  
             Namespace:  OTGP_PAGES 
 
2.2 Definition 
This page starts the Registration Step 1. This webpage takes two inputs; the 
user full Name and username as inputs. In addition, user registers the graphical 
unlock pattern on this page. This username and unlock pattern will be used as 
part of the credentials for user to login into the system. 
 
2.3 Methods and Events  
Internal page method: 
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2.3.1 ChkUserName: This method checks the duplication of the entered 
username from database. It does not let the registration steps to 
continue and prompts the user with an error message stating that the 
chosen username is already registered.                                                                   
2.3.2 IbRegisterPattern_Click: This method first checks the username is 
not duplicated and Pattern lock is drawn then proceed to register the 
user. 
3) FrmRegisterC.aspx 
 
3.1 Identifications              
                Hierarchy:   System.Object  OTGP_PAGES     
     Namespace: OTGP_PAGES 
 
3.2 Definition 
This page is for step 2 of registration process. In this step system randomly selects 
4 themes for the user and each selected theme contains many images. Each user has 
to select 4 images to continue the registration process.  
3.3  Methods and Events: 
Internal page event: 
3.3.1 Page Load: In this page load event, the system checks the username 
and pattern is inserted by the user or not. In case the username or 
pattern was unfound, the system will redirect the user back to 
Registration step 1. 
This event calls two internal page methods GetSelectedRandomTheme 
and BindSelectedRandomThemeImages which are explained next. 
3.3.2 GetSelectedRandomTheme: This method takes the input of already 
selected theme ID in order to make the logic for not repeating the 
selected theme ID again. For the first time it takes the ID to 0. This 
method calls the database process to get the random themes to present 
them in the system. 
3.3.3 BindSelectedRandomThemeImages: This method sets the interface 
of the page as we get the images of the randomly selected theme. This 
method binds the images of the selected theme within the grid on the 
page to display the images to user. 
3.3.4 ImageButton_Click: This is the control event which is bounded with 
all the images on the page and it just records the image selection 
starting time and changes the background of selected image and popup 
a larger version of the selected image. The popup screen contains two 
buttons; one to confirm the image selection, and the second button to 
cancel it. 
370 
3.3.5 btnOk_Click: This control event is bounded with the popup decision 
button1 which states to add the selected image and continue with a new 
theme. In this event the logic is implemented to check whether the user 
has selected four images or less. If that selection is the fourth image, 
then the system redirects the user to the next Registration step. 
3.3.6 btnCancel_Click: This control event is bounded with the popup 
decision button2 which states to cancel the selected image and go back 
to the same theme grid to add a new image. 
4) FrmRegisterationD.aspx 
4.1 Identifications              
                Hierarchy:    System.Object  OTGP_PAGES     
     Namespace:   OTGP_PAGES 
 
4.2 Definition  
This page is the last step of Registration process. In this step the user will select the 
input format (the axis locations for the codes). This page contains two security 
levels. Initially, the system selects one of them for the user randomly, however, 
users can change the assigned security level as they wish. Inside each security level 
there are two options that determine the exact location of codes where the user 
needs to look for after identifying the pass-images. These options cannot be 
changed once they are selected by the system since the system, at the page load, 
will select one of the two options of each security level and link it with security 
level for that session. In this page, the system also displays all the selected images 
for the user. 
 
4.3 Methods and Events: 
Internal page event: 
4.3.1 Page Load: In this event, the user session is checked; if the session is 
expired the system displays the session expiration message. In this event, 
the system binds the user selected images to show the interface and also 
the system selects a random security level. 
4.3.2 rdoBasicSecurity_CheckedChanged: This is the control event which is 
bound with the Radio Button control on page to select the basic security 
level. User can change the security level as desired. 
4.3.3 rdoAdvanceSecurity_CheckedChanged: This is the control event 
which is bound with the Radio Button control on page to select the 
advanced security level. User can change the security level as desired. 
4.3.4 InsertUserRegistration: This method takes the user’s input data to the 
middle layer that communicates with the database to register the user into 
the system by saving the details into the database. In this method system 
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also note the time of every transaction taken by the user in details to 
complete the registration. 
 
5) FrmLoginA.aspx 
5.1  Identifications              
                Hierarchy:    System.Object  OTGP_PAGES     
     Namespace:   OTGP_PAGES 
 
5.2 Definition 
This page is for the login process. It shows empty table without images in the 
background and a popup screen where the user needs to enter the username and 
draw the unlock pattern. Based on the provided (entered) credentials, the system 
checks the data; if correct then returns a set of images including user’s pass-images, 
but if the user inputs the wrong credentials the system shows a set of random 
images. This page also locks out the user if the maximum number of allowed failed 
attempts are met which is also configurable through the database. 
 
5.3 Methods and Events: 
Internal page event: 
5.3.1 IbLoginPattern_Click: This method takes user credentials as input and 
on validation it shows the random images for user verification. 
5.3.2 ImagebtnLogin_Click: This is the control event which is bound with 
Button control on page to login into the system. This method first checks 
if the user is not blocked. If the user is blocked, then it returns the control 
and shows the random images but without performing the login. On the 
other hand, if the user is not blocked it performs the validation with the 
random codes which are generated by Random numbers and placed on the 
pre-determined axis based on the correct pass-images. If the user is 
validated, the system displays the success page and maintains the log of 
the failure and success attempts in the database. 
 
B. Application classes 
1) clsTheme Class 
 
1.1. Identification 
Hierarchy: System.Object   OTGP_OBJECTS.BLL.clsTheme 
Namespace:  OTGP_OBJECTS.BLL 
 
1.2. Definition 
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The purpose of this class is to provide properties and methods for Theme objects to 
implement business processes. Theme object also contains images to link Themes 
and Images. 
 
1.3. Properties 
Theme properties are as follows:- 
1.3.1. lstThemeImage 
Holds a collection of images in .NET list object i.e. registration image selected by 
user etc. 
1.3.2. ThemeImageID 
Holds a single image. 
1.3.3. MaskImageCount 
Configures number of distractor-images for each pass-image. 
1.3.4. RandomImageForLoginCount 
Configures the total number of images that the system will show to user in login 
page. Users will select their pass-images from among these images. 
 
1.4. Methods 
Theme objects use the following methods:- 
1.4.1. GetRandomTheme 
a. Parameters: 
strExcludeThemeID – This is the input parameter of string type to exclude the 
themes that the system should not fetch.  
Return – Method returns DataTable of themes.    
  
b. Method definition: 
This method is used in registration process to get random themes from the pool of 
lookup provided themes. Method have strExcludeThemeID parameter to exclude 
those themes that are already shown and user have selected image from it.  
strExcludeThemeID is comma separated string that keeps on including the theme 
that has been shown to user. 
 
1.4.2. GetRandomImageByTheme 
a. Parameters: 
Return – Method returns DataTable of images for a given Theme. 
 
b. Method Definition: 
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This method is used to retrieve random images of the provided Theme. The 
method receives ThemeID by class property. It is used in registration process to 
display images of a particular Theme. 
 
1.4.3. GetRandomImagesForLogin 
a. Parameters: 
intUserID – an input parameter of integer type. It carries registered user id. 
intTop – an input parameter of integer type used to show number of images in 
login. This number includes the pass-images and distractor-images.  
Return – Method returns DataTable of images. 
 
b. Method Definition: 
This method is used in the user login process. The method fetches random images 
from random themes to display against GOTPass codes. The method does not 
fetch real pass-images and its corresponding distractor-images. 
 
1.4.4. GetUserImages 
a. Parameters: 
intUserID – an input parameter of integer type. It carries registered user id. 
Return – Method returns DataTable of user pre-chosen pass-images.  
 
b. Method Definition: 
This method fetches user pass-images that user has selected during registration.  
 
1.4.5. GetMaskImages 
a. Parameters: 
intUserImageID – holds the value of the user image that has been selected in 
registration. 
Return – Method returns DataTable of distractor-images against particular user 
pass-image. 
 
b. Method Definition: 
This method retrieves distractor-images for a given user pass-images. 
 
2) clsThemeT Class 
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2.1. Identification 
Hierarchy: System.Object   OTGP_OBJECTS.BLL.clsThemeT 
Namespace:  OTGP_OBJECTS.BLL 
 
2.2. Definition 
The purpose of this class is to provide properties and methods for Theme objects to 
access database objects. This class is associated with clsTheme class as it provides 
all type of data access interfaces to clsTheme. clsTheme purely implements 
business processes of GOTPass system without having any database interface. 
However, clsThemeT exposes database interfaces for clsTheme to save and retrieve 
information. This class implements transaction and other common methods that are 
required for database operations. 
 
3) clsUser Class 
 
3.1. Identification 
Hierarchy: System.Object   OTGP_OBJECTS.BLL.clsUser 
Namespace:  OTGP_OBJECTS.BLL 
 
3.2. Definition 
The purpose of this class is to provide properties and methods for User objects to 
implement business processes of GOTPass.  
3.3. Properties 
User class properties are as follows: 
3.3.1. UserID 
An integer datatype to hold the UserId of a registered user. 
3.3.2. FullName 
Holds the full name of a registered user. This property saves values of string type. 
3.3.3. UserName 
Holds the UserName for a registered user. The property uses string datatype.  
3.3.4. Pattern 
Holds the value of the unlock pattern which is a set of integer numbers, selected by 
the user during registration. 
3.3.5. UserImageOrderCode 
Contains the order value of user pass-images. This carries string value. 
3.3.6. objTheme 
Carries complete Theme object. User class have a relation with Theme object. 
3.3.7. UserImageID 
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Contains registered user image id. It can also hold values of user selected image id 
before the creation of user account. 
3.3.8. UserImageAxis 
Holds registered user image axis. This property can also contain axis values in 
registration process before the creation of account. 
3.3.9. lstUser 
Carries a list of users in .NET list objects. 
3.3.10. AuthenticationStatus 
Holds authentication status of user attempt whether the login is correct or not. 
3.3.11. UserLoginAttempts 
Holds maximum value for user login attempts. Whenever this limit is reached in 
login screen, system will lock the account. This carries integer data types. 
3.3.12. UserLoginInterval 
This integer property carries the time duration in which the user is locked out when 
s/he failed to login for a particular number of times. 
3.3.13. UserNameBeginTime 
This property is used to log registration/login start time for typing in username and 
full name. It contains hours, minutes and second in string format. 
3.3.14. UserNameEndTime 
This property is used to log registration/login end time for typing in username and 
full name. It contains hours, minutes and second in string format. 
3.3.15. UserPatternBeginTime 
This property is used to log registration/login pattern drawing start time. It contains 
hours, minutes and second in string format. 
3.3.16. UserPatternEndTime 
This property is used to log registration/login pattern drawing end time. It contains 
hours, minutes and second in string format. 
3.3.17. UserImageBeginTime 
This property is used to log registration/login start time to select pass-images. It 
contains hours, minutes and second in string format. 
3.3.18. UserImageEndTime 
This property is used to log registration/login start time to select pass-images. It 
contains hours, minutes and second in string format. 
3.3.19. UserOTGPBeginTime 
This property is used to log registration/login start time to input GOTPass code. It 
contains hours, minutes and second in string format. 
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3.3.20. UserOTGPEndTime 
This property is used to log registration/login start time to input GOTPass code. It 
contains hours, minutes and second in string format. 
3.3.21. IsUserCredentialsValid 
It is a Boolean property to validate the user credentials whether correct or not. 
3.3.22. IsUserCredentialsPatternValid 
It is a Boolean property to validate the unlock pattern credential whether correct or 
not. 
3.3.23. IsUserNameValid 
It is a Boolean property to validate the username whether correct or not. 
3.3.24. IsUserPatternValid 
It is a Boolean property to validate the unlock pattern whether correct or not. 
3.3.25. IsUserOTPValid 
It is a Boolean property to validate GOTPass code whether correct or not. 
 
3.4. Methods 
User objects have following methods:- 
3.4.1. InsertUser 
This method creates a new user in the database by inserting username, fullname 
and unlock pattern details. 
3.4.2. InsertUserImage 
This method inserts the user selected pass-images during registration process. 
3.4.3. InsertMaskImage 
This method is triggered after inserting user pass-images. This method saves 
distractor-images for each pass-image. The system saves 3 distractor-images with 
each password-image. 
3.4.4. InsertImageOrder 
This method inserts the required order of the selected pass-images.  
3.4.5. GetUserInformation 
The method is used to get the information of a registered user. 
3.4.6. InsertUserLoginLogs 
This method is called for tracing. It saves information of user login attempt. 
3.4.7. InsertUserAxisOrder 
This method is used to save the GOTPass axis order to generate OTP password 
during login. 
3.4.8. GetUserLogInformation 
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This method is used to retrieve and verify user credentials. It is used in login 
process. 
3.4.9. RegisterUser 
This is the main method to register a user into the system. There are multiple 
methods that are called by this method. 
3.4.10. GetImagesForLogin 
This method retrieves pass-images from the database. The method is used in login 
process to present pass-images to the user and generate OTP password. 
3.4.11. GetUserImageInsertPosition 
This is a middle method to implement logic of inserting pass-images mixed with 
decoy-images.  
3.4.12. GetMaskImageInsertPosition 
This method inserts distractor-images into the grid with other pass-images and 
decoy-images. 
3.4.13. CreateImageTableForLogin 
This method is the main method to create table/grid of images for user login. This 
table/grid contains pass-images, decoy-images and distractor-images. 
3.4.14. GetUserRegisteredImageOrder 
This method is used for generating a random code in the right order based on pass-
images and the pre-determined input format. 
3.4.15. LoginUserHandler 
This is top middle method to handle full login process. There are hierarchy of 
methods called from this method to implement logic of login processes. 
3.4.16. ReplaceRandomNumberInDatTable 
This method assigns 4-digits random number to the images (pass-images, decoy-
images and distractor-images) on x-axis and y-axis. 
3.4.17. GenerateUserRegisteredImageOrderCode 
This method generates string of password by getting 4-digits random code along 
with user selected x-axis and y-axis information of the selected pass-image. 
3.4.18. GenerateOTGP 
This is the main method that handles the random code generation process. 
3.4.19. CheckUserCredentials 
This method validates the unlock pattern of user during login process. 
3.4.20. InsertUserTrace 
This method inserts trace information of the user who is registering into the system. 
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4) clsUserT Class 
 
4.1. Identification 
Hierarchy: System.Object   OTGP_OBJECTS.BLL.clsUserT 
Namespace:  OTGP_OBJECTS.BLL 
 
4.2. Definition 
This class is associated with clsUser class as it provides all type of data access 
interfaces to clsUser. clsUser purely implements business processes of GOTPass 
system without having any database interface. However, clsUserT exposes 
database interfaces for clsUser to save and retrieve information. This class 
implements transaction and other common methods that are required for database 
operations. The methods in this class do database communication and work as a 
middle layer of business and database access layers. 
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